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Glossary of Terms
Authority where the rules of the agency trump all other rules of agencies with similar/equivalent mandates.
Compact an agreement where both the general public interest and the particular parochial interests are reconciled  
  and reflected in a common set of goals.  Compacts have two dimensions: agreements between public   
  authorities at different levels, federal, state and territory through to local; and agreements between public,  
  private sector and community organisations. A compact is a platform of mutual accountability to general  
  provisional goals and common principles in which the intent/spirit is clear.
Decentralisation   
  is an act by which higher levels of government formally cede powers and authority (to plan, raise or   
  allocate resources, or manage public functions) to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political,   
  administrative and territorial hierarchy.
Effectiveness  
  is achieved by institutions when they are popularly regarded as adequately accomplishing their purpose  
  and producing the intended result.
Governance of Government  
  the way governments go about making decisions; the way government engages with – and governs – its  
  citizens and institutions. The use of the term ‘governance’ in this report refers to public sector governance  
  unless otherwise indicated. 
Legitimacy is acquired by institutions when there is a broad based perception that arrangements and outcomes are   
  proper, effective and just. Process legitimacy refers to the way in which decisions are made. Performance  
  legitimacy refers to the products or outcomes of the process.
Management Advisory Committee  
  is a forum of Secretaries and Agency Heads established under the Public Service Act 1999 to advise the   
  Australian Government on matters relating to the management of the Australian Public Service (APS).
New Public Management  
  as introduced to the public sector since the 1980’s on the assumption that ‘market oriented’ policies and  
  practises would lead to greater cost efficiency, competitive performance and leadership.
Place-based the term used in this report to refer to activity in a geographic place or “community.” The term has been  
  used in the context of new “localism” policies and with other regional or territorial activity.
Place-centred 
  the term used in this report to refer to a point on a scale of governance that may transcend a number of   
  geographic places. As such is a complex layered or tiered concept which should not be confused with or  
  seen equivalent to place-based approaches. 
Remote Australia   
  for the purpose of this report remote Australia is that part of the landmass that is at distance from centres  
  of economic and political decision making. The figure on the following page describes the remote and very  
  remote regions of Australia that form the basis of this report as our remoteFOCUS.  
Subsidiarity refers to the principle that decisions should be made at the level of governance most capable and most   
  likely to bear the political consequences of the decision.
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Remote Australia
Remote Australia is depicted on this map in the two 
shades of blue.
Very Remote
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Outer Regional
Inner Regional
Major Cities
Data Source: This map is based on the Accessibility 
Remoteness Index Australia 2006 map produced by GISCA 
and The University of Adelaide with information from 
the Australian Government, Geoscience Australia and the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Perth
Kalgoorlie
Adelaide
Melbourne
Esperance
Albany
Bunbury
Geraldton
Carnarvon
Port Hedland
Broome
Balgo
Kununurra
Katherine
Alice Springs
Darwin
Warburton
Coober Pedy
Ceduna
Woomera
Port Augusta
Port Lincoln
Mount Isa
Broken Hill
Mount 
Gambier
Nhulunbuy
Bamaga
Karumba
Coen
Thargomindah
Echuca
Horsham
Strahan
Launceston
Karratha
Newman
Tom Price
Onslow
Tennant Creek
Yulara
7 remoteFOCUS | Fixing the Hole in Australia’s Heartland 7 
Acknowledgements
This report sets out the challenges of 
governance in remote Australia, advances a 
series of propositions and defining features 
of remote Australia and identifies ways to 
improve governance.
We examine changes in Australian public sector governance 
and the implications of those changes for remote Australia. In 
particular, we identify six aspects of dysfunctional governance 
evident in remote Australia.
In framing solutions we look to Australia’s recent responses to 
governance dysfunction and identify responses adopted by other 
OECD countries as well as those in fragile and conflict affected 
settings in non-OECD locations.
We establish principles for effective long-term governance in 
remote Australia and capture them in a practical framework for 
governance reform incorporating conditions necessary to achieve 
and sustain this outcome.
The framework is applied to demonstrate the possibilities for 
application in the Pilbara and Central Australia.
The report is supported by a set of papers documenting, in detail, 
the conversation across remote Australia, the commissioned 
research undertaken to inform the report and more details of the 
context of the two worked examples. These papers by Professor 
Ian Marsh and Dr Mary Edmunds can be accessed at  
www.desertknowledge.com.au/remotefocus.
This report lays the foundation for taking forward the debate and 
negotiation to achieve significant governance reform for the benefit 
of remote Australians.
It is a product of many people’s reflections and engagement 
with the issues confronting remote Australia. We acknowledge 
the contributions and hospitality of people from the north of 
Western Australia through central and northern Australia to 
central Queensland. The Australian Government and the Pilbara 
Development Commission through the Royalties for Regions 
program have supported this project. The West Australian Local 
Government Association, MacDonnell Shire Council and BHP 
Billiton have also contributed to different phases of the fieldwork.
Members of the remoteFOCUS reference group have steered the 
project and provided advice based on their considerable experience 
of remote Australia and public management.
Bruce Walker 
remoteFOCUS Project Director
A
C
K
N
O
W
LE
D
G
E
M
E
N
T
S
Melbourne
Brisbane
Sydney
Mount Isa
Broken Hill
Bamaga
Karumba
Coen
Cairns
Townsville
Mackay
Longreach
Emerald
Thargomindah
Roma
Bundaberg
Hervey Bay
Gold Coast
Port Macquarie
Newcastle
Bairnsdale
Bega
Canberra
Yarram
Narrabri
Dubbo
Griffith
Echuca
Horsham
Hobart
Strahan
Launceston
8E
x
E
C
U
T
IV
E
 SU
M
M
A
R
Y
Executive Summary
Australia has changed significantly, and continues to change, in 
fundamental ways. 
85%
of the coast.
of our population now lives within  
 50km
20121980’s 1990’s 2000’s
Over the past 30 years, it has become the most urbanised continent in the world.  
Australia’s view of itself has shrunk to its coastal fringe. More than 85% of our population 
lives within 50km of the coastline and our system of democracy and national economy  
has progressively been altered to serve the coastal areas and the large mass of people in 
urban Australia. 
In numerous ways, this has been at the expense of how remote Australia and its people and 
communities are governed, leading to what is nothing less than a crisis in governance, and 
an urgent need for systemic change.  
Remote Australia is that part of the Australian landmass (approximately 85 per cent) distant 
from centres of economic and political decision-making. And yet it makes a significant 
contribution to national wealth with 60 per cent of the nation’s mining platform operating 
in remote Australia. In effect, with the exception of the cities of Melbourne, Adelaide, Perth 
and their immediate hinterlands, remote Australia is what is left of the nation once you go 
beyond the plains west of the great divide.
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Many Australians view remote Australia in terms of 
extremes: variously as a last frontier, a vast unsettled and 
isolated terrain, a place of Aboriginal crisis, or the “heart” 
of the nation (often including a romanticised notion of 
the “rugged outback” life). It is also seen as an economic 
wasteland, a place of market failure and extreme poverty 
(even a “failed state”), somewhere to drive when you retire, 
or more recently a quarry for the mining boom driving the 
nation’s economic performance. To some it is a legitimate 
part of the Australian narrative only because of the heritage 
status of the pastoral industry and the major resource 
development projects scattered throughout it. 
It is worth noting here the fundamental discord between 
these opinions and the thinking of many Aboriginal 
Australians, who see remote Australia as Country, a place 
that nourishes and provides meaning and identity: their 
spiritual and physical home. One set of views is centred on a 
desire to dominate and tame the space, while the other lives 
in and adapts within it. This discord is part of the complex 
contest that needs to be addressed and resolved.
How do the residents of remote Australia, a population 
larger than that of the ACT or of Tasmania spread over 
85 per cent of the continent, see themselves and their 
situation?  Largely, and fairly, as ill served by government. 
an
d 
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e One set of views is cen
tred on
 a de-
sire to dominate
while the 
other lives  
in and adapts 
within it.
The deep sense of disconnect and discontent recorded in our extensive consultations 
across remote Australia is captured in the five things people have constantly told us 
they want but don’t get: 
1.
2.
3.
A say in decisions which 
affect them. 
Equitable and sustainable 
financial flows. 
Better services and a locally 
responsive public service. 
4. 
5.
Local control and    
accountability where possible. 
Inclusion in a greater 
Australian narrative. 
Accordingly, structural response 
to these concerns is required for 
successful governance.
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The governance of remote Australia should 
not be cast as an ‘Aboriginal issue’ — it is 
about ineffective government arrangements, 
disengagement and national indifference. 
These problems are too often perceived only in the context of the dysfunction of remote 
Aboriginal settlements and seen therefore as purely ‘Aboriginal’ issues rather than issues 
of government capability. That is a mistake. Many non-Aboriginal Australians face similar 
issues as a result of their remote location. 
In remote Australia, either as a result of New Public Sector Management reforms or 
coincidental with their implementation in the face of global economic activity, the 
landscape of governance can be characterised through six ‘governance dysfunctions’. 
In this remoteFOCUS report we advance five propositions, responding 
to two fundamental questions: 
1. Remote Australia’s diverse regions are confronted by 
common issues: issues globally familiar and presenting 
complex local challenges. They are common to regions 
where people reside remotely from centres of economic 
and political power but are facing rapid social and  
economic change. 
2. While it is important to recognise the limited influence 
that public policy can have on some aspects of these issues, 
present governance arrangements which have developed 
incrementally over 20 years or more are not well attuned  
to the current circumstances and emerging trends in  
remote Australia. 
3. In the absence of a nationally accepted narrative that 
embraces micro-economic reform and establishes the 
national interest in remote Australia and a settlement 
pattern that supports that national interest, little is going  
to change, as initiatives will tend to be spasmodic rather 
than systemic. Solutions will at best be “band-aid”, rather 
than sustainable. 
  
4. There are many potential ways of remedying these 
structural governance problems, but the more promising 
prospects involve greater degrees - and varying patterns - 
of community engagement and decentralised governance. 
While this will inevitably take time, it is imperative 
that a start – a substantive start - be made. The general 
framework within which particular designs can be 
developed requires wide ranging regional engagement 
to resolve the specific application of these principles in 
particular locations. Application and details of the approach 
will differ from place to place and from time to time.  
Acceptance that there is no one size fits all solution is an 
important starting point.
5. While there is spasmodic attention on remote 
Australia (particularly on “crises” such as Aboriginal 
disadvantage, or as the social and personal fall-out of 
“fly-in-fly-out” workplace practices), normal politics and 
public administration are unlikely to achieve the structural 
reforms needed to address these issues, and others. 
Special purpose initiatives will be required and these will 
need cross-party political commitment and support from 
business, professional and community organisations. 
What is going wrong in  
remote Australia? How can it be fixed?
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determine 
accountabilities
Governance arrangements are a threshold cause of  ●
policy failure, and
Policy for remote Australia needs to be separately  ●
conceived and framed, and “custom-built” to meet its 
specific circumstances and needs. 
The challenge in designing new approaches to  ●
governing and administering remote Australia is that a 
paradigm shift in policy is required - one that addresses 
and changes structurally embedded habits, practices, 
and approaches - and this cannot come from within the 
present governance framework.
 
The key outcome of the developing of 
new governance principles should be the 
creation of locally appropriate institutions 
that have sufficient authority, legitimacy and 
effectiveness to fulfil their functions. The 
current three-tiered system of government 
fails to do this adequately in remote Australia. 
In large parts of remote Australia Aboriginal 
organisations including Land Councils and 
Native Title Bodies provide effectively a  
fourth tier of governance adding to the 
complexity of arrangements.
 
The nature and pace of economic, social and technological 
change in remote Australia and the deep and consistent 
concerns expressed in our consultations with the people of 
remote Australia - and acknowledged in many government 
reports - necessitates creation of governance responses that 
meet the following requirements: 
A structure or institution with the authority and  ●
legitimacy to create and sustain a vision for a region  
is needed. 
We conclude that:
For solutions to dysfunctional governance problems   ●
in remote Australia to be lasting, they should 
incorporate ‘negotiated compacts’ which adequately 
mandate institutions to mediate contests and reach 
durable agreements. 
Solutions are also likely to invoke place centred  ●
responses and regional innovations. 
‘Resourcing must follow function’. This principle is less  ●
contentious, but is typically acknowledged only in the 
breach in Australian public policy. 
In this report, it is proposed that with intense regional 
engagement, a governance reform process of six  
primary steps should be established. The steps can be 
summarised by the following terms: establish context; 
define design parameters; describe principles, scope and 
mandate; determine functions; design form; and  
determine accountabilities.
This report provides examples of how this approach to 
governance reform could be executed in the Pilbara and 
Central Australia. These examples illustrate both the 
general framework within which particular designs can be 
developed and the specific application of these principles in 
particular locations.
establish context
define design parameters
describe principles, scope & mandate
determine functions
design form
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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Reforming public sector governance in remote Australia 
demands leadership at the top level of governments and a 
willingness to support real change for the good of remote 
Australians and the nation as a whole. See Section 5.4 of 
this report.
Initiatives such as Royalties for Regions and Pilbara 
Cities in Western Australia (politically-led, necessarily) 
are examples of serious attempts to find new approaches 
and reflect some elements of the principles to meet glaring 
needs. However, more comprehensive and preferably cross-
partisan approaches are required – approaches that are 
embedded in regional engagement and are less affected by 
the political cycle.
Royalties for Regions is a unilateral (that is, State) 
policy which addresses the traditional failure to provide 
financial resources to regions sufficient to meet their 
legitimate needs and aspirations. The next step is to ensure 
all governments and the different Pilbara communities 
are on the same page – declaring Loyalty to Regions - and 
this cannot be done unilaterally.  A particular necessity is 
the incorporation of Aboriginal interests into this process 
through their established representative structures.
In Central Australia there is a clear need for a unifying 
vision going beyond service provision and law-and-order 
and reliance on the boom-and-bust cycles of commodities, 
and focused on development of capacity and economic 
livelihoods, regional connectivity and innovation.  With 
three levels of government, representative community 
organisations and a web of representative Aboriginal 
organisations the task is similar to that in the Pilbara - but 
in different circumstances, as detailed in the report.
What is required is an intense regional engagement around 
issues, needs, objectives, responsibilities and capabilities, 
and structures to develop new governance arrangements 
that meet the criteria outlined above. Such engagement 
across all sectors has to be mandated by political leadership 
in those sectors. 
The application of the principles and framework outlined in 
this report is demonstrated through provisional examples 
to develop possible options for governance reform in the 
Pilbara and a context for regional engagement in Central 
Australia. These examples will be enhanced through 
further and wider public engagement to refine and alter the 
analysis. However, as now written they demonstrate in a 
preliminary way how the principles and process outlined in 
the report might be applied if concerned stakeholders chose 
to mandate serious reform.
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Policy development and administration for remote Australia 
is largely determined within State and Territory borders. 
As a result there is a fragmented approach. Major decisions 
affecting remote Australia are almost entirely made in 
capital and regional centres on the coast or in Canberra, with 
little understanding of its key drivers and its unique setting. 
Instead, strategic and context-specific action is required to 
achieve positive outcomes. 
Reform of this nature and scope will not be easy, nor will 
it be uniform. In some situations existing legislation and 
organisational resources will have to be used to initiate 
serious reform. 
One approach would be for high level political support 
to establish a small number of trials, or ‘innovation’ 
regions or zones, where the principles and approach 
outlined in the report are applied, with the specific 
aim of developing an on-going process of learning, 
consensus and regional capacity building - a starting 
point with a defined scale and scope. This will help 
build momentum for change and provide “proof by good 
example” of the efficacy of such change. 
Another option would be for the Productivity 
Commission to investigate the capacity for such a 
governance reform to act as a micro-economic stimulant 
for remote Australia. 
And ultimately there is a critical need for an on-going 
institution such as an Outback Commission that has the 
mandate and authority to focus on remote Australia and 
its regions, change the dynamic of under-development 
that afflicts the regions, and sustain a momentum for 
change and regional coordination that is specific to 
remote Australia.
For some, the ‘failed state’ declaration for remote Australia 
in the remoteFOCUS prospectus (2008) may have seemed 
“over the top”. But denial of the damage being done 
through the continuing failure of governance (despite good 
intentions) helps perpetuate an institutional and national 
indifference which creates despair and loss of hope for those 
impacted by that failure of governance.
And to choose indifference over reform is to become a 
bystander: to succumb to the fears and prejudices of a 
13 remoteFOCUS | Fixing the Hole in Australia’s Heartland 13 
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maintain their relevance. This type of neglectful inequality 
is corrosive for the nation and rots Australia from within.
Furthermore, the economic cost (a common “mainstream” 
criterion) of deferring action, or refusing to reform is 
nationally significant. Investment now with a view to 
avoiding vastly higher costs both in terms of addressing 
disadvantage and relocation is prudent and in the national 
interest. There are aspects of our national interest and 
identity that we lose by making the wrong decisions over 
and over again or by neglecting to make a decision at all.
Is the current governance of remote Australia good, or even 
adequate? We think not. Is it fair and just?  We think not.
Can Australia properly be a 
nation while there is this hole 
in our heartland? We think not.
largely ignorant (of the problems in remote Australia) 
majority and relieve oneself of the burden of leadership  
and initiative. To not respond to evidence of persistent 
systemic failure is to effectively dispute that evidence, or to 
imply that a response would be of little or no consequence. 
Even worse, it is to suggest that the people of remote 
Australia are not as important as people living in the 
populated cities along the coastal fringe.
It is not a case of whether or not we know what to do, but 
rather of having the collective will to do it. The market will 
not define the national interest in remote Australia and its 
peoples. Only political and civic leadership will drive the 
necessary reforms.
It is easy politics to hide behind concepts of representational 
democracy and market economics and waive the needs of 
remote Australia in favour of the weight of public opinion 
and numbers in the serviced suburbs. For it is here that 
the majority of political leaders derive their authority and 
The hole of Australia
The whole of Australia
The Australian Archipelago: 
90% of Australians experience 
this as Australia every day.
Our Nation, unified with 
its heartland.
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remoteFOCUS 
remoteFOCUS is a group of concerned Australians with 
extensive experience in dealing with regional and remote 
Australia. remoteFOCUS has embarked on a major engagement 
and discussion process to develop practical sustainable  
cost-effective options to greatly improve governance, policy 
and infrastructure and service delivery in remote Australia.
We have been informed by our own and others’ close community engagement and 
consultations; analysis of national and international thinking and experience; and 
commissioned research of Aboriginal governance in the Pilbara and of initiatives directed at 
addressing governance dysfunctions identified across regions where people reside remote 
from centres of economic decision making and political power but are facing rapid social and 
economic change. As a networked and shared endeavour guided by serious analysis, we aim 
to stimulate beneficial systemic change for all people in remote Australia. 
Remote Australia is distant from services and in many places distant from the decision 
making points of global economic activity: a region that everywhere is on the periphery of 
the political dynamic that drives Australian democracy.
And yet it also encompasses places, events and stories that have given national and 
international significance to Australia. It contains some of the iconic symbols of the nation 
spread across 85% of the landmass, with “only” 5% of the population.
Through the remoteFOCUS project we have accumulated evidence of the way governments 
govern this heartland of the Australian landmass. We seek to offer alternatives that aim to 
address some of the systemic drivers which contribute to the difficulties of governing the 
vast, valuable and sparsely populated backyard of the nation.
Our report is principally concerned with the way government is structured to make 
decisions and carry them out. Our intent is to fix the hole in Australia’s heartland.
This report should not be news to government since we have also drawn evidence from 
governments’ own reports, reviews, policy statements and political promises. It certainly is 
not news to the people of remote Australia.
remoteFOCUS | Fixing the Hole in Australia’s Heartland 15 
It is therefore with a deep sense of 
obligation that we present this report, 
to open an active national discussion 
around the benefits of strategic 
structural reform across remote 
Australia in the national interest - as a 
key element of micro economic reform 
that is needed not just for the benefit 
of the 5% of Australians occupying 
85% of the land mass, but for all 
Australians. 
The ‘desert knowledge’ movement 
began 15 years ago when people living 
and working in desert Australia, at the 
heart of remote Australia, developed a 
vision for a revitalized and expanded 
knowledge sector in the desert 
economy. At the core of this movement 
today is Desert Knowledge Australia 
(DKA), a statutory authority of the 
Northern Territory Government. It has 
a national and international mandate 
to help bring about change to sustain 
and enhance the lives and livelihoods 
of all desert peoples.
Through this strong and recognisable 
presence Desert Knowledge Australia 
connects people across desert and 
remote Australia to each other as they 
use and create knowledge derived from 
a ‘whole-of-desert’ system approach. 
In 2007 I led a state-wide community consultation in 
Western Australia about the idea of a Human Rights Bill. 
We visited the regions, Kimberley, Pilbara, Mid West, 
South West, Goldfields and held public meetings. What we 
found was more of a demand for economic and social rights 
than civil and political rights. People felt short changed 
and attitudes to government (not political parties but 
government generally) were uniformly in terms of ‘”them” 
not understanding “us”. “They don’t speak our language” was 
a common expression. Disillusion and even at times despair 
were evident. Meetings in the remote towns often were 
tearful accounts of shameful failures by governments and 
their agencies severely impacting on lives and well being. 
I had been familiar with the complaints from Aboriginal 
communities and organisations over a long period about 
government inconsistency, irregularity of funding, ever 
changing personnel and the failure to listen.  But these 
complaints were not just the complaints of Aboriginal 
people (and who listens to them?) but the complaints of 
those town folk, black, white or brindle, remote from the 
metropolitan decision makers and administrators. 
As we involved in the remoteFOCUS project have talked 
with people in meetings in remote regions about how 
government works the same complaints recur. They seem 
well based. Whenever I meet people in remote regions 
in any context I hear them asking for a say in decisions 
affecting them, asking for accountability to them (not just to 
distant authorities), asking for fair funding and less stop-go 
funding. They ask to be treated as though they are a part, 
an important part, of Australia rather than some forgotten 
place getting attention from a distant capital when there is a 
crisis or a mine to be developed.
I have also been a sometime participant and long time 
observer of honest attempts by governments to do better.  
The uniformity of failure to match results with good 
intentions makes it clear to me that failure is not a matter of 
partisan politics, of lack of good intentions, of just getting 
policy settings wrong, or of having the wrong people.  
There is a system failure here; the present instruments of 
government are not fit for use in remote Australia.
Fred Chaney AO
New approaches, new thinking and new commitment 
are urgently needed in regard to remote Australia. 
With so much of our country’s wealth generated 
there, so much national and international attention 
on the dysfunctions experienced by some of our 
most vulnerable citizens, and so much at stake, more 
of the same - or working harder on and inherently 
perpetuating the old ‘solutions’ - is not an option. 
1. Voices of Remote Australia
A Personal Reflection in the Need for this Dialogue
1.
 V
O
IC
E
S 
O
F 
 
R
E
M
O
T
E
 A
U
ST
R
A
LI
A
16 
On April 1 and 2 2008, Desert Knowledge Australia, with 
financial assistance from BHP Billiton, RioTinto and the 
WA Local Government Association (WALGA), convened a 
group of 28 people1 at the Hale School in Perth to consider 
the crisis facing remote Australia and the apparent failure 
of Australian governments to adequately govern and 
engage with the country’s vast remote regions. The group 
of government, industry and community members had 
extensive experience in dealing with remote Australia, and 
produced a prospectus aimed at highlighting the urgent need 
for reconsideration of how governments engage, administer 
and govern remote Australia.
To quote from the remoteFOCUS prospectus:
The situation in remote Australia has reached crisis 
point, with clear evidence that there is a ‘failed state’ at 
the heart of our nation and, if not addressed, there will 
be dire economic, social, cultural, environmental and 
security consequences for Australia as a whole. Many of 
these dire predictions are now apparent.
This is not an ‘Indigenous issue’—it is an issue 
of ineffective government arrangements and 
disengagement. These problems are too often 
perceived only in the context of the dysfunction of 
remote Indigenous settlements and seen therefore 
as purely ‘Indigenous’ issues rather than issues of 
government capability. That is a mistake.2 
The forum participants concluded that the ongoing 
economic, social and environmental issues which bedevil 
remote Australia would not be resolved by merely applying 
the tools available under existing institutional and 
governance frameworks. Notwithstanding good intentions, 
current government policies, funding mechanisms and 
programs were deemed inadequate or demonstrably failing.
The prospectus framed and informed a public consultation 
process about remote Australia—how it should be governed 
and how the remote regions could be included in a modern 
integrated Australia.
Key messages from these conversations inform this report, 
as it derives its authority from the messages given by people 
at the ‘spinifex roots’ of remote Australia.
Through the Desert Knowledge Australia Inter-regional 
Virtual Meeting Place Network, sites in New South 
Wales, Northern Territory, South Australia, Queensland 
and Western Australia were linked to discuss the 
prospectus. There was consistent and strong support of 
the key challenges raised in the prospectus, particularly 
the experience of being at the tail-end of “government 
governance”. For example, participants spoke passionately 
of the removal of the regional partnerships program without 
having a strategy to respond to the pending applications. 
In the Kimberley there is no infrastructure so 
people don’t want to stay and can’t stay. Because the 
population is low, the government won’t invest in 
infrastructure so the workers continue in the FIFO  
(fly-in-fly-out) model. If there is no infrastructure, 
mining on its own won’t support people to live there. 
FIFO results in no government investment.
Every time there is a change in government they 
want to make changes, but why are we expected to 
put our lives on hold whilst the new government gets 
organised. No one else has the right to step into a job 
and put everything on hold until they’ve learned  
the job.
Participants shared a perception that remote Australians 
don’t have a voice—“the Government only thinks of us 
when there is a crisis”: Regions get attention or reaction 
from government because of media pressure not for  
strategic reasons.
Remote Australia is faced with the ‘tyranny of democracy’.
We don’t want to portray remote Australia as a ‘basket 
case’ but the magnitude of the issues to be addressed 
requires a proactive and positive engagement with 
governments. 
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People were very alert to a range of issues including cost-
shifting from Commonwealth and state governments to 
local government; a housing crisis in many remote regions; 
and government staff in remote regions not having the 
resources and power to actually do things.
Regions need government support to build economic 
resilience not just band-aid social issues.
Across the network was a compelling sense that remote 
Australia is part of the solution, not a set of intractable 
problems. Solutions need to be pursued and emanate from 
remote Australia.
In partnership with the Yothu Yindi Foundation, Desert 
Knowledge Australia held remoteFOCUS workshops at the 
Garma Festival in 2008 and 2009.
The workshops attracted more than 100 committed and 
energised Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal participants 
involved in research, service delivery and/or who were 
residents of towns and communities in remote Australia. 
They identified major issues requiring institutional and 
social transformation in remote regions of Australia 
including recurrent themes around:
Using local knowledge  ●
How to derive authority and responsibility for local  ●
solutions 
The use of partnerships and adoption of programs that  ●
work across government agencies, and 
Recognising diversity in culture, leadership and  ●
development among communities and building specific 
programs appropriate to those conditions.
The workshops suggested the need to research and address:
How to reflect local governance in legal structures  ●
and the barriers and support mechanisms that 
maintain the existing mentality in federal, state and 
local government, including the “anthropology” of 
bureaucracies and how they respond to  
remote Australia
How to take data and experience gained from pilot  ●
projects and engineer wider implementation within a 
framework of citizenship rights and the many systems 
of Aboriginal governance
How to foster decision-making processes with  ●
emphasis on building the participation of youth
These consultations are documented in chapter 3 of  
the remoteFOCUS compendium: The Challenge, 
Conversation, Commissioned Papers and Regional Studies  
of Remote Australia.
The remoteFOCUS workshops at the Garma Festival in 2008.
1.
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1.2 Concerns
A Desert Knowledge Australia remoteFOCUS workshop in November 2010 gathered a 
large and diverse group of community people and public servants from remote Australia 
to frame and refine eight key concerns that would have to be addressed in order to judge 
success of public sector governance reforms across remote Australia. 
Key Concern 1: Local Planning, Budget Development and Control
In remote Australia, people and institutions are often 
disempowered by what they see as institutional 
indifference. People feel they are located at the end of 
a long process or supply chain for services provided by 
government. Services delivered often do not meet local 
needs or reflect local circumstances. Inevitably responses to 
needs are ‘siloed’ leading to a lack of coordination between 
services. Critically, these arrangements work against people 
taking responsibility for themselves.
Key Concern 2: Focused, Flexible and Sustainable Funding for 
Remote Australia
At present funding, funding criteria and rules relating to 
delivery and acquittal are centrally determined and provide 
little opportunity for local variation and for cross-program 
coordination and integration. This one-size fits all approach 
inhibits capacity to shape and deliver policy that meets the 
diverse circumstances across remote Australia, as well as 
limiting capacity for cross-agency integration. The rules and 
focus of programs and funding streams designed to meet 
the needs of the 95% of the Australian population that do 
not live in remote Australia are too often not appropriate 
to the remote context. There is an urgent need to simplify 
and reduce the fragmentation of funding streams, increase 
flexibility and promote local discretion, reduce compliance 
overheads, and extend funding cycles to three to five years.
Key Concern 3: Strategic Commonwealth Investment in  
Remote Australia
Commonwealth funding streams to states and territories 
that are supposed to take into account the ‘disability factors’ 
of remote circumstances and demographic profiles do not 
fully take account of the realities, costs and circumstances 
in remote Australia. Most importantly, there is no guarantee 
that these funds are applied to remote Australia.
Key Concern 4: Sustained Long Term Investment in Local 
Communities and Institutions (Civil Society)
Remote Australia is characterised by inadequate institutional 
capacity and governance arrangements that significantly 
undermine efforts to improve outcomes, deliver meaningful 
services and improve underlying conditions. Local 
communities, regions and institutions too often struggle to 
effectively engage with governments and with the issues 
that government is trying to tackle. Governments, likewise, 
too often do not have the capacity, capability, perspective 
or governance arrangements to effectively engage with the 
issues and with local communities and institutions.
Key Concern 5: Ensuring Continuity and Effectiveness of Public 
Servants Servicing Remote Australia
Public servants do not have attractive or rewarding career 
incentives to work in remote Australia. As a result remote 
Australia suffers from a chronically high turnover of public 
servants. Consequently little accumulated knowledge is 
retained in public institutions. There are few incentives 
to ‘see through’ specific initiatives and there is weak 
accountability for achieving tangible outcomes. The result 
is a fragmented unduly high cost and inconsistent interface 
between governments and remote citizens in which 
frustration erodes positive working relationships. 
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Key Concern 6: Closing the Gap between Intentions and Outcomes
Governments contract other institutions to deliver services 
in remote Australia. This model does not work. The 
transparency and accountability of the contracting process 
and the relationship between the service purchaser and the 
provider plays a significant role in the ongoing difficulties 
in achieving effective service delivery and development of 
realistic and effective programs that address local needs and 
conditions. It also skews data and policy development.
Key Concern 7: A National Social and Economic Strategy for 
Remote Australia
There is no strategy, no considered development framework 
and, despite many successive attempts, little coordination 
amongst the tiers of government, the various jurisdictions or 
the people and communities that make up remote Australia. 
Current approaches are universally ad hoc and non-
systemic. The three tiers of government and community 
structures do not have shared and clearly expressed 
objectives. As a result, there is no sense of the future that 
might guide and inspire Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
Australians to have the confidence and certainty to make 
commitments to living and investing in remote Australia. 
The positive potential of remote Australia is unrealised. 
There are unrealised linkages and synergies, and too much 
duplication. There is no framework to guide and inspire a 
cogent consideration and development of Aboriginal futures 
and how these interact with the rest of the community, 
the nation and the global economy. There are ongoing 
reactive and costly interventions to address crises, and a 
need for special measures to address long-term neglect. An 
integrated, careful and considered long-term settlement and 
population plan, implementation and investment strategy, 
and monitoring process is urgently required.
Key Concern 8: A Commission for Outback/Remote Australia
Both policy development and administration for remote 
Australia is largely determined within State and Territory 
borders. As a result there is a fragmented approach. Major 
decisions affecting remote Australia are almost entirely 
made in capital and regional centres on the coast, with little 
understanding of its key drivers and its unique setting. 
Instead, strategic and context-specific action is required to 
achieve positive outcomes. There is a critical need for an 
on-going institution that has the mandate and authority to 
create a sustainable focus on remote Australia, change the 
dynamic of under-development that afflicts the region, and 
achieve momentum for change and regional coordination 
that is specific to remote Australia. 
These key concerns created the framework for the 
discussions and project from which this report was derived. 
Fieldwork and commissioned research sought to gather 
evidence and perspectives that would refine and amplify 
them. A full account of the conversation and commissioned 
research is found is found in the Compendium document3.
During the course of the remoteFOCUS project there were 
significant political developments: federally, with the 
The Pilbara town of Port Hedland.
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In his address to the National Press Club in September 
2010, the Federal Minister for Regional Australia, Regional 
Development and Local Government, Simon Crean, outlined 
a number of principles that apply to remote Australia:
Local empowerment is about recognising that in our 
federalist structure, the needs and aspiration of our 
people can best be met by allowing decision making 
about their economic, social and environmental 
wellbeing to be made closer and closer to the people 
most affected by those decisions...
The Minister’s emphasis in his speech links the central 
principle of local engagement closely with diverse and 
sustainable social and environmental, not just  
economic, development.
Upon his retirement after 36 years working in the Australian 
Public Service (APS), Dr Ken Matthews4 outlined the issues 
that he had observed in his policy work and constant 
dialogue with people of regional and remote Australia.
Regional Australia is a much bigger policy and delivery 
challenge for the Australian Public Service than 
most public servants so far realise. The challenge 
for public administrators is therefore more than 
simply to introduce one parallel ‘regional’ policy to 
complement our traditional metropolitan oriented 
policies. Many of our policies and programs will have 
to be comprehensively regionalised and localised—to 
multiple regions and localities.
Matthews is concerned that Federal public servants no 
longer have independent channels that enable them to  
‘keep their ears to the ground’ in regional Australia  
and he questions whether the APS will be able to  
adjust its usual analytical tools to accommodate regional 
policy requirements.
The APS will need more sophisticated project 
selection methodologies to capture the non-monetary, 
community and externality values of the rural road. 
There is more to this than just political judgment by 
ministers.
He foresaw the next set of challenges that would  
confront the APS, given the ‘new paradigm’ of priority for 
regional Australia. 
Like metropolitan Australians, regional Australians over 
the next decade will be looking for more accessible 
agencies—on screen, on phone and in home. Like 
metropolitan Australians they will increasingly 
expect more timely services and correspondence. 
Like metropolitan Australians, regional Australians 
will expect more personalised and tailored public 
services. They will want to know by name their contact 
officers in the APS and will be impatient with agencies’ 
constant re-organisation and staff changes. They will 
also be impatient with apparently artificial functional 
separations between different agencies, and for that 
matter, different levels of government. Governments 
will have to organise themselves to be more unified 
externally and ‘keep the spaghetti behind  
the counter.’
However, unlike metropolitan Australians, regional 
Australians will more than ever be expecting 
Government services to be localised and spatially 
delivered. They will want their services to be tuned  
to their particular communities and their regions. On 
the one hand they will expect to be able to  
participate in decisions about their regions. On the 
other they will sometimes startle the city-based 
Australian Public Service by exhibiting consultation 
fatigue (because so often in smaller communities it  
is the same people who must front all the  
consultation processes)”… 
Writing in 2005, Dr Peter Shergold AC, the former  
Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet and a primary author of the current government 
framework, observed:
formation of a portfolio titled Regional Australia, and in 
Western Australia with the establishment of Royalties for 
Regions wherein the ‘regions’ assumed a greater priority in 
the eyes of government. 
Support to Desert Knowledge Australia from the Pilbara 
Development Commission as well as the Australian 
Government enabled the remoteFOCUS project to take place 
throughout the Pilbara region, through visits, a number 
of public community meetings, commissioned research 
around Aboriginal engagement in the Pilbara Cities vision 
and how that should be addressed in governance reform, 
presentations to regional business gatherings, meeting with 
shires and through attendance and presentation at a number 
of Pilbara Dialogue events where the Pilbara Cities and 
Pilbara regional development issues were discussed.
1.3 Supporting Voices
We found evidence of the key concerns in the statements of ministers and  
senior officials.
1.3 SU
PPO
R
T
IN
G
 V
O
IC
E
S
remoteFOCUS | Fixing the Hole in Australia’s Heartland 21 
We need to drive governance programs in the direction 
of connectedness. Programs need to be made more 
flexible, responsive to community needs and priorities 
and delivered in a holistic manner… More importantly, 
there needs to be a delivery of programs in a seamless 
manner to local communities. 
In a further speech in 2006, he voiced his personal 
frustration at the persistent failure to achieve  
significant change:
I am aware that, for some 15 years as a public 
administrator, too much of what I have done on behalf 
of government for the very best of motives has had 
the very worst of outcomes … In my personal opinion 
three things need to be done… We need to tailor 
government programs to the particular circumstances 
of discrete communities … We must ensure that 
discretionary government expenditures are negotiated 
to goals that address local needs … Community 
challenges are almost invariably holistic in their nature 
and require a variety of programs from all three tiers of 
government to be delivered in a coordinated whole of 
government manner… 
These particular sentiments are echoed in more 
general terms in many recent reports on broader public 
sector reform.
We have drawn inspiration from some outstanding 
examples of how people in remote Australia have  
responded and adapted to the governance dysfunctions 
in evidence across remote Australia which we describe at 
length in the report.
The formation of the RAPAD Company by seven shires 
in Central West Queensland in response to the retreat of 
public services and their shared need to argue regionally 
for services is a very good example of a local place based 
response to the issues presented. Within the RAPAD 
group many imaginative roles are being undertaken by the 
individual councils to ensure community amenities are 
maintained at desired standards:  
In the absence of any other feasible service providers, 
local councils must provide a large range of essential 
services. For instance, there are not many councils in 
Australia that provide the postal services (as in Barcoo 
and Ilfracombe); offer banking facilities (Blackall, 
Boulia, Tambo and Winton); a café (as in Boulia, 
Isisford and Winton); undertaker services (Barcoo, 
Blackall, Boulia, Ilfracombe and Tambo); real estate 
agency activities (Diamantina); operate general stores 
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1.4 Some Encouraging Successes
Diagram The seven shires that make up the RAPAD Company (source, RAPAD).
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Winton (S)
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Barcoo (S)
Barcaldine 
(RC)
Longreach 
(RC)
Blackall 
Tambo (RC)
22 
(Ilfracombe and Isisford); provide freight services 
(Isisford); or operate the local newspaper (Blackall)…
In addition, each council provides extensive support to 
the numerous community and sporting organisations in 
their boundaries.5 
The ground-breaking work documented in the Groote 
Eylandt and Bickerton Island Regional Partnership 
Agreement6 shows that it is possible to adapt and  
achieve progress within existing government structures, 
although constraints around enduring mandates, financing 
and engagement at all levels of government suggest such 
initiatives would be enhanced by a structural  
governance reform.
1.5 What People Say They Want But Don’t Get
From our consultations we conclude that people in remote Australia want but currently do not get:
A say in decisions which affect them. 1. 
Equitable and sustainable financial flows. 2. 
Better services and a locally responsive public service. 3. 
Local control and accountability where possible. 4. 
Inclusion in a greater Australian narrative. 5. 
Structural response to these concerns is required for successful governance.
Our report seeks to carry the voices of remote Australia to encourage, facilitate and lead the case for reform. 
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Australia has changed, and continues to change, in 
fundamental ways. Over the past 30 years, it has become 
the most urbanised continent in the world. Australia’s 
view of itself has shrunk to the coastal fringe. More than 
85% of our population lives within 50km of the coastline 
and our system of democracy and national economy has 
progressively been altered to serve the coastal areas and the 
large mass of people in urban Australia. 
And remote Australia has changed, because:
The pattern of settlement has changed as transport and  ●
communication technology has changed travel patterns,
The nature of mining operations and workplace  ●
practices has changed,
The nature of family pastoral leaseholds has changed, ●
The tourist industry has changed, and  ●
The approach of governments to Aboriginal  ●
settlements has changed
Across most of this area, you won’t find significant 
hospitals, high schools, universities, banks, police stations, 
and thriving market opportunities. And yet there are more 
people resident in remote Australia than in Tasmania or 
Canberra. They are just hidden in the backyards of the 
States and Territory.
Many Australians view remote Australia in terms of 
extremes: variously as a last frontier, a vast unsettled and 
isolated terrain, a place of Aboriginal crisis, the heart of 
the nation. But it is also seen as an economic wasteland, a 
place of market failure and extreme poverty (even a “failed 
state”), somewhere to drive when you retire and of course 
the quarry for the mining boom that is driving the economic 
performance of the nation. To some it has legitimacy in 
Diagram Australia’s population density June 2011 (source, Australian Bureau of Statistics).
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2.1 Views of Remote Australia
2. The Challenge of Governance 
in Remote Australia
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Australian nationhood only because of the heritage status of 
the pastoral industry and the major resource development 
projects that are scattered throughout the remote regions.
The discord is striking between these opinions and the 
thinking of many Aboriginal Australians who see remote 
Australia as Country, a place that nourishes and provides 
meaning and identity. One set of views is centred on a 
desire to dominate and tame it while the other lives in and 
adapts within it. This discord is part of the complex contest 
that needs to be addressed and resolved.
The distorted ‘extremes’ view from non-remote Australia 
leads to a failure to appreciate the social, economic 
and ecological crisis facing remote Australia which has 
significant consequences for the nation as a whole.
Remote Australia is by definition distant—and displaced—
from the everyday attentions of government. Successive 
and sincere efforts to ‘make a difference’ have generally 
failed. This is because remote Australia usually only enters 
the national conscience when the spotlight is on some 
spectacular artifice of nature, human calamity or when 
viewed as a ‘risky’ place. Unstructured and ephemeral 
attention is not conducive to level-headed policy-making. 
Remote Australia is too often perceived only in the context 
of the dysfunction of remote Aboriginal settlements and 
seen, therefore, as purely an ‘Aboriginal’ issue. That is a 
mistake. In fact, this report argues that a major proportion 
of the remote Aboriginal disadvantage is derived ‘more 
from their remoteness than from cultural or racial drivers, 
and need to be tackled primarily as part of a set of remote 
issues…’7  Predominantly non-Aboriginal settlements in 
remote Australia suffer from similar issues relating to the 
governance of government, that is the way government is 
structured to make decisions and carry them out.
2.2 Commissioned Research
The engagement and consultation process described in Chapter One was supplemented  
by the commissioned research undertaken to inform the report. Professor Ian Marsh  
was commissioned to investigate five areas pertinent to and arising from our  
community conversations.8
What have been the changes to how governments and public servants 1. 
function as a result of globalisation and centralisation  
of governance? 
What are the implications for better services and sustainable funding 2. 
of those services that can be drawn from an examination of the 
mainstreaming of services to Aboriginal people in remote Australia?
What have been the structural barriers confronted in attempting to 3. 
respond to Aboriginal issues through strategic whole of  
government approaches? 
How have other countries with similar governance traditions attempted 4. 
to give agency, voice, local control and accountability to people living in 
marginal or peripheral places and what trends or changes have occurred, 
particularly the trend to place-based governance and regional  
innovation systems? 
How might the strategic challenges for remote Australia  5. 
be reframed?
In early discussions with the Pilbara Development Commission and the four local 
government bodies providing services across the Pilbara, it was made clear they all felt there 
were difficulties in taking account of the interests and engagement of Aboriginal people of 
the region. 
Ironically, the Pilbara is a notable exception to our identification of the governance problems 
of remote Australia being generally misunderstood as belonging solely to the realm of 
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Aboriginal public policy. In the recent flurry of planning for the region, including the WA 
Planning Commission’s Pilbara Planning and Infrastructure Framework (2011) and the 
establishment of Pilbara Cities, the focus has been on attracting more long-term residents 
from outside and working towards building a more sustainable community. This may be an 
alternative “vision splendid” but, in its elaboration, Pilbara Aboriginal people—a key group 
of long-term residents—have been all but invisible.
How the multiple and, as the papers show, important Pilbara Aboriginal organisations 
meshed with the existing planned or proposed Pilbara governance or administrative 
structures is not established. 
In view of these deficits and, with support from the PDC, we commissioned Dr Mary 
Edmunds to prepare a series of papers:
1. A socio-political overview of Aboriginal people in the Pilbara and  
a report on the dynamics of engagement between Aboriginal  
people and the institutions of the Pilbara including State, 
Commonwealth and local government, and industry and other 
Aboriginal organisations.
2. Specific targeted studies in the Pilbara that will inform the remoteFOCUS 
project on ways Aboriginal people can draw the greatest benefit from 
developments in the Pilbara and the establishment of the Pilbara Cities 
agenda; and
3. From the overview and case studies, distil evidence-based learnings 
and recommendations, as a basis for strategic and positive ways for 
Aboriginal people to pursue their aspirations through engagement/
involvement in governance reforms in the Pilbara and the associated 
investments occurring in that region.
These papers9 individually and collectively, vividly illustrate the resultant effects of the 
governance dysfunctions of current governance structures and practices affecting remote 
Australia and identified as part of the broader remoteFOCUS project. 
Remote Australia has changed. Originally, Aboriginal people 
lived on Country across remote Australia using the land, 
resources and spirit of that country to provide sustenance 
and livelihoods. With European settlement, beginning on 
the east coast and pushing into the regional and remote 
areas of the country, new land uses and resource allocations 
were forced on the Aboriginal inhabitants and the history 
of contact, change and new land settlement began to evolve.  
That evolution continues.
The push from the coastal regions into what is now rural 
and remote Australia was driven by the nation’s need 
to sustain life with food and water and then, through 
agricultural and pastoral development (initially through 
wheat, sheep and cattle), an economy. Today the national 
interest is served more in remote Australia through 
extraction of mineral resources. 
Relevant to this report the nature of the conquest and 
the damaging consequences of dispossession continue to 
shape people’s behavioural response to change. However, 
significant as this history is, it is less important than the 
recognition that there was and continues to be a contest 
largely emanating from the changes in use and governance 
of the land and the impact of a global economy on  
remote Australia.
Designing governance systems that can ‘settle’ conflicts as 
they arise is a key objective of our work.
2.3 Change and Contest
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The Consequences of the ‘Failed State’ of 
remote Australia10 
The increasing social crisis in (and 
drift of population from) remote 
Australia has disturbing ramifications 
for Australia’s national security. A 
coherent societal structure throughout 
remote Australia, with its networked 
infrastructure of settlements, roads, 
airstrips and communication systems, 
should be supported as an important 
plank of Australia’s defence system 
in one of the most vulnerable regions 
of the nation. Australia’s defence 
against possible threats and breaches 
of security – including bio-security – 
is made all the more difficult when 
remote Australia itself is gripped 
by social and economic crisis. 
(The network of settlements and 
population also provides important 
support for the ever-increasing 
number of outback travellers.)
There is an escalating cost in public 
outlays particularly in the health, 
welfare and other social services, 
and justice areas. State and Territory 
government budgets are increasingly 
feeling the impact of poor health 
outcomes as greater numbers of 
Aboriginal people occupy scarce 
(and getting scarcer) hospital beds 
in the public health system for 
serious illnesses such as renal failure. 
Continuing poor education outcomes 
make effective community governance 
and development hard to generate 
and sustain. The increasing focus 
on law and order intervention and 
substantial police recruitment to 
remote Australia will inevitably lead 
to a need to expand the immensely 
costly prison system.
Without a proactive and coherent 
investment strategy that addresses 
Aboriginal impoverishment and the 
impact of FIFO/DIDO workforce 
practices in Remote Australia the 
demographic trends point to an 
exponentially increasing cost in  
public expenditure.
If you take a slice across the heartland of the Australian 
desert region of remote Australia, it is possible to see that 
remote Australia has in the past contributed significantly to 
the national interest.
Longreach, in far-western Queensland, was a transition 
point where the pastoral industry connected with the cities 
of the coast by rail. This region gave the nation an early 
watershed moment in politics and workers’ rights - the 
first big shearers’ strike; ‘Waltzing Matilda’ was crafted as 
the iconic Australian ‘anthem of the bush’, and Australia’s 
national airline, Qantas, was born, and our first aircraft  
were manufactured.
Adjacent to far-western Queensland is Central Australia and 
Alice Springs. Aboriginal people have historically gathered 
at what is now Alice Springs, as a meeting place and a 
point of exchange. Alice Springs was a key communication 
link between Australia and the European world since 
the Telegraph Station was established in 1872. In many 
respects, there is no reason for Alice Springs to exist other 
than its location at the mid-point of any travel between the 
east and west or north and south of the nation and the role 
it continues to play as the communication and service hub 
not just within Australia but in a global context. The town 
is at the heart of the Australian-American defence alliance, 
providing strategic communications services at the Joint 
Defence Scientific and Research Facility at Pine Gap.
Also, Central Australia continues to attract national interest 
because of the widespread publicity given to social problems 
in Alice Springs. The contest for Country and the economic 
outcomes that flow from different uses of Country along 
with the clash and contest that results from attempts, 
good and not-so-good, to close gaps in living standards 
are at the heart of a constant tension between Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal people. All too quickly swept aside in 
national coverage of contemporary social issues is the past 
and present contribution of dislocation and dispossession 
resulting from earlier contest and change in the region. 
Much of that contest continues without settlement.
To the west of Central Australia, the vast Pilbara region 
stretches across to the coast of north-western Australia. 
Forgotten and ignored for much of the last 200 years, the 
Pilbara is now the most significant of the resource-rich 
zones that will dominate the future of remote Australia this 
century. Already contributing considerably to the national 
wealth, the Pilbara in many ways is the touchstone of the 
nation’s relationship with the emerging new world economy 
focussed on China, and, further into the future, India. It has 
provided a welcome domestic stimulus through the growth 
and expansion to the mining centres in the north of WA 
where there are now more aircraft movements in a day than 
in any other towns of similar size in Australia. A virtual 
population of ‘fly-in-fly-out’ workers, almost equivalent in 
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Diagram The Pilbara, Central Australia, and Central West Queensland.
size to the resident population of the region, dips in and 
out of the region, leaving behind a significant array of side 
effects that have to be dealt with by local communities.
Consultations in these three regions show that the drivers 
of change in the regions originate well beyond the remits of 
local and state governments, even though they are ostensibly 
mandated to provide for the residents of the regions. Each of 
the regional towns is deemed to be sub-optimal in size and 
resourcing and ability to respond to the pace and scale of 
economic change confronting the residents. All are distant 
from the centres of power and the next major governance 
level. Most people living in Australia’s coastal urban centres 
have a limited interest in or indifference to the impact of 
these changes on local communities.
The remoteFOCUS Prospectus argued strongly that the  
cost of remote Australia languishing as a ‘failed state’ is 
so grave that it constitutes a sovereign risk to the entire 
Australian nation.
This social crisis in remote Australia has serious implications 
for the nation in managing and sustaining the prosperity 
from resource development. The Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade estimates that minerals and fuels exports 
amounted to $135 Billion in 2010. This was the single 
biggest contributor to the Australian economy. Resource 
commodities including iron ore and coal made up 47.5 per 
cent of Australia’s exports11. 
Approximately 60% of mining platforms operate in 
remote Australia12 and in 2008 84% of all current mining 
development was taking place in desert Australia.13 The 
mining industry’s capacity to recruit skilled labour to regions 
of social crisis and depleting services is a serious issue for the 
long-term sustainability of the mining industry in remote 
Australia. In addition, the mining industry is a potential 
source of significant revenue for Aboriginal interests from 
native title and other agreements. However, in the absence 
of a regulatory and regional development framework, and in 
the context of fragile Aboriginal communities and regional 
governance structures, this new source of wealth may add  
to the crisis in remote Australia through promoting 
community conflict.
There are strong grounds for concluding that the ownership, 
settlement and active land use of a significant proportion of 
remote Australia by a substantial and growing Aboriginal 
population, along with the infrastructure networks which 
accompany this population, contributes in multiple ways to 
the strengthening of the nation’s security14.
Something has happened over the past 30 years to diminish 
the voice, the strength and the potency of the messages 
and ideas coming from remote places. Earlier generations 
acknowledged that regional inequalities were structural, 
the consequences of living in a big country with a sparse 
population, but in the 1980s and 1990s, the hey-day of  
neo-liberalism in Australia, regions were encouraged to  
take responsibility for their own futures by becoming more 
self-reliant, more entrepreneurial, more creative15. 
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There are a series of common issues present across remote 
Australia whether we are talking with people in the 
pastoral, Aboriginal, tourist or resource sectors. 
Whilst we argue strongly that the problems are not specific 
to Aboriginal people and their settlements, a significant 
part of the report nevertheless examines public sector 
governance in the context of Aboriginal matters. This is 
because, apart from the recent Pilbara Cities initiative and 
the Royalties for Regions policy in WA and the emerging 
North Australia agenda, broad-ranging remote Australia 
policy is targeted almost exclusively on Aboriginal matters. 
It is also the case that the effects of the governance 
dysfunctions highlighted in this report have their earliest 
and most obvious impact on Aboriginal domains. In a 
perverse way this emphasis on Aboriginal policy serves to 
inflame the sense of conflict described earlier.
We advance several propositions that suggest the 
development of Aboriginal policy separately will not provide 
sustainable outcomes for them or people of remote Australia 
as a whole. However, in order to understand the difficulty 
governments face in governing remote Australia, and in the 
absence of more comprehensive policy pertaining to remote 
Australia as a whole, (beyond the more particularised 
debates around the resource sector, coal seam gas, FIFO 
and viability of homelands etc.,) we are required to focus on 
governments’ track records in delivery of Aboriginal services 
and from there to derive general principles that impact the 
whole of remote Australia.
This report will not be news to government, as we have 
also drawn our evidence from government reports, reviews, 
policy statements and political promises. Well-meaning 
and well-intentioned efforts by senior public servants and 
politicians demonstrate they know about the problem but 
are thwarted in their concerns by the inability of our current 
system of governance to be able to respond to the identified 
needs. Put starkly, knowing what needs to be done is 
different from being able to do it .  
The Treasury Red Book (2010) warned the incoming  
Gillard Government:
The extent to which regional policies can 
influence settlement patterns is likely to 
be limited … Historical experience shows 
regional settlement policies are expensive 
and inefficient and result in an inefficient 
allocation of resources. This will be 
particularly the case in a full employment 
economy where any short term employment 
and economic gains of one locality will 
inevitably come at the expense of another…17
This comment ignores the fact that because of the scope 
and scale of remote Australia and relevant issues, and 
policy levers used in the past, ‘regional policy’ was destined 
to have a poor track record. Contrary to the advice above 
—and, indeed inevitably—governments continue to be 
actively involved in remote Australia. It is not a matter of 
‘if’ there is a ‘regional policy’. What government itself has 
identified is that in remote regions different approaches 
are needed. What has not occurred is a shift in how policy 
relates to economic geography—i.e. the spatial outcomes of 
how the economy is regulated, and in turn the governance 
architecture responsible for implementing policy. It is the 
latter element, the governance architecture, which is the 
subject of this report. 
Our findings lead to a range of conclusions, some of them 
seemingly at odds with others. Specifically:
1. We demonstrate that governance 
arrangements are a threshold cause 
of policy failure. Centralised protocols 
and siloed departments undercut local 
responsiveness. Effective governance can 
ultimately only be achieved with the active 
involvement of the affected citizens. But this 
essential mobilisation is negated by the 
present governance framework and cannot 
be remedied within it.
2. Policy for remote Australia needs to be 
separately conceived and framed. In 
essence, the circumstances and challenges of 
remote Australia are wholly different from 
those that confront citizens in metropolitan 
2.5 Governance Reform in Remote Australia
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areas. The role of government in the economy 
that may be appropriate for metropolitan 
communities does not fit remote Australia. 
The prosperous mining precincts, the 
homeland settlements and communal 
economies and the great pastoral estates 
all implicate government in a primary 
economic role quite unlike that elsewhere 
in Australia. 
3. The challenge in designing new policies 
for remote Australia is a strategic one: 
a fundamental rethink is required. A 
paradigm shift in policy—one that challenges 
structurally embedded habits, practices, 
and approaches—will always be hard to 
accomplish. This is terribly hard in Australia’s 
policy system which has few, if any, platforms 
which can host exchanges on complex 
systemic reform. An appropriate discussion 
of possible new policy frameworks—one 
that is sufficiently open to new evidence 
and new concepts, that is serial and 
sufficiently protracted, and that is not 
immediately politicised in partisan 
debates—is very difficult in the present 
Australian policy system.
The capacity and right of citizens to participate in the 
choices that affect them is integral to any conception of 
governance. This acknowledges a democratic right of 
choice as being of primary importance18.  Moreover, this 
right is seeded, cultivated and exercised through voice 
and through direct and practical engagements. Of course, 
powerless and marginalised citizens can be uncomfortable 
conversationalists19. Choice is embedded in western  
ideas of democracy but this is essentially ethnocentric 
and can be juxtaposed to negotiated adaptive forms of 
governance in Aboriginal contexts. In regions with limited 
resources exercise of choice by one group can stimulate the 
contest and change that underpins our argument for  
governance reform.
These considerations are critical in the development 
of policy both for remote Australia and specifically for 
Aboriginal Australians. If equal democratic citizenship, as 
both practice and orientation, is the objective, then the 
development of institutional arrangements that effectively 
empower the agency of Aboriginal Australians is a pre-
eminent challenge. 
Transforming present governance approaches presents 
formidable challenges—and from the outset their scale 
needs to be recognised. Contextualised approaches are 
required. But there can be no contextualised solutions until 
governance20 itself is significantly reconfigured.
At the heart of this report is the claim: there is an 
imperative need to reframe governance in and for 
remote Australia. Much that is happening in remote 
Australia, given the historical policy experience and 
the nature of the drivers of change in remote Australia, 
is beyond ready influence by public policy alone. The 
governance gap cannot be solved by ad hoc adaptations. 
It is clear that administrative measures (exhortations to 
joined-up and better co-ordinated approaches, sorting 
out the siloes and interventions of different sorts) whilst 
positive in intent just will not cut through. There are no 
‘magic bullet’ solutions. To integrate legitimate national 
and state concerns with local interests, basic structural 
change is required. The alternative is merely ‘more 
of the same’. The simplest test is to ask would we need 
extraordinary interventions in remote Australia if the 
ordinary systems of government were working?
There are unresolved questions which are at the heart of  
the difficulties experienced by government in governing 
remote Australia.
Who determines the priorities for   ●
remote Australia?
Who holds and shapes the narrative that  ●
provides direction for remote Australians and 
links them to the national interest?
2.
5 
G
O
V
E
R
N
A
N
C
E
  
R
E
FO
R
M
 I
N
 R
E
M
O
T
E
 A
U
S.
30 
1. Remote Australia is confronted by common 
issues and these issues are globally familiar 
though extraordinarily diverse and complex 
local challenges. They are common to regions 
where people reside remotely from centres of 
economic and political power but are facing 
rapid social and economic change.
2. While it is important to recognise the limited 
influence that simply improving public 
policies can have on some aspects of these 
issues, present governance arrangements 
make it more difficult to effectively 
and legitimately respond to the current 
circumstances and emerging trends in  
remote Australia.
3. Among the range of possible responses 
to these governance challenges, the more 
promising prospects involve greater degrees—
and varying patterns—of decentralised 
governance and community engagement.
4. While the present dispensation of national 
and state/territory politics has prompted a 
high degree of attention to remote Australia 
(particularly Aboriginal disadvantage and 
FIFO/DIDO workplace practices), normal 
representative politics is unlikely to result 
in the structural reforms needed to address 
these issues since the structures themselves 
are geared to the 95% of the population 
living in more settled areas. Special purpose 
initiatives are required, and these need  
cross-party political commitment and  
support from business, professional and 
community organisations.
5. In the absence of a narrative that embraces 
micro-economic reform and establishes the 
national interest in remote Australia, and a 
settlement pattern that supports that national 
interest, little is going to change, as initiatives 
will be ad hoc rather than systematic.
2.6. Propositions about Remote Australia
In our engagements across remote Australia, communities have consistently expressed five 
expectations about what they want in governance. They want a say in decisions that affect 
them; equitable and sustainable financial flows that underpin decisions; better services 
and a locally responsive public service; local control and accountability where possible; and 
inclusion in the greater Australian narrative. 
In response, we advance five propositions.
Scholars have sought to define what distinguishes  
remote Australia from other regions of the country to  
better understand the constraints on equitable and 
sustainable development.21
We have drawn on their work and have identified seven 
linked features (see Figure 1.) which provide a lens through 
which we have examined our regional engagements. Our 
aim is to draw common insights from the challenges they 
depict and to frame possible responses. 
The extremes of climate in remote Australia, coupled 
with scarcity of other resources, result in low and 
variable primary agricultural activity. Remote Australia 
has a dispersed network of largely Aboriginal towns and 
outstations and substantial pockets of mineral resources, the 
extraction of which creates enclaves of highly mobile and 
highly paid populations. Other towns are predominantly 
administrative and service centres with mixed populations 
and Aboriginal people in a minority. The scattered and 
low-density settlement patterns mean that people in remote 
Australia are almost always distant from markets and the 
urban centres where decisions which affect their lives are 
made. The expectations and experience of urban Australians 
for and of remote Australia are mismatched with those of 
the people who live in remote Australia.
These features combine to produce three flow-on effects: 
Local economies perform poorly; the wider economic 
multipliers of investment are limited; and the funding and 
regulatory decisions made by governments have a significant 
impact on economic livelihoods.
Low population densities and mobile populations, combined 
with great distances to urban centres create deficits in how 
2.7. Defining Features of Remote Australia
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people are represented politically, services are administered, 
and people access their entitlements as Australian citizens.
Finally, many have observed that remote Australia attracts 
particular kinds of people and has particular kinds of social 
relationships. People in remote Australia have developed 
unique ways of living in challenging environments and 
exploiting opportunities but, in general, local institutions 
are being overwhelmed by the changes taking place, 
many are unsuited to the tasks they confront and, as a 
consequence, they are unable to create durable and equitable 
arrangements to manage conflict, deliver services or sponsor 
entrepreneurial activity. 
The impacts of climatic extremes, poor soils and rainfall on 
patterns of settlement and mobility in remote Australia are 
relatively well known. Less well appreciated are the features 
that flow-on from these biophysical and geographic factors, 
in particular the implications for the contests that occur to 
secure rights to exploit available resources.
Low and scattered population density, and long distances 
to centres where economic and political decisions are made 
are key issues, especially in light of the long term and 
prominent role of government in remote Australia. Trends 
over time are likely to accentuate this feature of remoteness. 
Save for a few on the perimeters of natural resource 
enclaves, middle and small towns are likely to continue to 
stagnate. As a consequence of the way the resources sector 
engages with state, territory and federal structures the local 
tax base will continue to contract.
Young non-Aboriginal people will continue to migrate 
from remote Australia, primarily because of the range of 
opportunities cities and provincial towns offer in jobs and 
education, entertainment and lifestyles. Correspondingly, 
the proportion of Aboriginal people in small to mid-size 
towns is likely to increase, as a result of migration from 
settlements in the hinterlands of towns and general 
Aboriginal population increase, and driven also by the 
uncertain future created by unstable national policy about 
the status of remote and outstation settlements22. 
The nature of remote economies, and trends over time, 
offer few prospects to counter this outlook. Borrowing from 
experience of developing countries, the economies of remote 
Australia are variously referred to as dual, bifurcated or 
asymmetrical. In this respect, they have several common 
features23.  Historically, while the exploitation of natural 
resources—minerals, fisheries, agriculture and cattle—in 
these regions has contributed significantly to national 
wealth, the scale of wealth extracted has not been matched 
by investment in local labour, nor benefits in surrounding 
communities24.  Indeed, many in remote Australia argue 
that they are unfairly burdened by the adverse effects of 
an appreciating exchange rate, increasing costs of labour 
and changes to FIFO/DIDO workplace practices, uneven 
investment capital, and changes to everyday life that has 
largely occurred as a consequence of the natural wealth 
extracted from their regions. Productivity in the formal 
economy is much lower in remote Australia, reflecting long 
term declines in investment in machinery, equipment and 
intangible assets, and chronic under-investment by the 
Variable Climate
Extremes of weather, 
unpredictability.
Patchy Resources
Low soil fertility, 
unreliable water.
Figure 1.
Sparse & Mobile 
Population
Great Distance 
to Political & 
Economic Centres
Low Performing 
Local Economies
Political & 
Administrative 
Deficits
Social Capital 
& Institutions 
Misaligned  
with needs
Note: low-performing local economies can (geographically) include 
high performance mine locations which can be highly profitable 
businesses in a region rather than an economy. The concentration  
of resources tend to be geographically unequal as well as patchy.
A framework for 
understanding the challenges 
facing remote Australia (see 
full explanation of Desert 
System page 16 supporting 
documents)
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public sector in industry assistance—except for substantial 
levels of support for tourism and related construction 
activity because of the much larger local economic 
multipliers and local votes they generate25.  
Supply lines for mineral resource exploitation are largely 
independent of local businesses. The economic benefits 
of the present mining boom—partly because of changes 
in the capital composition of mining—tend to accrue 
disproportionately to urban centres like Perth, where mining 
companies, contractors and service operators and most 
of the workers are located (and spend their wealth) such 
that large areas of (remote) Western Australia have become 
Perth’s hinterland26. In remote Australia, increases in mining 
activity often come at the cost of the tourist sector as 
accommodation and airlines are committed to the resource 
sector and service costs escalate as it becomes more difficult 
to retain labour.
The part of remote Australia’s ‘dual economies’ not geared 
to export comprises people who owe their income either to 
public sector wages, pensions or royalties, or to enterprises 
and occupations that are dependent on demands these 
incomes create. Close analysis of Central Australian 
economy reveals that a significant share of it relies on the 
stimulus provided by the public sector, service industries, 
and pensions and royalties either generated by or actually 
flowing directly to Aboriginal families. But equally striking 
is that very little money generated by the local economies 
flows into the pockets of Aboriginal people. For the most 
part, money that flows into the non-Aboriginal communities 
goes to other businesses and non-Aboriginal households. 
It seems clear that natural resource royalty equivalents and 
employment opportunities accessed by Aboriginal people 
have made little difference to their socio-economic status  
or independence27.  
Peculiarities in remote economies are matched by distinctive 
patterns of governance, representative politics and public 
sector administration. The urban bias in Australian 
representative politics is now coming in for sharp review, 
but the ‘representational deficit’ faced by remote Australia 
is deeper than party politics; it is structural and repeated 
across many jurisdictions of governance. One analysis claims 
the entire north of Australia, 20% of the nation’s landmass, 
is administered by only four of a total of 56 Natural 
Resource Management Boards. Federal budgetary allocations 
for natural resource management on a dollars-per-area 
basis, are such that the natural resource management 
budget for the Northern Territory would need to increase 
227 times to meet current investment levels for the ACT, 
or 116 times to meet NRM investments in Victoria28.  
Equally bizarre patterns are evident in local government 
allocations determined on a per capita basis. Jurisdictions 
like the Northern Territory with one sixth of the Australian 
land mass receive less in local government assistance than 
is notionally allocated to the population of Geelong29.  
Regional Development Australia has declared 55 regions 
across Australia, though less than 15 of these regional 
development areas cover 85% of landmass, with NT as one 
whole region despite its distinctly different agri-economies.
While such comparisons may appear simplistic, these 
geographically induced and governance-related inequalities 
are exacerbated by a distinct urban bias to politics 
within Australia, resulting in political processes that 
skew investments in services, create administrative 
inefficiencies and reproduce geographic and social inequities. 
Aggregating remote Australia within a national regional 
development category is ultimately unhelpful and in some 
respects entrenches urban bias. In the Northern Territory, 
Commonwealth money allocated for services in remote 
areas has been systematically diverted in the past decade to 
provide for the priorities of Darwin30. In Western Australia, 
mining royalties largely derived from the regions provided 
little by way of support for regions such as the Pilbara or 
Kimberley until the 2008 election, when a narrow margin 
led to the new state government adopting a concerted 
regional development policy. Only Queensland has pursued 
remote area expansion with any commitment or lasting 
success: an example of which is the establishment of a set of 
viable irrigation and broad acre agricultural industries along 
the Great Divide31.  
The limited representation of remote Australia in formal 
politics also means that basic administrative anomalies go 
uncorrected and those policies incongruent with regional 
realities receive less challenge than they warrant. Public 
sector workforce profiles are light on front-line service 
workers and heavy on administration which, in turn, 
favours the centralisation of bureaucratic controls and 
management capacity in urban areas. The categories used 
to define and measure ‘remoteness’ further contribute to 
its under-representation in politics and administration. 
Populations are under-counted and the classifications 
and definitions created and used are crude, subjective, 
inadequate and restrictive. As a result, concludes Dennis 
Griffith, a statistical geographer, “the disadvantage of  
remote communities ... is significantly understated or often 
totally excluded”32.  
A most recent example of biased perspectives on remote 
Australia is projected in the NBN rollout where the satellite 
‘solution’ that will provide broadband to 7% of Australians 
remote from urban areas will provide download speeds at a 
tenth of the speed as their city cousins and upload speeds 
at 100th of the city fibre-based solution. This will work 
against real engagement in industry and commerce and limit 
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the opportunity for the remote parts of Australia to actively 
contribute into the economy and provide service to distant 
markets. This limitation has the potential to significantly 
impede new opportunities for services and new industry in 
remote Australia and presumes at the outset that remote 
Australia has nothing to offer at an affordable cost. The 
reality is that the nation simply could not afford to offer 
a ‘fibre-to-the-home solution’ to every remote home, but 
the lack of concerted effort to minimise the reality of this 
digital divide, through leveraging and extending existing 
infrastructure to minimise the disparity further highlights 
the reality of remote Australia being the forgotten backyard 
of the nation. 
The deficits and defects in how remote Australia is 
represented in political and administrative processes pave 
the way for serious misalignment between commitments 
and practices, and between policies and the underlying 
reality. For instance, according to an NT Council of 
Social Services analysis, in 2009 the NT Government was 
underspending to the tune of $500 million on categories of 
social welfare for which Commonwealth grants had been 
received33. Similarly, the social dysfunction—the violence 
and abuse, morbidity and psychological problems—typical 
of mid- and small-sized predominantly Aboriginal townships 
are well known. It is clear that these problems are far 
less evident in small family or clan-based outstations and 
homeland centres. In fact, in some, people thrive34. Despite 
this, for nearly two decades, governments have been 
steadily and, more recently, precipitously reducing support 
for settlements and livelihoods that economic rationalism 
labels as being ‘uneconomic’35. 
The final box in Figure 1.1. pertaining to the social capital 
of remote Australia is more complex to explain and 
more difficult to support with evidence. It may be fairly 
argued that remote Australia attracts and is inhabited 
by distinctive people—the ‘outback culture’. It is not 
doubted that Aboriginal cultures have distinctive norms 
and outlooks, ways of making decisions and organising 
business, politics and social life. And given the complex 
and diverse environments and the shifting and always 
uncertain fortunes of business opportunities, it is 
reasonable to assume that generally the business people of 
remote Australia who do well will have finely-tuned local 
knowledge about how to survive in these circumstances. 
But this kind of knowledge is not always abundant, nor 
is it necessarily well suited to coping with the kinds of 
externally induced challenges and opportunities now 
emerging across remote Australia.
For some time it has been apparent that the labour market 
in remote Australia is far less efficient than elsewhere, a 
point exacerbated by the premature attempt to retire the 
CDEP scheme. With few exceptions, these regions face 
chronic skills shortages and depend on ‘import’ of labour, 
particularly the FIFO phenomenon. A highly mobile 
population moving across great distances, a growing share 
of which is ‘expatriate’ in its outlook and commitment, is 
not tuned to local diversity and is unlikely to seek durable 
innovations in business or service delivery. Also, high  
turn-over means that it is difficult to maintain a mass of 
local institutional memory. This in turn makes it more 
difficult to build reliable, trusted networks and means that 
already thinly spread institutions become more fragile.
Our consultations across remote Australia reveal that 
many local organisations are overwhelmed by, or unable to 
match, the particular demands of dealing with externally 
driven change. Central Australia has recently been beset 
by a sequence of social issues leading to calls for strong 
law and order solutions. Increasingly individuals and 
institutions are concerned with personal security and safety, 
the delivery of public services, and the promotion of local 
economic livelihoods. It is apparently proving difficult to 
create durable organisations capable of resolving disputes, 
to reach fair outcomes and ensure agreements are honoured. 
What this means is that in order to survive, be effective and 
legitimate, local organisations need to be endowed with 
responsibilities, skills and resources different from those 
required elsewhere in Australia. However progressively 
one or more of the tiers of government have taken up or 
assumed functions previously delivered by community 
organisations and this has served to exacerbate decline of 
local institutions and local capacity.
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Port Hedland Community Submission on 
Outer Harbour Port Expansion36
Balancing community aspiration with 
the demands of a working port poses 
imponderable problems for decision-
makers and local residents.
If the port shuts down for a day, it 
can cost somewhere between $50 
and $60 million. The proposed outer 
harbour extension of the port by 
BHP Billiton entails expenditure 
close to the total sum allocated by 
the Commonwealth to infrastructure 
works at the time of the 2008 global 
financial crisis, and will almost double 
the Port’s output.
Against this background a community 
coalition comprising the Port 
Hedland Progress Association, Port 
Hedland Soroptimists International 
and the West End Action Group 
lodged a submission with the EPA 
setting out their concerns and 
aspirations around the Outer Harbour 
development. Their submission 
called for partnerships with industry, 
business and government and long-
term planning. Other conversations 
highlighted the sense of the 
community being overwhelmed by 
the boom: “it is harder for people to 
organise to get things done and  
there are so many people moving 
through that it seems nobody 
respects the place as they indulge in 
short-term solutions”.
The Outer Harbour Port Expansion 
will see Port Hedland become one 
of the world’s largest working ports. 
Unlike other world ports, it is not 
built adjacent to a major city with all 
the facilities that are necessary and 
efficient for sustainable living. Port 
Hedland, a town of 20,200 people, 
does not have a butcher or a bakery 
or a dry cleaner.
The submission notes that while 
the mining industry has a plan for 
40-50 years, the town operates on 
much shorter 5-10 year plans with 
government funding committed year 
by year, and from election to election. 
The community leaders are calling 
for long-term sustainable industries 
and investments in universities, 
innovation, recycling, alternative 
power and energy sources, tourism 
and food production that redress the 
imbalance in the local economy or 
at least allow the local economy to 
cope better with the pressure it is 
experiencing. They argue that  
a 50-year plan with government  
and industry will result in  
private investment.
They expressed concern that BHP 
Billiton representatives had assured 
community members there will be no 
impact on the town’s infrastructure 
from the 2000 FIFO construction 
workers building the port extension 
and the 300 permanent FIFO 
workers. This was not the view of the 
townsfolk who argued that the EPA 
evaluation of possible effects on the 
community and infrastructure was 
done in isolation from and did not 
take into account other cumulative 
impacts of other industry expansion 
taking place in the region.
The submission also outlined 
concerns that 80% of the town’s 
water supply was used to control 
dust on the industrial stockpiles. Port 
Hedland also boasts the highest per 
capita recreational boat ownership 
in Australia and uncertainty about 
the impact of port expansions on 
recreational use of the harbour is 
shown in the submission. The town 
has seen a recent increase in the 
volume of flights, but the availability 
and affordability of seats for the 
public has actually been reduced by 
the number of seats taken up by FIFO 
workers. The community knows that 
converting some of the FIFO workers 
into local residents would increase 
the critical mass required to stimulate 
further investment but is struggling 
to find mechanisms through which 
they can pursue these opportunities.
Expenditure through Royalties for 
Regions and investments by BHP 
Billiton are helping relieve some 
pressures but the pace of change is 
such that it is almost impossible to 
catch up. Residents find it difficult to 
follow these things up locally because 
nobody from the Department of 
State Development lives in the 
Pilbara and furthermore none of the 
mining company decision makers 
is present in the north either, as it 
contains production sites, rather than 
decision-making centres.
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Remote Australia is a region where economic growth on 
a per capita basis is lower than for Australia as a whole, 
where long-term trends are punctuated by the boom and 
bust of construction around enclaves of natural resource 
development, new tourist opportunities and infrastructure 
or in response to government investment associated with a 
strategic intervention. An increasingly youthful population 
has expectations raised by improved education, the internet 
and exposure to rich urban lifestyles. When they can, skilled 
young people migrate out, just as an increasing number of 
others are arriving to take advantage of opportunities fuelled 
by external investment in the resources sector. Remaining 
locals observe in-comers enjoying superlative incomes from 
jobs that too often seem beyond their reach, and remitting 
their wealth back home rather than investing in their local 
area. Income distribution is skewed according to which 
economy you are hooked into (export, services, welfare, or 
the Aboriginal ‘social enterprise’ economy), or according to 
where you live, or your ancestry.
Private sector activity—the small business retailer, the 
baker, the butcher, the local franchisees of national 
businesses, banks and insurance companies—is feeling the 
effects of rising costs of labour, transport, accommodation 
and otherwise doing business. Thirty small businesses are 
reported to have closed in Karratha in 2010-11. Like small to 
medium-sized business, government services are retreating 
from many areas and most services are being outsourced. 
Some services, like policing, are seen as responding only to 
extremes of family crisis, or to brief periods when remote 
people and regions show up in the national imagination 
as risky places and prompt extraordinary, but ultimately 
ephemeral responses. In response to pressures such as 
these, some local communities have responded creatively. 
For example, a report by the coalition of local councils 
in Far West Queensland, RAPAD, documents the many 
imaginative roles that are being undertaken by individual 
councils to ensure community amenities are maintained at 
desired standards37. 
In regions such as the Pilbara and Central Australia, 
the outcomes of economic change and public policy are 
‘asymmetrical’ and uncertain. Some outcomes improve—life 
expectancy, young child mortality—but elsewhere gaps 
between different sections of the population, (Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal, expatriate FIFO and local residents) get 
dramatically wider. Yet other indicators, perhaps domestic 
violence or the loss or destruction of property, appear to 
remain stubbornly at unacceptably high levels.38 For local 
people, the variations are often less important than the 
common theme running through peoples’ descriptions of 
their situation, and this seems to apply whether in remote 
Australia or fragile and conflicted settings elsewhere. This 
common theme is a strong sense of perceived injustice, of 
being socially excluded, frustrated by the apparent inability 
of government to move beyond rhetorical commitments and 
blaming (others) to achieve real improvements in personal 
security, quality of services, recognition for work done, or 
access to employment opportunities. Along with this theme 
of perceived injustice is the feeling that opportunities are 
unfairly distributed, that others receive undue attention, 
services or investment or job opportunities. The perception 
is that politics too is skewed to the interests of distant 
urban populations or expatriate public servants oriented to 
long-term futures elsewhere, and that the only constants 
in dealings with government are the continual change 
in policies and programs, the ensuing uncertainty and 
unpredictability. And there is a feeling that local institutions 
3. Changes in Australian Public 
Sector Governance: Implications 
for Remote Australia
At first glance, the theme of the World Bank flagship report, 
the World Development Report 2011, Conflict, Security and 
Development might seem a long way from remote Australia. 
But the external and internal stresses identified in the World 
Development Report 2011 as being associated with fragility 
and conflict resonate strongly with what people living in remote 
Australia had to say throughout our consultations with them.
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are simply not up to dealing with the pace of change, are 
being overwhelmed by multiple confusing and conflicting 
demands, and are not providing effective places for debating 
the issues, reaching and holding to agreements. As the 
World Development Report 2011 suggests, when 
this occurs, public institutions suffer a long-term corrosion 
of legitimacy, people withdraw their support and trust,  
and everyday life becomes more fraught and sometimes 
more conflicted39.  
It is not our contention that the issues and challenges facing 
remote Australia have gone unnoticed. And we are mindful 
that remote Australia presents tough challenges, many of 
which may be immune to solutions through public policy 
announcements. The region, on the one hand, includes 
citizens who by any measure are are the most peripheral 
to the mainstream economy and politics and, on the other, 
people who are intricately and beneficially linked with 
unprecedented global shifts in economic and political power. 
It is also clear that the significant reforms implemented 
over the past two decades in how governments manage the 
economy and deliver services and commitments on public 
welfare have had very uneven effects in remote Australia. 
Indeed, as will be argued below, because of the distinctive 
features of remote Australia surveyed above, the unintended 
effects of shifts in public sector governance are more 
pronounced there and, on the whole, negative.
We noted earlier that remote Australia is characterised 
by a dual economy. On the one hand global industries 
operating in remote Australia bring with them opportunities 
and distorting forces which drive inequality in regions.  
Globalisation drives the changes and contest. New public 
management reforms evolve to regulate the effects of change 
and deliver services and welfare support to communities 
who are engaging with global capital or seeking to live 
alongside the effects of change. 
Over the past two decades Australia’s overall governmental 
framework has changed more or less in tandem with what 
has been occurring worldwide as economic globalisation 
expanded. These governmental changes progressed after the 
elections of the Labor governments from 1983 and were, for 
the most part, deeply entrenched and extended through the 
Howard years (1996-2007). 
The evidence assembled in this report demonstrates 
conclusively that the present configuration of governance 
policy and practice, despite and perhaps partly as a result 
of globalisation and almost three decades of public sector 
reforms, is not working in remote Australia. We argue that 
current governance arrangements are a threshold cause 
of policy failure in remote Australia.
This section maps the key shifts that have occurred and 
considers their unintended dysfunctional consequences.
In relation to the economy, the 2008 global economic 
crisis did not lead to any fundamental change in the 
commitment made by consecutive governments after 1983 
to rely on markets as the primary determinants of industry 
development and employment opportunities. Indeed, the 
present federal government’s attempt to better regulate the 
booming natural resource economy for the common wealth 
underlined the fact that this view is deeply embedded, not 
just in a resistant globalised business community, but also 
with many of Australian voters who have no recollection 
of a more active government role in influencing how the 
benefits and costs of economic activity are distributed 
socially and geographically. The background materials 
produced by our work have not examined the merits of 
different macro-economic policy settings. But we are not 
convinced that the present policy stance is suited to ‘dual 
economy’ regions. It is not suited to the part of the economy 
that is so completely dominated by transnational corporate 
investors and commodity cycles. Nor is it suited to the 
other part, which is by far the larger geographic area, where 
economic activity, employment and welfare is, de facto, 
mostly the result of government spending.
In relation to service delivery, following the Hilmer review40 
of competition policy in 1993, there has been a steady shift 
away from a direct provision of services by government 
towards arms-length, performance-based contractual 
arrangements, with for-profit or NGO providers undertaking 
front-end responsibilities, and progressively more elaborate 
accountability arrangements being applied to discipline and 
monitor their performance and results achieved. While this 
shift has produced many inventive approaches to service 
delivery in mainstream Australia, in remote contexts they 
have compounded the problems it was hoped that they 
would resolve. Failures in these modalities have both 
prompted and been further complicated by top-down,  
crisis-driven interventions. These have created a terrain 
marked by policy uncertainty, institutional fragmentation 
and partially implemented experiments.
The provision of welfare and direct support for income 
security and livelihoods has increasingly stressed 
3.1. Dysfunctional Governance in Remote 
Australia
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the concept of recipient ‘responsibility’ and has been 
accompanied by much tighter central management and the 
development of control systems and other arrangements 
designed to enhance mutual obligation. In both service 
provision and welfare/livelihood support, policy is described 
as ‘closing the gap’.
Whether these gaps are between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal Australians, or between remote regions and 
mainstream urban Australia, it is evident that unless there 
are opportunities for meaningful employment or social 
enterprise, “responsibility” will be a hollow concept.
In this context, there are severe limits to what can be 
achieved through demanding more efficient service 
delivery or statutorily imposed responsibility and “mutual 
obligation”. A policy hoping to deliver dramatic shifts in 
social and economic outcomes through this route amounts 
to just ‘pushing on a string’. Moreover, across-the-board 
paternalistic or crisis-driven engagements also ignore or 
undermine the kinds of responsible behaviour and  
home-grown solutions that had been developing, albeit 
unevenly, in particular communities.
These shifts in public policy aimed to increase 
the responsiveness of the public service to elected 
representatives, and of governments to people, either as 
citizens with entitlements, or as clients of public services. 
The tally of benefits and costs arising from the  
so-called New Public Management (NPM) revolution  
in public sector governance has been much debated, 
 in OECD rich country contexts as much as in 
developing countries.  
Across the board, these reforms have been associated with: 
The inexorable rise in executive power  ●
Political and administrative centralisation  ●
The fragmentation or siloing of government,  ●
and
Problems of accountability. ●
Business is Different in the Bush43
The text below highlights the 
frustration resulting from application 
of principles that in ‘normal’ 
circumstances in urban Australia 
make sense, but become a nonsense 
in remote Australia. If achieving the 
best governance possible rather than 
the application of protective rules 
is the ultimate arbiter, then local 
flexibility is required.
A remote Aboriginal community 
corporation had gone broke. A 
former merchant banker with 
strong general management and 
board experience at an international 
level, and with specific expertise 
in strategic planning and business 
systems, volunteered to spend 
time working with the community 
corporation to restore its operations.
One of his tasks was to plan for an 
AGM and to ensure appropriate 
candidates stood for election to the 
board as several members of the 
board were proposing to stand down.
In his judgment, the corporation 
had gone broke because of an inept 
non-Aboriginal CEO. ORIC put 
in an administrator for 6 months 
and those on the board when this 
happened were technically unable 
to act as directors for up to 5 years. 
It is a small community with no 
pool of qualified potential directors. 
Given the problems were caused by 
the CEO, ORIC advised they would 
not object to some of the 2009 
board members being re-elected to 
the board in 2011. But it was then 
pointed out that the FaHCSIA funding 
agreements had in the fine print a 
provision that the reappointment of 
any director who had been in office 
when the company became insolvent 
would be a default event under the 
funding agreements.
The businessman wrote to FaHCSIA 
explaining the circumstances, 
pointing out that the insolvency 
was not the fault of the board 
members, that ORIC was not 
proposing to object, and asking for 
their agreement to the appointment 
of a small number of disallowed 
board members on the basis that 
in his opinion they were the best 
candidates the community had.  
It took weeks to get any response 
despite a number of phone calls. It 
would seem that the issue went up 
and down the FaHCSIA hierarchy 
with no-one willing or possibly 
able to make a decision. Eventually 
FaHCSIA said no, they couldn’t 
allow any exemption to the banned 
directors, asserting their obligation to 
protect the taxpayers’ money.
“It was clear that everyone obviously 
knew what was the practical thing to 
do but the delegations and systems 
in place did not let them approve the 
request,” said the businessman.
“It was irritating that when the 
community had tried to do something 
for itself and elect a good board, the 
FaHCSIA team was, for whatever 
reason, unable to make a timely and 
totally logical decision”.
“This was clear evidence of 
insufficient ‘flexibility and discretion 
at the local level’ and a lack of 
sufficiently experienced and 
empowered public servants.”
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Our commissioned research42 has examined these 
evaluations in relation to remote Australia—including,  
in particular, how people in these regions perceive the  
state of play—and in comparable OECD and developing 
country contexts. 
We find in remote Australia, that either as a result of NPM 
reforms or coincidental with their implementation in the 
face of global economic activity, the landscape  
of governance can be characterised through six  
‘governance dysfunctions’. 
A decision on Pilbara development taken by the 
State but responsibility to diversify the economy 
placed with PDC44
The Pilbara Cities vision 
carries significant flow-on for 
communities in the Pilbara. The 
cities are proposed in response 
to the longevity projected for 
the mineral and energy resource 
industries in the area. The State 
and the Commonwealth make their 
arrangements directly with these 
industries but the implications for 
local communities are less evident 
in the agreements reached.
During fieldwork, a visit to the 
President of the Shire of Ashburton 
was squeezed in between 
discussions with delegations from 
Chevron, who were discussing the 
planned workers camp at Onslow 
with something like 3000 people 
about to descend on the Shire, and 
a busload of people from Fortescue 
Mining discussing their plans for 
accommodation in the town. In 
between him handling questions 
from Shire staff about contracting, 
and turning his attention to a new 
initiative being promoted by Gumala 
Aboriginal Association, he spoke of 
the council’s initiative in opening 
up new serviced land on the edge 
of Tom Price. The Shire President 
revealed the fact that more money 
won’t necessarily help the Shire 
because they are unable to house 
more shire workers in Tom Price 
to deliver base services. The Shire 
has a base population of about 
6,500 with a budget almost 3 times 
that of Alice Springs (which has a 
population of 28,000). Few Shire 
Presidents outside the Pilbara would 
be dealing with such a range and 
scale of issues.
We met with small business people 
and long term residents of the 
Pilbara who are being encouraged 
to actively pursue a program of 
economic diversification, with 
some thinking of developing 
tourist potential for the region. The 
Pilbara Development Commission 
has been mandated to pursue 
greater economic diversity 
across the Pilbara. However, the 
state government appears to be 
withdrawing tourism resources and 
Tourism WA does not recognize 
any Pilbara asset as a “top 15” 
developmental priority. Tourism 
WA has closed its regional offices 
as part of its recent restructure and 
Australia’s North West has closed its 
Pilbara office. It is almost impossible 
to get accommodation in any of the 
Pilbara towns and equally difficult 
to get a seat on a plane. If you 
drive, the caravan parks are full of 
contract workers. Pilbara residents 
are attempting to make their own 
business investment decisions in 
an environment when a change in 
commodity prices could sink their 
own much smaller investment 
in business. These are confusing 
and conflicting messages coming 
from central government to local 
communities.
Local institutions are overwhelmed 
by the scale of the investment 
occurring around them and the 
restriction of their choices as a 
result of that investment.
3.1.1 Lopsided Governance and 
Responsibility
Two distinct asymmetries in public sector governance have 
emerged that have significantly impacted on how people 
in remote Australia relate to the state/public sector. Some 
governance capabilities have receded while others have  
been enhanced. 
On the one side there has been a shift in how government 
engages in the economy to achieve particular distributional 
outcomes, and how public spending is managed to guarantee 
service delivery outcomes. In the former, government has 
withdrawn from a direct role to an enabling role, such that 
government relies on market actors and forces to achieve 
social policy outcomes. The outsourcing of the bulk of 
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service delivery to the private sector has also changed the 
relationships government has with the clients of services. 
On the other side, government has greatly enlarged two 
types of capacity in remote Australia: the capacity to 
supervise, audit otherwise discipline the accountability 
of service providers, and the capacity to determine how 
transfers made to individuals and households for welfare 
and income support are used.
The increase in central, executive power is a pointer 
to a second kind of asymmetry, namely, a shift in the 
assignments of responsibility between citizens and 
government, and within government at different levels of 
territorial scale. While the power to define problems 
and priorities has become more centralised in public 
authorities, the onus of responsibility for solving 
problems has been assigned to local communities, 
households and individuals. Certainly, public policy 
acknowledges that many of the key drivers of change are 
external, but problems are typically cast as ‘local’—poor 
service delivery, dependency and violence, corruption and 
inefficiency, lack of will or commitment—with the strong 
presumption that their resolution is a local responsibility.
In remote Australia, as in similar regions elsewhere in the 
world, the combined effects of these two asymmetries are 
most noticeable in respect to economic livelihoods. For 
much of remote Australia, public policy remains blind 
to the fact that geography and globalisation conspire 
against an even spread of economic opportunity, and 
that viable economic livelihoods in remote Australia 
require an innovative blending of the formal economy, 
‘hybrid’ or social enterprise economies, and public 
sector equity, risk mitigation and enablement.45 
Dealing with this blind spot requires skills and capabilities 
that successive governments have underinvested in. 
But furthermore, where problems of livelihood are seen 
principally as local in cause, and where government has been 
persuaded that its primary role is to close gaps through the 
provision of social service, and to police waste and failures 
to observe fiduciary standards, this places it in a particular 
kind of relationship with remote Australians: It creates 
unrealistic expectations that health and education are 
the primary determinants of economic outcomes, it 
permits powerful market players to limit the scope of 
their local corporate responsibility in the same way, 
and it encourages higher levels of both government and 
business to speak to remote Australians in a moralistic 
and accusatory manner.
The over-prescription and misplaced assignment of 
responsibility on local organisations and people to respond 
and resolve problems inevitably places on them the burden 
of failure. Where apparent failure is repeated, as it has 
Hermannsburg Hall46
A remote Northern Territory community has waited 
18 months for federal funding to construct a new 
recreational hall for Indigenous youth and has 
submitted its application proposal 40 times.
Central Australian Youth Link Up Service (CAYLUS) 
says it highlights the bureaucratic obstacles 
preventing the federal government from effectively 
“closing the gap”.
The Aboriginal community of Hermannsburg is 
140km west of Alice Springs and consists of 1200 
people. It is one of only two communities in the 
lower NT eligible for Regional Service Delivery 
funding to tackle disadvantage in remote areas.
Negotiations over the hall were conducted with 
the NT tripartite group involving federal and NT 
government representatives. A spokesperson for the 
Indigenous Affairs Department confirmed the NT 
tripartite group gave in principle support in 2010.
A spokesman for CAYLUS said, “the bureaucrats said 
they would do this and that. A month later they 
were all gone. The big cogs are always changing”. 
The principal negotiator in the tripartite group has 
changed 15 times and CAYLUS has been forced to 
resubmit its proposal for a new hall 40 times to the 
cross departmental body.
“The government has got millions they want to 
spend on Regional Service Delivery,” said the CAYLUS 
spokesperson, “the gap is between the intention and 
the action.”
tended to be, government will feel compelled to mount 
‘crisis’ responses and to behave in ways that further 
undermine local capacity and legitimacy, confidence  
and trust.
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The asymmetries of governance and responsibility tend to 
be closely associated with organisational arrangements that 
are not ‘fit for purpose’ and, as a result, with a misalignment 
of needs and responses in remote Australia. This is 
particularly marked in regard to Aboriginal Australians, but 
while their experiences sharply illustrate the challenges, 
they are in the same category as those encountered in most 
engagements between public sector and local organisations 
in all remote communities. As noted in background papers 
to this report, Aboriginal Australians in remote Australia 
have a wide array of different forms of organisation for 
dealing with mining-related private sector enterprises.47
This contrasts with the patchy success in crafting 
organisations that result in durable and mutually 
beneficial interactions with the public sector. Aboriginal 
Australians do not have equivalent structures of political 
representation—with the demise of the ATSIC councils—
and recent efforts at mainstreaming—e.g., the NT Shires 
replacing Community Councils—have tended to make 
Aboriginal political interests less visible, involved and 
animated. This winding back of specific Aboriginal 
organisational structures is contrary to our finding that 
Aboriginal organisations in the Pilbara are the main point 
of civic engagement: places where Aboriginal people 
3.1.2 Organisational Deficits and Misalignments
The economically over-heated Pilbara 
provides a classic demonstration of 
the effects of the ‘resource curse’, 
the scale and pace of recent cycles 
of resource boom have threatened 
to overwhelm the capacity, not just 
of local people and institutions, but 
also of governments, to manage 
either their social or economic 
environments. Only in the past few 
years has government attempted to 
take back some control over this key 
region in remote Australia in order  
to fulfil its ‘responsibility to provide 
an institutional framework that 
enables civil society and economic 
and social development’50.
One of the challenges for government 
in this task is addressing the 
misalignment between the way 
government is organised and 
the organisational structures of 
Aboriginal people. The importance 
of Indigenous sector organisations 
goes beyond their service function 
to the core of social rights in a liberal 
democracy...Indigenous not-for-profit 
organisations are the primary means 
for most Indigenous people to make 
themselves visible as citizens within  
a polity of which they form a  
small minority51. 
Aboriginal organisations play a 
key role in the Pilbara, even in the 
absence of a formal regional body 
and in spite of the relentless pressure 
being exerted on them. While other 
Pilbara residents may privilege 
their status as citizens in their 
relations with the state, for Pilbara 
Aboriginal people this relationship, 
even as citizens, is largely mediated 
through organisations. Sullivan 
also points out52 that Aboriginal 
people, particularly in regional and 
remote areas, do not achieve their 
understanding of civic engagement 
with the wider society from schools 
or through the media, but through 
engagement with their local 
organisations. This is true in the 
Pilbara, whether the organisations 
are focused on dealing with the state 
or, as in the case of Gumala, with 
resource companies and an absence 
of government.
Despite their marginalisation from 
the broader planning, there is 
vigorous and sustained Aboriginal 
activity happening across the Pilbara, 
mainly through organisations, 
and Aboriginal people want to be 
included as equal partners in making 
decisions about the future of their 
country, at both local and regional 
levels. Ironically, the major resource 
companies like Rio Tinto, BHP 
Billiton, and Woodside understand 
this, even if they struggle to 
implement it adequately. Government 
has been slower to catch up. Yet a 
priority for government must be 
to find better ways of including 
Aboriginal people in decision-making 
for the future
A fundamental problem is that 
government services are essentially 
citizen services and entitlements 
rather than group or collective 
community entitlements. Whilst 
it is generally acknowledged that 
mining companies have been more 
innovative in their negotiations the 
structure of native title enables them 
to deal with representative groups. 
From a government perspective 
their policy frameworks respond 
principally to individual choice and 
individual citizen rights.
There are fewer points of alignment 
between Aboriginal organisational 
structures and their tiered autonomy 
and the organisation of government 
services around individual access.
Agreement Making in the Pilbara with 
Aboriginal People 49
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gain practical experience of participatory engagement, in 
challenges of acceptable representation, and in the critical 
need for cultural legitimacy.48
The public sector has been frustrated by what it perceives to 
be chronic internal deficiencies in client groups, and by an 
inability to recognise strengths and capacities that appear 
in unfamiliar forms of organisation. Governments have 
tended to respond by encouraging forms of organisation 
and behaviour that mimic public sector arrangements and 
practices. Typically, forms of organisation are copied from 
elsewhere, imported and pasted into often quite different 
(and inappropriate) circumstances. Several common 
consequences of what in development literature is called 
‘isomorphic mimicry’53 have been observed in remote 
Australia and in fragile and conflicted settings across  
the world.
It is much easier to create an organisation that looks like 
it is capable of performing its functions—with all the de 
jure forms of organisational charts, rules and procedures, 
staff and resources—than it is to create one that actually 
functions in the way it should. While the sharing of 
organisation arrangements from elsewhere, and the mixing 
of them with those already existing locally, is the essence 
of successful social change, the key to their durability and 
legitimacy is that this process actually occurs over time as a 
result of local bargaining, debate and dialogue.
Where this process is truncated and or where forms of 
organisation are imposed through an executive shortcut 
(as, for example, a condition of assistance), it will typically 
follow that organisations will buckle as a result of premature 
or inappropriate ‘load bearing’. Often social contestation 
will focus on the organisation norms, structures and 
procedures rather than on the purposes or functions that 
the organisation is there to serve. A good example of this 
process may be found in the discussion on Marnda Mia in 
the Pilbara.54
It follows that such organisations will be less capable of 
reaching agreements and compacts amongst their members 
or with external agencies, and it will be more difficult for 
them to sustain collective-action decisions over time. Such 
organisational arrangements are likely to be marked by an 
over-supply of ‘voice’ that is not connected with mechanisms 
that can mobilise power over time or implement 
commitments. What has been observed in relation to remote 
settlements, for instance, is found throughout the contexts 
where public sectors and communities are aid-dependent. 
In both, there is no necessary connection between supply 
and demand for services and there is empirical evidence 
to suggest that service providers proliferate even where 
effective demand is absent.55
Disconnects between policy and practice occur in all 
governance, whether this be at the higher reaches of the 
public sector or in local, non-state organisations. But in 
remote Australia the tendency for policy commitments 
to be over-reaching and for administrative performance 
to correspondingly under-reach is more severe and 
pronounced. As noted earlier, (see box on Hermannsburg 
Hall) there are several reasons why policy makers may not 
be attuned to local realities: the representational deficits, 
extremes of diversity and lack of knowledge, category 
errors that become more pronounced over extended lines 
of communication, etc. Similarly, local knowledge may be 
rich, but not applied or readily applicable to policy decisions, 
or, conversely, extremely poor because of an over-reliance 
on expatriate labour, or lost as people orbit from one 
locality to another, and these are also reasons why policy 
commitments can be over-reaching.
These disjunctures are also more evident in remote Australia 
because of a known track record of commitments being 
made beyond what is simply feasible from an administrative 
and fiscal point of view. The establishment of the NT 
Shires may well fall into this category. In situations where 
‘everyone knows’ that administrative capacity will fall short 
on requirements, leaders (be they external or local) are more 
inclined to mobilise their constituencies by what they say, 
than by what they do. In other words, they rely for their 
legitimacy more on rhetoric— on the grand claims of a new 
‘strategy’, a response to ‘crisis’, a new commitment, a ‘fresh 
start’—than leaders in more mainstream polities where 
administrative capacity is better resourced and, notably, 
more accountable to political leaders who in turn are more 
directly incentivised by citizens to perform. In other words, 
in mainstream contexts leaders political and administrative, 
achieve legitimacy on both a ‘say’ and ‘do’ basis. In remote 
Australia, the normal route to legitimacy (by gaining 
legitimacy through effective follow-through) is not so easily 
available. This is one reason the legitimacy of leaders and 
organisations corrodes over time. It is in this context that 
the ‘Closing the Gap’ framework developed by COAG will be 
sorely tested.
In practice, the breach between policy and practice becomes 
greater where administrative functions (e.g. service delivery) 
are being fragmented by outsourcing, and where at the same 
time responsibilities to plan, oversee and account for results 
are being ‘shuffled’ up and down levels of the system. But it 
is evident in remote Australia that administrative  
3.1.3 Policy Over-reach and Administrative Under-reach
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under-reach in performance is more pronounced as a result 
of the asymmetries between where responsibility lies to 
define problems and priorities, and where responsibility 
to solve them tends to be assigned. Where problems 
are defined by external agencies as being ‘local’, this 
often results in local managers and organisations being 
constrained by a narrow degree of discretion and by 
contractual arrangements that make implementers 
accountable for only a narrow range of outputs. This in turn 
reproduces the notorious problem of ‘siloed’ public sector 
responses to complex problems, and the failures of whole-
of-government coordination.57
“There are certainly barriers 
to working across government 
in jurisdictions, and efforts to 
implement ‘whole of government’ 
approaches are fraught. I have seen 
first-hand the turf wars that erupt 
when the autonomy or authority of 
chief executives is perceived to be 
under challenge. Hard won resources 
are protected fiercely and priority is 
generally given to the agency’s remit 
rather than consideration of ‘the 
greater good’.
Similar challenges exist within 
agencies, between siloed branches 
and between the centre and the 
regions. In my experience most 
chief executives are centralist. In 
my role I fought long and hard for 
adequate staffing to address the 
issues I had been sent to the region 
to resolve, for capacity to make 
decisions appropriate to the context, 
and for allocation of discretionary 
budget to fund local initiatives. I 
made some gains when there was a 
chief executive who was supportive 
of regionalisation and devolved 
decision making, but these were 
unsustainable beyond our tenure and 
as I understand it almost everything 
that had been gained for the  
region has since been clawed back  
by the centre.
In my experience heads of divisions 
within agencies do not like to 
relinquish control, whether it be 
because of a belief they know 
best, a lack of trust, resistance to a 
diminution of power, even a fear 
of being ‘shown up’. Providing a 
high quality service to the public is 
not always the main driver. This is 
not to say that there are not terrific 
public servants who work very 
hard to make a difference, but it 
can be an uphill battle that requires 
courage, resilience and stickability. 
My colleagues have included many 
such people, but also the ideologically 
driven, those who, if not racist, are 
judgmental about Aboriginal people, 
and those who are worn out or 
defeated by the scale of the challenge.
It was often a less than pleasant 
experience to be a senior public 
servant from my jurisdiction in 
meetings with the Commonwealth. 
They had no interest in hearing 
alternative viewpoints or suggestions. 
The agenda had been set in Canberra. 
We were told, very directly, not to 
waste time planning but to ‘get on 
with it’, to report ad nauseam and 
not deviate from the Canberra-
determined areas of activity.
I believe innovation and flexibility 
are some of the most difficult 
requirements to achieve in the public 
service. Risk aversion is rife, and 
this often starts at the ministerial 
level and cascades down through 
the organisation. In my experience, 
willingness to have a go, to try new 
things, to take risks, mostly occurs 
on the ground, in pockets, often at 
a distance from the centre. These 
are not attributes that are generally 
rewarded. “Don’t ask for permission, 
ask for forgiveness—but don’t ask 
for forgiveness for the same thing 
twice” is bandied about, but I don’t 
think most public servants feel 
safe to embrace this maxim. Many 
major policies have implementation 
strategies from which officers are 
reluctant to deviate, particularly given 
the often onerous and rigid reporting 
requirements for every task and 
sub-task identified in the strategy. 
The Commonwealth in particular is 
very fond of activity reporting, and 
of collecting ‘good news stories’. This 
encourages and sustains a culture  
of compliance.
There are numerous instances that 
could be cited where a change of 
government or simply a change 
of Minister, either nationally or 
at the jurisdictional level, has led 
to the abandonment of particular 
policies or programs, perhaps not 
on a whim, but for reasons that are 
difficult to fathom. This can be very 
disheartening and bewildering for 
people on the ground. Communities 
find the constant shifts in policies, 
programs and personnel confusing 
and frustrating. Similar situations can 
arise when there is a change of Chief 
Executive in an agency, or sometimes 
even if the change is merely at a level 
further down the hierarchy.”
Organisational barriers to local problem solving - 
Becoming the meat in the sandwich: Reflections of a 
former senior public servant in remote Australia.56
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Where managers are responsible to manage, but have 
discretion only within a relatively narrow range of classes 
of outputs, the veracity and salience of which has already 
been established at higher levels, it can be difficult for 
local managers to respond with the degree of nuance 
needed to meet diverse and particular local circumstances 
and demands. The record shows that managers under 
these circumstances tend to ‘retreat’ into conservative 
interpretations of their brief, or alternately to ‘break fences’ 
and circumvent the rules and then create reporting fictions 
that ‘everything was done according to rule’. In any event, 
these kinds of response to administrative under-reaching 
lead to problems of morale, burnout and turn-over. This, in 
turn, adds to the shortage of capable, context-aware policy 
makers and managers, and thus reproduces both policy  
over-reach and administrative under-reach.58
Pilbara Cities is a major initiative 
by the WA State Government to 
encourage more people to live and 
settle in the Pilbara. The government 
will invest nearly $1billion through 
Royalties for Regions funding over its 
term of office, to make it happen.
The region is the powerhouse of 
Australia’s economy and the vision 
is to make it a place that is also more 
attractive for more people to live in 
with modern vibrant cities and towns, 
and quality services and facilities.
Exponential growth within the 
resource sector in the Pilbara 
region has led to record population 
growth. This rapid growth has led 
to higher costs of living, placing 
extreme pressure on services and 
infrastructure in the region. Pilbara 
Cities aims to address the issues 
associated with this significant 
growth by building the population 
of Karratha and Port Hedland into 
modern, vibrant cities of 50,000 
people each, and Newman to 15,000 
people, by 2035 with other Pilbara 
towns growing into more attractive, 
sustainable regional centres and local 
communities able to support and 
deliver a skilled workforce for major 
economic projects in the Pilbara.
The key role of the General Manager 
of the new Pilbara Cities office is to 
lead and direct the management and 
strategic direction of transformational 
projects consistent with the Pilbara 
Cities Vision, to revitalise the Pilbara 
by seeking to fund ‘Alliance Packages’ 
across strategic issues and locations in 
the region.
Faced by:
Housing that is less affordable  ●
due to very high demand
Infrastructure upgrades/ ●
expansion not keeping pace  
with growth 
Small business numbers that  ●
have declined, partly due to 
rising costs
Education and health services  ●
that are below expectations
Aging and inadequate community  ●
services facilities, and 
A sense of community that is in  ●
decline, adversely impacted by 
workforce FIFO rosters and 12 
hour shifts,
one could be excused for thinking 
there was a degree of unreality in  
the role.
The GM and the Pilbara Cities project 
have no legislative authority as such 
and the GM relies on the provisions 
of the Land Administration Act to 
leverage outcomes that will lead to 
achievement of the Pilbara Cities 
Vision. The GM is required to adopt 
a ‘big picture’ perspective to ensure 
that government, industry, business 
and community objectives are aligned. 
His other point of influence is $1bn 
of Royalties for Regions funding to 
provide direction and incentive  
to others.
The GM works with key  
stakeholders to ensure projects align 
with the Department of Planning’s 
Pilbara Planning and Infrastructure 
Framework and the local strategic 
land use planning initiatives of  
the four Pilbara Local  
Government Authorities.
The General Manager Pilbara Cities 
has carriage of one of the most 
exciting and challenging visions 
in Australia, coordinating higher 
level inputs and community level 
concerns for amenity and services 
while spending a significant amount 
of time in the air between Perth and 
the Pilbara, dissolving silos, fostering 
partnerships, pulling budgets 
together, and attending as many as 
possible meetings of the wide range 
of Boards and Commissions that 
impact in Pilbara Cities—while at the 
same time avoiding burnout. He has 
12 staff.
His lack of statutory authority 
limits his capacity to carry out his 
mandate. His best leverage with the 
majors comes from his Minister’s 
“land” function, though this is of 
course something of a stretching (or 
overburdening) of that function and 
illustrates the limits on “whole of 
government” coordinating positions 
which have rhetorical support but 
which lack actual legal authority over 
what they are coordinating.
Pilbara Cities Vision59
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New bilateral negotiations between the Commonwealth 
and the states and territories see the Commonwealth 
withdrawing, or more correctly ceding, responsibility 
for all but three key items—housing, employment and 
welfare—to the state level. Adjustments to the NT MOU 
have seen effective abandonment of investment in 500 small 
homeland communities in favour of investment in larger 
hub towns unevenly dispersed across the NT.  Recently 
announced funding for homelands represents only a 10 year 
aggregate of annual funding already available for outstations 
under the current MOU. Whilst these are examples of policy 
shuffling, the reality on the ground is that what local people 
will expect from each level of government and what is 
offered will be different, and managers on the ground will 
carry the brunt of that misperception.
Thirsty Thursday in 
Tennant Creek60  
The Julalikari Council in Tennant Creek provides services 
for Aboriginal people in the Barkly region of the NT. The 
Council’s CEO Pat Brahim says rates of substance abuse 
are worse now than 10 years ago when there was a ban 
on the sale of takeaway alcohol on Centrelink pay days—a 
system known as ‘thirsty Thursday’.
But Centrelink now allows welfare recipients to choose 
the day they are paid and Pat Brahim says that has made it 
impossible to reintroduce thirsty Thursdays. “When they 
had thirsty Thursday people could have one day of rest 
but with individuals now picking their actual pay days 
there is alcohol every day of the week and that is having a 
huge impact on people’s health and employment”.
Pat Brahim says this is just one example of how 
bureaucratic changes introduced over the past decade are 
having a serious negative impact locally on Aboriginal 
people. She says unless bureaucrats start to listen to 
Aboriginal organisations on the ground the situation will 
continue to deteriorate as the population numbers boom 
and the rivers of grog continue to flow.
3.1.4 Inability to Reconcile Parochial and General Interests
It follows from the above features of governance in remote 
Australia that it will be difficult to achieve mutually 
acceptable and therefore durable balances between the 
parochial local interest, and the general, or mainstream, 
public interest. The centralisation of executive power will 
incline policy decisions towards the general interest, often 
triggering considerable local protest. On the other hand, the 
inability to implement these decisions consistently over vast 
areas incorporating great local differences will encourage 
fragmented and parochial practices that are seldom held 
to account to the general interest, save for the periodic 
barn-storming of an audit firm sent out from the urban 
headquarters, or a journalist on the loose from a major  
daily newspaper..
The challenges of reconciling general interests and 
parochial interests are always greater in geographically large 
jurisdictions where there are great differences in wealth, 
welfare, and identity markers of race, ethnicity and class. 
Australia’s federalism is the honourable legacy of a century 
of hard fought contest and bargaining, but it remains true 
that the policies designed for and by the 95% of the country 
that lives in cities do not necessarily serve the parochial 
needs of remote Australia.
There is an array of local, shire, state and territory 
and national government bodies, but judging by the 
overwhelming consensus in consultations held across 
remote Australia, people do not believe these organisations 
are necessarily suited to mediating the kinds of social 
contestation needed to achieve a more acceptable balance in 
how public wealth is distributed, how the costs and benefits 
of economic change are allocated, or how the ‘Australian 
narrative’ is constructed.
Instead of this balance, there appears to be in remote 
Australia a set of restrictions that in many cases are 
inappropriate and impose unreasonable burdens on public 
service and business institutions. This can be shown in 
relation to minimum standards, “credentialism”—over-
reliance on formal qualification eclipsing the value of 
experience—in the labour market, and the disproportionate 
accountability requirements imposed on remote Australia.
The policy community that has questioned the ‘viability’ of 
remote communities on the basis of inappropriate criteria 
and ‘economic thresholds’ for service delivery63, and the 
continued currency of this policy stance through the NTER 
and NT MOU is one poignant instance of the failure to 
achieve a satisfactory balance of general and parochial 
interests. We say this not simply because: 
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People in central western Queensland 
observed that whereas they would 
have once been consulted (because 
of their local knowledge) on local 
topics such as the Lake Eyre Basin 
or pastoral weeds, they were now 
being trumped by well-organised 
and connected environment groups 
based in the coastal, urban regions 
of Queensland. Accordingly, these 
groups were better able to exercise 
political power by weight of numbers 
compared to remote Australians.
Residents also observed a growing 
number of regulations that had 
been introduced and which required 
them to undertake training or to 
secure blue cards, etc. They have 
also observed a decline in people 
willing to volunteer because of the 
additional weight of governance 
and regulatory requirements. People 
in communities volunteer to work 
for the community - because they 
have a passion for the people and 
the causes. Imposed processes are 
now destroying the culture of co-
operation and volunteerism that had 
previously existed, leading to a sense 
of hopelessness and people walking 
away from community service.
Central West QLD overpowered by coastal 
pressure groups and external regulation62
The Wiluna Shire commissioned 
work that confirmed the major 
impediment to the success of 
the National Indigenous Reform 
Agreement in the mid-west of 
WA was a lack of critical strategic 
transport infrastructure to link 
communities to essential services.
The mid-west region is strategically 
interconnected, economically 
and socially, with the Central 
Desert, Gascoyne, Pilbara and the 
Goldfields regions of WA. Yet the 
physical connection - the transport 
infrastructure - is lacking, thereby 
limiting opportunities for resource, 
agriculture, tourism and investment 
in small business enterprise. All 
would greatly contribute to the 
social and economic wellbeing of 
surrounding remote communities.
Despite Wiluna sitting at the core 
of intensive mineral deposits, 
there is no sealed road access to 
the west. Wiluna and Meekatharra 
are separated by 182 kilometres 
of unsealed and unsafe road. The 
Goldfields Highway that runs 
through Meekatharra is a key 
strategic freight, tourist and inter-
town route running north and south 
of Meekatharra. Sealing the road 
west of Wiluna to Meekatharra 
would open up Wiluna and 
importantly improve delivery of 
health and community services from 
Meekatharra and Geraldton.
Separate discussions have centred 
on building a 230km stretch of road 
north of Kalgoorlie linking Wiluna to 
the Great Northern Highway north 
of Meekatharra. This connection 
would find favour with road haulage 
operators but it will not deliver real 
benefit to the Wiluna community. It 
would leave the town as the main 
centre of the Shire facing severe 
growth difficulties.
Resolving difficult conundrums such 
as this where tonnage hauled is 
likely to prevail over the lives and 
well-being of regional communities 
is a difficult issue to resolve from 
a distance. A delegation of Wiluna 
Shire Councillors met the WA 
Minister for Regional Development, 
who advised that an announcement 
would be made before the next 
election. The announcement 
would clarify how the government 
proposes to open up the Central 
Desert to the Pilbara, either by 
creating a new route joining the 
Great Northern Highway to the 
north, or by sealing the last stretch 
of the Goldfields Highway, i.e. the 
Wiluna-Meekatharra Road.
Wiluna Shire61
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At least seven reports since 1991 had explicitly  ●
“highlighted” the degree of child safety and sex abuse 
concerns
This policy sector wrongly categorised a wide range of  ●
settlements as ‘homeland communities’
The claims made about the comparative human  ●
development outcomes of settlements of different 
scale are open to challenge—and will have dramatic 
implications for the 500-plus settlements most severely 
affected by the cuts to funding. 
We are concerned that the larger settlement ‘hubs’  ●
favoured by this policy of economic rationalism 
are most likely “nonviable” if subjected to the same 
(dubious) economic threshold analysis. 
Rather, it is that this rendering of the general interest 
was once again imposed on these communities (and 
the nation) through an executive short-cut—through 
yet another ‘strategic intervention’—as a one-sized 
solution that over-rode and repudiated an array of 
intermediate and local level efforts to cope with 
governance, security and welfare challenges, and in 
doing so adding, in the long term, to the graveyard of 
partially implemented policy solutions.
It is appropriate to raise questions about how public 
entitlements—services legitimately considered as rights—
are delivered in different settlements in remote Australia. 
But it is problematic to invoke general, indeed often global, 
standards and metrics on what is acceptable or viable. “The 
truth is that people can choose to make almost any scale 
of settlement and remoteness work if they are prepared to 
adjust their aspirations and take on an appropriate service 
delivery model”.64   
The nature of remote Australia is such that there are 
some locations and kinds of settlement where it will be 
impossible, regardless of the delivery and governance model, 
Pilbara shires unable to rate mining 
tenements: The impact of tax on the 
viability of communities65
Historically because of the way 
agreements have been reached 
between the large mining companies 
and the WA Government the miners 
have been exempted from paying 
rates on their mines or processing 
sites. The Town of Port Hedland 
recovers around $17.5m in rates and 
the salaries of the staff cost $17.8m 
alongside a total budget of $168m, 
which incorporates other income 
from the airport fees and the waste 
disposal fees, state grants of various 
types and (on a project basis) funding 
from BHP Billiton.
Many of the Pilbara towns were 
originally company towns and a 
number are still serviced by electricity 
generation designed for the mines 
and production sites. While ever the 
miners negotiate with government 
and the Premier of the State directly, 
they undermine normalisation of the 
Pilbara. Good governance doesn’t 
operate properly and sustainably on 
grace and favour.
“FIFO” has also impacted on the 
rate base and general revenues of 
the Town. FIFO accelerated when 
the Commonwealth government 
introduced Fringe Benefit Tax and 
companies had to pay it on company-
owned housing occupied by staff. 
“FIFO” avoided this and at the same 
time the periods FIFO workers spent 
working in the special tax zones 
meant they were able to gain extra 
financial advantage.
An example of this anomaly is that 
a FIFO mining engineer resident in 
a leafy suburb of Perth and working 
at Leinster WA could recover a tax 
rebate as high as $2975 pa or $57 per 
week if he or she had a dependent 
spouse and four children. On the 
other hand, a truck driver living 
at Gascoyne Junction is entitled to 
$338 pa or $6.50 per week—yet he/
she lives over 160km from an urban 
centre of less than 7,000 persons in 
a community of less than 100 people 
without a hospital, medical or police 
services, or general store—and the 
community is seasonally isolated.
In another example, a lifetime 
resident of the Pilbara with a 25 
year work history with Rio Tinto is 
moving to Perth and switching to 
FIFO where he can get a better roster 
of “8 on 6 off”, can rent his Pilbara 
house out for over $2,000 per week, 
and recovers more pay, including the 
zone allowance.
People need to be rewarded 
for making their place in the 
community but at the moment there 
is effectively a disincentive, and 
they are effectively taxed for living 
there. In this instance, governance 
arrangements and policies have 
actually contributed to the alleged 
“unviable” nature of settlement in 
remote Australia.
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to provide services or to run businesses in ways that satisfy 
generalised minimum standards. Similarly, prohibitive 
effects have occurred in a range of vocations where 
credentialism—again, motivated by the need to protect 
standards—has driven para-professionals out of the labour 
market—as has been most marked in environmental health. 
For instance, programs like Fixing Houses for Better Health 
were able to demonstrate that a well-constructed house 
could improve health. The unintended outcome of increased 
regulation and accountability to standards was that 
Aboriginal people were gradually disenfranchised from the 
one area, building, where males were particularly competent 
and practiced. Thus the general interest, when tied to a 
chronic shortage of qualified people in remote Australia has 
been detrimental to service delivery and livelihoods, and has 
thereby inhibited the search for appropriate technological 
solutions to delivering services.
The consequences of the lack of organisational means to 
achieve fair and lasting balances between the perceived 
general (or wider) and parochial interest are also felt in the 
disproportionate restrictions and accountability demands 
placed on remote Australian organisations. From early this 
century, renewed efforts were made to deal with the public 
sector fragmentation and inflexibility that was so evidently 
hindering the ability of programs to adapt to diverse local 
circumstances. “Whole-of-government” arrangements at the 
local level aimed to provide better coordination and adaptive 
discretion to managers and service delivery agencies. 
Ironically, coordination and discretion became a casualty of 
the over-riding general interest to ‘minimise risk’—to protect 
higher level government priorities and fiduciary standards—
and this resulted in an increase in the number of funding 
programs, and a disproportionately higher increase in the 
number and stringency of accountability and reporting 
obligations imposed on local organisations.     
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3.1.5 Policy Turbulence and 
Instability
People and territories at the periphery of political power 
suffer, for various reasons, the worst effects of policy 
turbulence and instability in regard to how responsibilities 
are assigned up and down and across the system of 
government and between government, the community and 
private sector. Such turbulence has been noted as a feature 
of the public sector reforms in Australia and elsewhere 
since the early 1980s (see Marsh chapter 6 in compendium), 
but has been a particular affliction of outstations, remote 
communities and town camps.71 Moreover, it is a feature 
of contemporary populist, short term politics bedevilled 
by political conflicts which are germane to electoral cycles 
Consistent advice from people living 
in the Pilbara and working in the 
institutions in the region is that 
outside of the negotiations between 
resource companies and specific 
native title holding groups there has 
been a failure to bring Aboriginal 
people into meaningful partnerships 
that will ensure they achieve the 
full benefit of the Pilbara vision and 
opportunity. This is potentially a 
serious and chronic problem for 
all the parties. Government cannot 
dictate changes.
How the people of the Pilbara resolve 
the coexisting realities of Aboriginal 
people with entrenched communal 
and legal rights (and income streams 
and land holdings) and specific 
identities determined by culture and 
contract, and the desire of  
these same groups of people wishing 
to derive benefit as individuals from 
settlements and services provided  
by government will be an  
ongoing challenge.
Aboriginal people have a significant 
role to play if the vision is to be 
achieved. They hold substantial title 
rights to land across the Pilbara and 
they will lock in substantial income 
from communal royalty equivalents 
from these rights. In areas where 
there is a contest for resources, the 
agreement and negotiating process 
actually reinforces individual and 
communal identities and rivalries. 
In a context of continuing economic 
change, there will be conflicts 
between Aboriginal groups and 
resource companies and government 
which will need to be resolved in  
a permanent and relatively  
workable way.
That there is scope for workable 
structures is suggested by other 
instances where Aboriginal people 
have worked their way through 
analogous issues. This is exemplified 
in the formation of the Pilbara 
Indigenous Marine Reference Group 
in the Pilbara.68 The RPA development 
on Groote Eylandt69 is a more 
systematic and long term example of 
a workable outcome. In both cases, 
people and governments have been 
united through common purpose, 
defined responsibilities, defined 
resource commitments for all parties 
and defined timelines for action.
The evidence... points to the 
vulnerability of Indigenous 
governance structures trying to 
deal with the growing demands of 
resources boom, land negotiations, 
and very significant streams of new 
revenue from agreements with 
resource companies. Aboriginal people 
and organisations are being thrust 
into a complex web of negotiations 
and responsibilities. They are often 
forced to rely on hired expertise 
and assistance to import skills not 
available within the community. 
There is no mechanism to ensure 
integrity on the part of advisers 
and to promote capacity growth 
in governance. The Indigenous 
Community Governance Project 
has documented the effect of 
crippling stresses on the Indigenous 
organisations that are trying to 
cope with labyrinthine government 
funding arrangements, duplication 
and red tape, cross-jurisdictional 
inefficiencies, and the confusing 
array of overlapping short-term niche 
programs alongside a list of large scale 
commercial negotiations.
Achieving a meaningful place 
for Pilbara Aboriginal people 
within the stated goal for Pilbara 
Cities is clearly highly complex 
and therefore daunting. There is 
positive and important engagement 
through the Royalties for Regions 
and collaboration between the 
Department of Indigenous Affairs 
and Pilbara Cities; but the principal 
focus is not on integrating or 
consolidating Aboriginal residents 
with a broader population. Rather, it 
is on encouraging long-term migration 
to the Pilbara of outsiders, who will 
not just live but die there, with a key 
performance indicator for the success 
of sustainability being ‘when the 
cemeteries are full’. 70
Reconciling citizen rights and cultural 
obligations in the Pilbara67
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and positioning and undermine effective public policy 
despite - as has been the case in remote Australia under 
the auspices of the Management Advisory Committee 
(MAC) - repeated efforts to achieve stability and whole of 
government coordination (2002), devolve responsibility 
(2009) and deal with ‘wicked problems’ (2007). The net effect 
is to blur, and ultimately destroy, the two-sided relationships 
of accountability between citizens and governments, and 
between governments at different levels of jurisdiction and 
territorial scale.
Policy turbulence in regard to remote Australia can be 
seen as the cumulative effect of the four governance 
dysfunctions described to this point. The refrain is familiar: 
programs come and go with bewildering rapidity, new 
policies are announced even before existing policy has been 
implemented and tested, and new program requirements 
are sent out, to be layered over others already struggling to 
be implemented (and adding to existing layers of reporting, 
inexorably increasing the overall quantity of reporting). 
This is not only a function of Aboriginal policy. In the 
Pilbara, there has been a number of shire, regional, state and 
federal government strategic plans produced over the past 
three years, all attempting to adjust to the rapidity of change 
confronting them.
This has several well-known consequences. One, evident 
in our consultations, is how it fuels animosity towards 
government and corrodes the trust and confidence essential 
for any form of organisation to work. The NT Emergency 
Intervention conforms to a much longer running pattern, 
but, nevertheless, it is a powerful contemporary example.
The rapid evolution of planning and coordination in the 
Pilbara is a further example of this effect. The additional 
burden on local shires of growth-induced planning 
requirements quickly outstripped local capacity. The 
response was to interpose a General Manager of Pilbara 
Cities, to break through red tape, shortcut processes to 
meet deadlines and, more recently, centralise regional 
development functions with the WA Regional  
Development Council.
It is of course appropriate that innovations and refinements 
occur in policy, but these instances underline the strong 
conclusion from our investigations that the present 
institutional arrangements for negotiating policy change 
are inadequate. They are too ad hoc, interim and ‘pilot’ in 
nature, and made too fragile by the lack of a statutory basis. 
As proposed in subsequent sections of this report, new 
robust forms of regional, territorially responsible institutions 
are required that are primarily accountable to the interests of 
people residing in remote Australia. 
Even with the introduction of new vehicles through 
which policy contests are able to occur, it should still 
be possible to reduce the shuffling of responsibilities to 
make and implement policy up and down different levels 
of government authority. The shuffling in assignment of 
responsibility has produced in remote Australia extreme 
cases where responsibilities are occupied by so many  
levels and agencies of government and contracted private 
sector that it is nearly impossible to track accountability  
for outcomes. 
Housing is a classic example: state, territory and national 
governments deliver both mainstream and Aboriginal 
housing and housing-related programs, and even within 
the national government, there has been a number of 
separate Aboriginal housing programs (CHIP/NAHS, CHIP/
AACAP, FHBH) all delivering housing and essential services 
at the community level, along with ARHP which funds the 
states and territories to deliver housing at the community 
level.75 Recent attempts to provide better coordination 
and management through the SIHIP alliance contracting 
approach have introduced another corporatised layer of 
accountability into the process adding to the blurring  
of accountability.
Sorting out the most appropriate level of authority and the 
nature of that authority is only partly a technical issue—i.e., 
resolvable by application of the principle of ‘subsidiarity’. 
West Arnhem shire 
and the Wadeye  
COAG trial72
In the West Arnhem Shire in the NT, governance 
arrangements had been developing slowly since 2004 
through protracted negotiations engaging relevant 
groups and communities, and a new governance 
structure had been settled. But in 2007, the combination 
of the creation of new super shires and the Intervention 
unceremoniously aborted these arrangements, leaving 
behind a frustrated and cynical local community.73 
Similarly, when a crisis erupted at the COAG Wadeye 
trial site, the Commonwealth government resorted 
to a more coercive approach characteristic of 
hierarchical or contract government. The legitimately 
elected Thamururr Regional Council, with whom the 
Commonwealth had signed the COAG trial agreement, 
was by-passed, thereby undermining the very Aboriginal 
governance structure the Commonwealth had partnered 
with only four years before, and to which it remains 
formally committed in the NT bilateral agreement.   
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Many attempts have been made to 
coordinate and sustain efforts—by 
state and local governments, the 
mining sector—to diversify the 
economy, enrich the quality of 
life and reduce the cost of living. 
But the rate of change and the 
underpinning government legal and 
financial arrangements are such that 
competing or conflicting governance 
and administrative arrangements too 
often impede co-ordination.
How do you establish sound 
governance in such a complex and 
changing environment?
How do you plan new cities and 
operate a business in a region like the 
Pilbara when the reality is that there 
are probably thousands of people 
not in this region who are making 
decisions every day that have a direct 
impact on this region?
All levels of government—
commonwealth, state, and local—as 
well as industry bodies are taking 
an active role in planning for the 
Pilbara and the management of 
current, proposed, and expansion 
projects. This has resulted in frenetic 
activity levels of some complexity. 
In addition to normal departmental 
responsibilities for their various 
portfolios –the State government  
has largely as a result of the Royalties 
for Regions program introduced in  
2008 established or redefined a 
number of specialist bodies to 
oversee Pilbara matters.
The Pilbara Regional Council 
is a statutory body established in 
2000 by the four Pilbara shires: 
Ashburton, East Pilbara, Roebourne, 
and the Town of Port Hedland. Its 
aims are to take a regional approach 
to service delivery and to act as a 
collective voice to government  
and industry.
The Pilbara Development 
Commission is one of nine 
Regional Development Commissions 
in WA. The Commissions is a 
progressive, strategically focused 
and effective leader in the social and 
economic development of the  
Pilbara. It works successfully to 
inform, partner with and advocate  
for Pilbara communities
The WA Regional Development 
Council is the peak advisory 
body to the Western Australian 
Government on regional 
development issues.
The Pilbara Regional Planning 
Committee is one of six regional 
planning committees set up to advise 
the WA Planning Commission, the 
statutory authority with state-wide 
responsibilities for urban, rural, and 
regional land use planning and land 
development matters.
The Pilbara Industry 
Consultative Council (PICC) 
was set up in 2006 with member 
companies BHP Billiton Iron Ore, 
Chevron Australia, North West 
shelf venture, Rio Tinto Iron Ore, 
Woodside. Fortescue Metals Groups 
(FMG) is now also a member. Its 
key commitments are twofold: to 
increase Indigenous participation in 
employment in the Pilbara and the 
sustainability of Pilbara towns.
Regional Development Australia 
(RDA) is a Commonwealth entity 
to bring together all levels of 
government to support the  
growth and development of  
regional Australia.
Regional Development 
Australia Pilbara Committee 
(Pilbara RDA) was previously the 
Pilbara Area Consultative Committee, 
now part of the RDA network.
The Office of Northern 
Australia was also established 
in 2008 to provide policy advice 
to the Australian Government on 
sustainable development issues in, or 
affecting, northern Australia.
The WA Planning Commission’s 
(Pilbara Regional Planning 
Committee) 2011 draft Pilbara 
planning and infrastructure 
framework is the latest, and only one 
but perhaps the most ambitious, of 
a number of regional plans that have 
emerged in recent years.
In 2008, the Pilbara Area Consultative 
Committee—now Pilbara 
RDA—produced The Pilbara Plan, 
identifying 43 ‘essential projects’ 
in conjunction with the Pilbara 
Development Commission and the 
Pilbara Regional Council. This  
formed the basis of RDA Pilbara’s 
August 2010 Preliminary Pilbara 
Regional Plan.
In 2008 and 2010, the Pilbara 
Industry’s Community Council 
commissioned reports, planning 
for resources growth in the Pilbara, 
focusing on employment and 
population projections to 2020.
Hanging out the washing in a cyclone74  
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Wadeye was selected as the sole 
Northern Territory site for a COAG 
trial led for the Commonwealth by 
the Secretary of the then  
Department of Family and 
Community Services (FaCS).
As part of the trial, a Shared 
Responsibility Agreement (SRA) was 
signed between the Commonwealth 
Government, the Northern Territory, 
and Thamarrur Council in March 
2003. The SRA identified three 
priority areas for action: Women  
and families; Youth; and Housing  
and Construction.
The optimism shown in regard to 
the trial proved to be misplaced. 
An evaluation report by Bill Gray 
AM indicated significant failure 
of the Wadeye trial to achieve its 
objectives. Contrary to the trial‘s 
objective of a reduction in red tape, 
the burden of administering funds 
increased markedly. Flexible funding 
and streamlining did not eventuate. 
Experience of communications 
within and between governments 
was mixed with a reduction in 
effective communication as the 
trial progressed. The Federal 
Government’s objective of improving 
engagement with Aboriginal families 
and communities was not achieved. 
There was a significant breakdown in 
relations with Thamarrur. Other key 
structures or processes agreed under 
the SRA, such as Priority Working 
Groups, either faltered, or never 
became operational.
The Wadeye COAG trial showed that 
the ‘whole-of-government’ approach 
to service delivery was difficult 
to implement, required a major 
investment of time and resources, 
and was yet to demonstrate that 
it provided a reliable and realistic 
platform for the administration of 
Aboriginal affairs.
The greatest danger arising from 
the disappointing outcomes of the 
COAG Wadeye trial, and from similar 
problems with other COAG trials, 
was that the wrong lessons would 
be learned, e.g. simply moving on to 
another ‘model’ of intervention. The 
Government moved to abandon the 
COAG trials. There was an evident 
lack of enthusiasm for continuing 
with the COAG model for service 
delivery to communities.79   
The new approach to be implemented 
was two-pronged—it delegated down 
the authority for agreement-making 
for service delivery (by giving ICC 
managers authority to commit in 
a single SRA up to $100,000, and 
State managers up to $500,000), and 
moved it up to high-level agreements 
between the Commonwealth and 
state and territory governments on 
strategic interventions (‘intensive‘ 
interventions) in designated 
regions or communities - usually 
communities deemed to be ‘in crisis’.
In all jurisdictions, shuffling—continual churning in how 
authority to act and spend money is assigned to different 
levels of government—is a normal part of politics. But 
in peripheral areas, lower levels of authority are most 
prone to the destructive effects of shuffling—uncertainty, 
disciplining, continual change, etc.
Research in desert Australia reveals that leaders in local 
governments and community agencies are less concerned 
with the relative merits of alternative government policies, 
than they are frustrated with seemingly endless and largely 
fruitless rounds of policy changes seeking improvements.76 
But this is felt at higher levels as well, with states and 
territories compelled, by decisions of higher authority or 
circumstances, to accept responsibility for settlements, 
programs or spheres of policy that they believe are beyond 
their capacity. 
For example, the NT Government has found it almost 
impossible to develop an affordable policy in relation  
to outstations. 
The greatest danger arising from the 
disappointing outcomes of the COAG Wadeye 
trial, and from similar problems with other 
COAG trials, was that the wrong lessons 
would be learned, for example simply moving 
on to another ‘model‘ of intervention.77
The Wadeye Evaluation78
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It was clear that this interventionist model would put 
the strategic decision-making clearly in the hands of 
government—the Aboriginal community was to become 
involved after the decision to intervene had been made. 
Although this strategic intervention approach was initially 
a top-down bilateral decision in respect of the region or 
community chosen, it was claimed that subsequently 
the detailed planning of the implementation of the 
intervention would be done in close consultation with other 
stakeholders, including Indigenous community members 
and traditional owners.80
It should be noted that these comments, and the analysis 
on which they were based, were made a good year in 
advance of the NTER. In fact, the 2006 Social Justice Report 
noted that a new division, the Strategic Interventions Task 
Force, had been established in FaHCSIA to administer the 
interventions, and targeted particularly at communities 
considered to be in crisis.
Wadeye, with its population of 3000, the largest 
Aboriginal community in the Northern Territory, and 
long a byword for trouble and tension, is well on the 
road to a stable future of its own making.
The vital ingredients for the Wadeye renaissance over 
recent years have been straightforward: the launch 
of a new style of governance structure squarely built 
on regional traditions; the provision of well paid, 
continuing local employment, backed by sustained, 
intensive public funding; a holiday from hostile 
media coverage, and—from a most unlikely quarter 
—the infusion of strict unbending discipline into the 
younger generations.
Bureaucrats were bereft of viable ideas. But 
behind the scenes, among the local leaders, a deep 
negotiation was underway, and it produced, in 2003, 
a pact: a revival of the area’s traditional political 
architecture.
Five years on, the rundown settlement is turning into 
a well-established town.
Wadeye Five  
Years On81
3.1.6 Mis-matches between 
Responsibilities and Resources
A founding principle of international policy on good 
governance is that ‘resourcing follows function’ or, more 
prosaically, that the chain of accountability leading from 
citizens to elected leaders to administrators resulting in 
the delivery of public entitlements is irrevocably broken 
where resourcing is inadequate, unpredictable and not 
transparently linked to source.
In remote Australia, research documents three things. 
Funding made available has been consistently 1. 
less than the costs of obligations to  
deliver services.
Funding has been made available in ways that 2. 
undermine the ability of local authorities to 
operate effectively.
Huge backlogs in capital infrastructure remain 3. 
unmet either through incapacity of local 
government funding or Commonwealth  
grant mechanisms.82  
Long-term and programmatically consistent funding 
for services and infrastructure development, operations 
and maintenance has been absent. Instead, funding 
commitments are typically patchy, cobbled together from 
a number of sources including, regular transfers, one-off 
capital grants, short term pilots, mining royalties, mining 
company endowments, and public sector grants like CDEP.83  
This sixth feature of governance in remote Australia is a 
logical conclusion of those preceding, and its underlying 
drivers may be summarised in technical and political 
terms. Technically, it is much more difficult to determine 
the resources needed for governments to meet and sustain 
their responsibilities in remote Australia. The diverse needs 
of people and settlements spread thinly over vast areas 
are much less understood, poorly and often inaccurately 
portrayed in available data, and thus tend to be assumed 
on a unit or area cost basis that has been developed for 
mainstream Australia and against benchmarks apparently 
applicable there. But the technical failures that underpin the 
misalignment of functions and resourcing occur principally 
because remote Australia is less politically represented than 
the mainstream, for all the reasons noted to this point in  
the report.
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At self-government in 1978, the NT had just four local 
governments in its major urban centres. During the 1980s 
the NT Government encouraged the development of local 
governments in smaller urban centres and outlying areas 
under the Community Government provisions of its Local 
Government Act. 
In 1999, the NT Government noted that of the 68 local 
governments many had populations of around 300 and that 
in these situations the amount required for even a basic level 
of administration impacted seriously on the money available 
for services. They also noted some local governments faced 
continuing difficulties in attracting sufficient numbers of 
qualified, competent and ethical staff. Current councils were 
deemed to be too small for the achievement of economies  
of scale. 
The NT Government argued that councils with a population 
of less than 2000 people encountered greater difficulties in 
NT Local Government Reform84
1. Jilkminggan Community Council
2. Imanpa Community Incorporated  
Council
3. Aputula Housing Association
4. Tapatjatjaka Community Council
5. Wallace Rockhole Community 
Council
6. Areyonga Council Incorporated
7. Ntaria Council
8. Ltyentye Apurte Community 
Council
9. Alice Springs Town Council
10. Ikuntji Community Council 
Incorporated
11. Watiyawanu Community Council
12. Walungurru Incorporated Council
13. Nyirripi Community Incorporated 
Council
14. Urapuntja Council
15. Arltarlpilta Community Council
16. Aherrenge Association 
Incorporated
17. Anmatjere Community Council
18. Yuelamu Community 
Incorporated Council
19. Yuendumu Community Council
20. Ali Curung Council Association 
Incorporated Council
21. Alpurrurulam Community Council
22. Tennant Creek Town Council
23. Lajamanu Community Council
24. Daguragu Community Council
25. Elliot District Community Council
26. Walangeri Ngumpinku 
Community Council
27. Timber Creek Community Council
28. Borroloola Community Council
29. Yugul Mangi Community
30. Jilkminggan Community
31. Mataranka Community
32. Nganmarriyanga Community 
Incorporated Council
33. Binjari Community
34. Peppimenarti Community Council 
Incorporated
35. Thamarrurr Regional Council
36. Katherine Town Council
37. Nauiyu Nambiyu Community
38. Pine Creek Community Council
39. Nyirranggulung Mardrulk 
Ngadberre Regional Council
40. Numbulwar Numburindi 
Community Council
41. Angurugu Community Council
42. Umbakumba Community Council 
Incorporated
43. Milyakburra Community Council
44. Marngarr Community Council
45. Yirrkala Dhanbul Community 
Association Incorporated Council
46. Gapuwiyak Community 
Incorporated Council
47. Galiwin’ku Community 
Incoroporated Council
48. Ramingining Community Council 
Incorporated
49. Milingimbi Community 
Incorporated Council
50. Maningrida Community 
Incorporated Council
51. Jabiru Town Council
52. Kunbarllanjinja Community 
Council
53. Coomalie Community
54. Litchfield Shire
55. City of Palmerston
56. City of Darwin
57. Belyuen
58. Cox Peninsula
59. Tiwi Islands Community Council
60. Warruwi Community 
Incorporated Council
61. Minjilang Community 
Incorporated Council
maintaining adequate levels of administration and service 
delivery over the longer term. In many ways, the NT 
Government was pushing for larger regional multi settlement 
local governments while acknowledging respect for single 
settlement localism. 
In 2003, the Minister Ah Kit announced a Building Stronger 
Regions-Stronger Futures (BSRBF) policy that recast regional 
development as economic development local government 
and service delivery. 
He proposed a voluntary regional upscaling into new 
regional authorities.
The sudden demise of the BSRSF policy owed much 
to the ideological dissatisfaction and implementation 
difficulties experienced by government bureaucrats in 
trying to accommodate Indigenous ideas about ‘regions’ and 
representation for local government and their consensus 
modes of decision-making about these matters.
Discussion and decision-making time, internal negotiations 
and sensitive facilitation—all of which challenged the 
capacity, commitment and resources of both the NT and 
Australian Governments were inadequate for the task at 
hand. The political imperative for fast results chaffed at the 
more measured pace of voluntary regionalisation and in the 
meantime several NT community and association Councils 
had collapsed owing to poor financial administration  
and governance. 
Diagram
NT Municipalities pre Local Government 
Reform (source, NT Department Housing Local 
Government and Regional Services).
1. 2. 3.
4.
5.
8.
6.
7.
9.
21.
15.
10.
11.12.
13.
19.
17. 16.
14.
20.
22.
23.
25.
26.
24.
28.
27.
29.
39.
30.
31.
33.
38.37.
35. 34.
32.
59.
53.
54. 51.52.
40.
48. 46.
42.
41.
43.
45.
44.47.49.50.
60.
61.
18.
36.
58.
57.
56. 55.
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One early initiative of the new NT 
shires was to have a consistent IT 
platform across all shires. The initial 
system worked nowhere near as well 
as had been hoped. This was largely 
explained by the urgency in getting 
ready for hand-over.
This made it difficult for shires to 
produce accurate financial reports 
from their computer system. The 
Barkly Shire quickly ditched the 
system after struggling for a year to 
establish the fundamental accounting 
and financial system.
The company contracted to develop 
the systems was a Brisbane-based 
firm. A new association named 
ShireBiz was established to own 
the financial system in the name of 
each of the shires with each shire 
CEO being a director. Barkly Shire 
is committed to almost $700,000 in 
residual costs for software, hardware 
and support that they cannot use. 
This is the residual cost of the shires 
contract with the provider that was 
imposed on all shires by the NT 
Government. For the next 3 years 
it appeared that two-thirds of the 
council’s discretionary budget was 
spent on financial management, IT 
and communications.
In the case of the Central Desert 
Shire, the amount in their budget for 
the business systems represents about 
twice what they receive from rates.
The original ShireBiz system was 
configured wrongly for the Northern 
Territory and a remediation project 
had to be established to fix it. The 
assessment of the person hired 
to fix the problems noted from 
every perspective, timing, project 
management it was doomed to 
failure. The configuration was wrong; 
there was no consultation with shire 
councils about what sort of accounts 
they had. There appeared to be no 
evidence of proper project plans  
and commitments.
There were people involved from the 
department but a number of those 
key people left the project before the 
shires were due to go live. There was 
no-one in his view who was looking 
at how the shires would operate 
in a holistic way. The time frame 
was crazy—there was no way they 
could have effectively implemented a 
solution for a stable shire council in 
that period of time.
When asked to estimate the cost of 
remediation of the ShireBiz program, 
it was estimated at between $3.5 and 
$4.5 million. The system was judged 
to have failed because of the systemic 
and administrative shortcomings 
on the part of those charged with 
administering local government 
reform in the NT.
Shire IT bills greater than their rate base85
In October 2006, the new local government Minister 
McAdam announced another round of local government 
reform. The new framework was to develop municipalities 
and ‘regional shires’ that would cover the entire Territory 
from July 2008. The new Minister indicated that a Shire of 
less than 5000 people would struggle to be sustainable. 
In January 2007, Minister McAdam announced there would 
be just 4 municipalities and nine shires.
In July 2008, the foreshadowed new shire arrangements 
took place. Fifty-seven small community government 
councils that covered about 5% of the NT’s landmass 
amalgamated into eight larger shires that in conjunction 
with the municipal councils now cover 100% of the NT’s 
sparsely populated land mass. The mess and heartache 
created by the rapidity of policy announcements and the 
subtle changing and churning caused by the process of 
the birth of the Shires was largely overshadowed by the 
impact of the NT Emergency Response in mid 2007. The 
misalignment between the objectives of the NT Local 
Government Reform and the Commonwealth Emergency 
Response drew attention away from the under resourcing of 
the local government mandate.
Yulara
Alice Springs  
Town Council
MacDonnell Shire
Central Desert Shire
Barkly Shire
Victoria Daly 
Shire
Roper Gulf 
Shire
West Arnhem 
Shire
East 
Arnhem  
Shire
Tiwi Islands 
Shire
Wagait 
Shire
Coomalie Shire
Litchfield Shire
Belyuen Shire
Darwin City Council
Palmerston City Council
Diagram
NT Municipalities post Local Government 
Reform (source, NT Department Housing Local 
Government and Regional Services).
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First, these problems are pronounced in contexts 
undergoing rapid change as a result of decisions made by 
external parties. Typically, these changes are associated 
with corporate commercial decisions to exploit natural 
resources or decisions by governments to strategically 
intervene in a territory for military or security reasons. 
International aid and development agencies can also distort 
local circumstances where large projects inject funds for 
humanitarian purposes.
Second, these governance problems are evident where 
repeated rounds of new public sector/management reforms 
have been occurring. 
In both cases, these effects are more pronounced in places 
geographically remote from centres of economic, political 
and administrative decision making.
We now turn to considering ways to frame responses to the 
challenges presented by these governance dysfunctions. Our 
approach rests on three points. 
For large parts of remote Australia, policies 1. 
that presume that the market will deliver 
positive outcomes—in services, settlement 
patterns, environmental management, and 
wider social inclusion—rests on a fiction that 
a market actually exists. The national interest 
in remote Australia therefore needs clarity 
of purpose and a resolute and continuing 
engagement by governments at all levels 
accompanied by significant systemic reform. 
Given the diverse nature of remote Australia, 2. 
it follows that there is no single solution 
applicable across all remote Australia. Magic 
bullet solutions, whereby it is imagined 
that solutions can be achieved through 
manipulation of a few ‘key variables’, are 
certain to fail.
Nonetheless, based on our review of 3. 
experience of remote Australia, and global 
trends in how generically similar problems 
across a wide range of situations are being 
tackled, we feel that a higher degree of local 
autonomy—possibly including the creation  
of new authorities on a regional basis—will  
be required. If coupled with greater clarity and 
stability in the assignment of responsibilities 
amongst local, regional and higher level 
authorities and, crucially, adequate and 
predictable financing, this is likely to both 
improve the quality of outcomes and increase 
accountability for the achievement of  
those outcomes.
4. Framing Responses
Many of the problems we have described are universally 
encountered by public institutions. We have reviewed 
international and local experience to understand why these 
governance dysfunctions appear in exaggerated form in remote 
Australia. We have found that these problems typically arise 
where two particular elements come together.
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The current circumstances of remote Australia are characterised by contests: controversy 
and dispute among residents and business around policy changes in Aboriginal affairs 
and about fly-in-fly-out (FIFO) workplace practices which place new demands on local 
communities; competition between the resource and tourist sectors for personnel, 
accommodation and seats on planes; and changing attitudes to live animal exports are all 
examples indicative of current contest.
In its simplest form, such contest is reflected in the consistency of concerns expressed in the 
five things people say they “want but don’t get.” (chapter 1.1)
In urban settings markets and political institutions are much better able to mediate 
disputes and contests and produce outcomes which are durable and considered fair. Where 
national or global interest imposes itself in remote Australia, the local market and political 
institutions are less able to cope and as a result institutions are overwhelmed and unable to 
sustain productive solutions and outcomes over time. And the six governance dysfunctions 
ensure government is unable to provide effective relief. (chapter 2.1)
Governments are recognising that for large parts of remote Australia the notion that the 
market will deliver positive outcomes—in services, settlement patterns, environmental 
management, and wider social inclusion—is a fiction. The national interest in remote 
Australia therefore needs clarity of purpose and resolute and continuing engagement 
by governments at all levels, accompanied by significant systemic reform.
Governments with active programs in remote Australia have to become facilitators of diverse 
agencies (non government and private sector) to offset their poor capacity and their inability 
to cede control.
In Australia, two broad responses—‘whole-of-government’, and ‘strategic interventions’—to 
these governance challenges have been evident over the past decade, and are outlined in 
the following sections. Their key elements overlap and indeed, in some respects, the latter 
is simply a more selective or “strong” or “heavy” version of the former. We also observe 
the emergence of more recent trends to focus on place based investments in some human 
services sectors.
4.1.1 Whole-of-Government
Whole-of-government approaches typically entail 
substantially increased investment in the public sector, 
arrangements to enhance central strategy and executive 
control, and efforts to ‘join up’ multiple agencies of 
government, often through joint agency/funding 
agreements. Two MAC86 reports87 (2004, 2007) described 
the changes in organisation and processes needed to make 
a whole-of-government approach work. These include 
‘substantial’ cross-agency agreements, outcomes-oriented 
budgeting, provision of greater discretion to frontline 
staff, and stability in commitments over time. What these 
features point to is that whole-of-government approaches 
will not work without proper devolution of authority, 
funding, accountability and coordinated organisation. More 
to the point, it is clear that fundamental shifts in structural 
relations are needed between central and local authorities, 
and among influential private sector players, community 
members and representatives of public authorities.88
4.1.2 Strategic Interventions
Strategic interventions have often been designed to add 
authority and a selective focus on key issues to whole-
of-government approaches. Australia’s experience with 
strategic interventions in East Timor, the Solomon Islands 
and the Northern Territory (The Northern Territory 
4.1. Australian Responses to Governance 
Dysfunction in Remote Australia
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Emergency Response—NTER—exemplified ‘strategic 
intervention’) demonstrates that focus and resources can be 
mobilised to deliver tangible results rapidly.
But while such strategic interventions signal resolute 
commitment by higher levels of authority, experience also 
shows that whatever the gains, they tend to be short-lived, 
unless accompanied by investments in long-term reforms to 
governance structures and practices.
Strategic interventions have become a feature of government 
responses to crisis and conflict and the key elements are 
common across contexts as diverse as remote Australia, 
Afghanistan and Solomon Islands.89  
The political and administrative elements of strategic interventions include:
1. Creation of special purpose executive arrangements that have the effect 
of centralising authority and over-riding the powers and functions of 
lower level authorities. The effect of these executive arrangements is to 
suspend lower-level representative political processes, to allow  
rapid import of externally defined ‘best practice’ (attempted) solutions  
to problems.
2. Whole-of-government action at the local level, directed by 
representatives of central authorities to ensure focused attention on 
problems perceived to lie at that local level. 
3. Selective engagements with community organisations to deliver  
services (such as social services, small infrastructure, local justice and 
dispute resolution services) according to priorities established at higher 
levels, along with sharpened administrative arrangements to hold them  
to account.
The Australian Defence Force was deployed in the early stages of the NTER.
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These elements of strategic interventions enable 
governments, at the highest level, to create direct relations 
with communities and individuals at the local level 
perceived to be ‘at risk’ or ‘risky’—as in the case of the NT 
Emergency Response, in which the Federal Government 
acted to directly link with children at risk. Strategic 
interventions also enable higher level authorities to cut 
through or bypass existing agencies, to break administrative 
log-jams to act on a select set of problems, whether they 
be the management of household incomes, the delivery 
of health services or, in extreme cases, the deployment of 
command and control agencies—such as the armed forces—
to surmount logistical and communication challenges.
Unlike the negative aspects of NT intervention, the policy 
initiative of the Western Australian government to invest 
in two cities in the north in the Pilbara has local political 
support. However, it is in many respects a co-ordinated form 
of intervention aimed at catching up with the impacts of 
global change and demand for commodities and bears many 
of the political and administrative elements of a whole-of-
government response.
These types of responses to crisis can have several merits. 
They can deliver a quick dividend in security and stability—
in terms of personal and public safety—and the executive 
short cuts of strategic interventions can quickly channel 
large volumes of resources into services and infrastructure 
in remote places. Dealing with logjams/bottlenecks speedily 
can be highly popular. The appointment of Coordinators 
General (NTER) or a General Manager (Pilbara Cities) 
places executive staff in control of local institutions with 
direct lines of accountability to the central government or 
external authorities (e.g., the Regional Assistance Mission 
to Solomon Islands following Australia’s response to violent 
conflict). These approaches are able to police local areas, put 
kids in school, deliver additional primary health care, get 
infrastructure built and set off a round of small community 
projects geared to needs as diverse as local justice, health 
care, savings and credit and provision of local infrastructure, 
including housing.
There is extensive literature on strategic interventions that 
also points to the profound limitations of this approach.90 
Three seem to be particularly pertinent for remote Australia.
First, strategic interventions tend to over-ride local 
authorities and arrangements. This disables local 
organisations and often leads them to redirect their energies 
to resisting the reforms being implemented, irrespective 
of their merits. Thus, productive engagements that would 
allow external agencies to tailor their interventions to local 
conditions are less likely to occur.
Second, the administrative arrangements and institutions 
created through strategic interventions often prove 
to be unsustainably expensive and unable to bear the 
responsibilities assigned to them when the special 
conditions (funding, authority) of the intervention no  
longer apply.
Third, and not surprisingly, strategic interventions tend 
to face common problems in regard to ‘exit strategies’, i.e. 
how to transfer responsibilities back to the existing local 
agencies which had been sidelined by the intervention itself. 
This commonly sets off a cycle in which neither the local 
agencies, nor the external agencies created by the strategic 
intervention, are locally regarded as effective or legitimate.
It is undoubtedly the case that strategic interventions 
and whole-of-government approaches will be considered 
appropriate for particular, short-term crises, or will be 
deployed where there is no appetite for longer-term, lasting 
solutions to the governance dysfunctions noted earlier but 
they are not a substitute for governance reform.
4.1.3 Place-Based Co-production
In parallel with the above responses some agencies of 
government at Commonwealth and State levels are rapidly 
moving towards place based investment approaches that 
give citizens greater control.  This is particularly evident in 
the disabilities sector where carers and families are being 
engaged in co-producing and co-managing services.
In WA local area coordinators have been located across the 
State as groups are given control though they still receive 
public funding.
The Commonwealth is also reviewing the Finance 
Management Act to better support this new way of 
operating.  This is a welcome shift in emphasis however, 
in remote Australia even if such arrangements were to be 
instituted individuals often would not be able to purchase 
services for the reasons outlined earlier in this report. In 
remote Australia there is limited capacity to benefit from 
such place based initiatives without a wider set of reforms 
in support.  Never the less the trend to co-production is 
a welcome initiative of government and the reforms in 
governance promoted in this report will add value to this 
changed approach.
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4.2.1 Place-Based Approaches
In the UK, ‘Big Society’ place-based initiatives led to a new 
Localism Bill, tabled in December 2010. The Bill sought to 
devolve greater powers to councils and neighbourhoods 
to give local communities more control over local services 
and service delivery and planning decisions. The economic 
downturn in Europe has made progress challenging and 
unresolved issues around bundling of funds, new analytic 
tools to determine spatial scale, and to value ‘community 
development’, political accountability and local coordination 
are still being addressed. However the shift to decentralised 
(place centred) governance and place-based approaches 
offers the only viable public policy alternative for the future.
The OECD has developed frameworks for designing place-
based arrangements to address a variety of elements, 
including economic development and innovation, social 
development, city and rural development, unemployment, 
deprived areas and high needs contexts. In these 
frameworks governance reform is a threshold condition for 
advancing action.
4.2.2 Regional Innovation 
Strategies
Regional innovation strategies which switch from over-
reliance on compensatory and redistributive approaches, 
to arrangements which can identify and capitalise on 
opportunities, have grown as a mechanism to identify 
and achieve place based opportunities recognising and 
emphasising that employment is a key to social and 
economic development. They shift the focus of economic 
strategy from markets to capabilities, because these 
capabilities develop at regional not economy wide levels.
Regional development occurs as localised capabilities are 
mobilised in response to change. Regions gain competitive 
advantage by mobilising all their assets, including 
institutional and governmental capabilities. In the past, 
local capabilities have been the key to surviving in remote 
Australia but many of these capabilities and institutions 
don’t travel well when dealing with globally induced 
change or opportunity. A Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS) 
shifts the regional policy paradigm, enabling a platform for 
building a provisional consensus around the steps that need 
to be taken to realise opportunities. However, taken alone 
a Regional Innovation Strategy potentially short-circuits the 
governance question.
4.2. Responses to Governance 
Dysfunctions in OECD Countries
Where a sense of crisis is not evident and longer term solutions are being sought, experience 
gained from OECD countries, and the international community’s response to circumstances 
in conflicted and institutionally fragile countries, indicates that a new set of policy principles 
are being applied.
The UK, OECD and some developing countries have actively reviewed past experience 
with matters such as decentralisation, regionalism, and rural development to distil lessons 
that go beyond the essentially centralising orientations that are the kernel of New Public 
Management (NPM)91. Much of this new policy revisits past experience in place, community 
development practice, regional planning and innovation and learning. 
In the UK, OECD and developing countries, emerging policy responses have included place-
based approaches, regional innovation strategies and ‘experimentalist’ or pragmatist  
policy designs.92
These responses provide increasingly popular policy mechanisms seeking to represent the 
next move in the development of public management in regions.
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4.2.3 Replacing principal-agent 
designs with experimentalist or 
pragmatist approaches
Under modern public management procurement practice, 
external agents are often contracted to deliver services. A 
central tenet of principal-agent theory is that the principal 
can determine desired outcomes in advance. Pre-determined 
performance metrics allow the principal to hold the agent 
accountable for outcomes and elaborate contractual,  
co-production, outsourcing and reporting structures have 
developed in a variety of fields.
An ‘experimentalist’ or pragmatist approach presents an 
alternative that promises to shift exchanges from a primarily 
punitive to a primarily learning basis. These approaches 
recast the terms of accountability from a process that 
concentrates on conformance (with goals and rules),  
to ongoing monitoring, mutual reflection and  
shared responsibility.
Pragmatist or experimental principles entail an approach 
to the management of inter-governmental and purchaser-
provider relations wholly different from the structure now 
dominant in remote Australia.
These emerging policy responses could be developed for use 
in the remote Australian context but remain subsidiary to, 
and will only be effective within, a significantly new and 
more effective governance system.
A number of lessons may be drawn from a review of OECD and fragile 
state contexts:
Economic policy and practice, rather than a singular focus on improved subsidies,  ●
welfare and ‘services’, must be at the heart of policy on remote Australia.
But under such economic policy, government needs to do more than set macro- ●
economic conditions—it needs to become an active partner in business/livelihood with 
community and private sector.
Agglomeration, regional integration, and regional connectivity are keys to any  ●
innovative response.
In the context of regional policy ‘place-centred’ governance is a more realistic concept  ●
than ‘place-based’ concepts. Place-centred is a complex layered concept which should 
not be confused with or made equivalent to place as a geographic area or ‘community’ 
or other spatial scale. Place-centred governance is determined by mandate, not  
by location.
Government could stimulate capacity in remote Australia through micro-economic  ●
reform including adoption of more innovative regional and procurement policies.
4.4 Lessons from Remote Australia
And in reviewing the current state of remote Australia the following 
lessons can be drawn:
It is not clear who, if anyone, is setting the priorities for remote Australia and what  ●
those priorities are.
The current arrangements—comprising three tiers of government and a series of ad  ●
hoc regional arrangements—appear to be incapable of resolving both the priorities and 
the contests that need to take place around these arrangements.
The structure and configuration of institutions across remote Australia are therefore  ●
largely not “custom-built” or fit for their particular purpose.
4.3 Lessons for Remote Australia
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Consideration of economic circumstances is crucial in establishing priorities in remote  ●
Australia and the private sector has been more successful in working through these 
issues than has government.
Failure to innovate is most marked in the public sector. ●
The five things residents of remote Australia say they “want but don’t get” fuel the  ●
discontent and unhappiness consistently conveyed through our consultations  
and discussions. 
At the outset of the chapter we indicated our response rested on three 
points. The way forward therefore needs to take account of what we 
have learned in relation to those points.
1. The national interest in remote Australia needs clarity of purpose and 
a resolute and continuing engagement by governments at all levels 
accompanied by significant systemic reform. 
● The national interest requires that governments are mandated to be an active 
participant in remote Australia because of the absence of a functioning market and 
a critical mass of people to ensure real security, services and safety for all across the 
remote Australian landmass.  Principally this requires a vision or narrative about 
remote Australia and its place in the nation. The absence of vision leads to the hole 
in our national heartland that this report—and the remoteFOCUS initiative—is 
devoted to resolving.
2. There is no single solution applicable across all remote or  
outback Australia.
● Whilst there is a need to focus nationally on remote Australia local and regional 
responses to the pressures and drivers delivering ongoing localised contests need 
to be addressed differently in each case. Our work has shown that solutions in 
the Pilbara will be found through different approaches to solutions that might 
arise in central Australia or in north Australia.  However whilst there is no one 
size solution the framework proposed as a result of our work can be consistently 
applied to develop a range of place based solutions
3. A higher degree of local autonomy—possibly including the creation 
of new authorities on a regional basis—coupled with adequate and 
predictable financing is likely to both improve the quality of outcomes 
and increase accountability for the achievement of those outcomes. 
Place, people, partnerships and connectivity are factors in stimulating new  ●
innovative responses and it is more likely than not that existing regional 
structures, whilst being involved, will not be the best and most appropriate models 
to move initiatives forward. In addition the emerging practice around place based 
and place paced approaches will need to be nuanced to account for place centred 
governance responses where mandates are assigned to multiple ‘places’ in the 
governance system.
4.
4 
LE
SS
O
N
S 
FR
O
M
  
R
E
M
O
T
E
 A
U
ST
R
A
LI
A
62 
5. Principles for effective  
long-term governance in  
remote Australia
The key outcome of the application of new governance principles is to create locally 
appropriate institutions which have sufficient authority, legitimacy and effectiveness 
to fulfil their functions.
To
Create and Maintain a Vision for  
the Region
Negotiate Compacts
Ensure Resourcing for Functional Capacity
Foster Place Centered Responses/Regional 
Innovation/Learning by Doing
Authority
Legitimacy
Effectiveness
New Governance Principles
The nature and pace of change in remote Australia, the ongoing 
contest as people respond and adjust to change, necessitates 
creation of regional governance structures that have:
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By authority we mean that the rules of the agency trump all 
other rules of agencies with similar/equivalent mandates.
Legitimacy is the degree to which citizens within the 
agency’s jurisdiction perceive and accept that it has the right 
to do what it does.
Effectiveness refers to an institution’s capacity for 
purposeful action—to set policy, to plan and procure 
outcomes, and to hold officials accountable.
The nature and pace of economic, social and technological 
change in remote Australia, and the consistency of the 
concerns expressed in our consultations and engagement 
with the people of remote Australia necessitates the  
creation of governance responses that meet the following 
four principles:
Authority and Legitimacy1. 
The institution must have the authority and legitimacy to 
create and sustain a vision for the region. The crafting of 
a vision which unites, identifies criteria for “success”, and 
provides a strategic framework for all regional interests, is a 
fundamental prerequisite for the achieving of such authority 
and legitimacy.
2. Negotiated Compacts
Lasting solutions to dysfunctional governance in remote 
Australia will require ‘negotiated compacts’. These 
compacts have two dimensions: agreements between 
public authorities at different levels—federal/state/ local; 
and agreements between public sector, private sector and 
community organisations. What this principle makes clear 
is that a reorientation of public policy toward place-centred 
approaches is neither an abdication by higher authorities 
of their obligations and responsibilities to citizens in 
remote Australia, nor does it necessarily mean the creation 
of ‘autonomous authorities’ at the local level to operate 
independently. Rather, it is a form of ‘dual compact’ where 
the general public interest and the particular parochial 
interests are all reflected in a common set of goals. More 
particularly, general goals would require endorsement by 
the highest levels—parliament, a regulatory authority, or 
the relevant corporate boards—and they would be revised 
in response to proposals by lower-level units responsible for 
defining particular needs and ways of executing key aspects 
of the tasks required to realise the goals.94  
To achieve durable compacts, new forms of institution 
may be needed which have the authority, legitimacy and 
effectiveness to carry out the essential tasks of mandating, 
mediating and settling contests. In common with findings 
from OECD experience, such a new form would aim to deal 
with ‘information gap’ asymmetries. It would recognise and 
include in consultation processes, ‘the policy challenge’ and 
agree to resolve it via the principle of subsidiarity. It would 
agree, at the principle level, to adopt a range of metrics (not 
just standard, general measures e.g., uniformity in service, 
compliance standards) when considering priorities/reaching 
decisions, thus confronting the ‘objective gap’.95
To be credible, the scope of the negotiated compacts 
required for remote Australia would need to extend beyond 
the typical reach of whole-of-government approaches 
and strategic interventions and give special emphasis to 
economic-livelihood outcomes. This would entail recognising 
that achieving more inclusive economic outcomes for remote 
Australia will require federal and state commitments to 
capital investments, and social enterprise and industry  
policy at an unprecedented scale—and maintained over a 
long period. 
While there is no unambiguous empirical evidence or 
consensus about what drives “viable economies” in remote 
areas, there is consensus internationally on two points. 
a. Governments everywhere have a poor 
record of directing global market forces into 
particular geographic locations or industry 
sectors.97 Thus, economic policy that artificially 
nominates settlements as ‘growth hubs’ or 
aims to coerce economic agglomeration by 
turning off funding for particular classes  
of settlement is not likely to prove a  
successful policy. 
b. There is consensus that it is critically 
important to facilitate connections between 
remote areas and centres of economic activity, 
to enable mobility, access to services and  
the phenomena in remote Australia known  
as ‘orbiting’.98
Compacts have been used as an instrument of the US 
Congress to grant native nations authority and funding to 
run services following a period of contracting and capability 
development. The Native American Challenge requires 
eligible entities to negotiate and enter agreements (Native 
American Challenge Compacts) with the United States that 
in general serve to allocate the roles, responsibilities, and 
resources to be dedicated by each of the parties, and set out 
clearly defined and measurable goals to be achieved.99
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3. Place-centred responses and 
regional innovations
Lasting solutions to dysfunctional governance in remote 
Australia will most likely require the creation of  
place-centred responses and regional innovations. 
The key element of a place-centred approach is the 
introduction of an authority with comprehensive oversight 
at regional levels whereby any jurisdictional overlaps are 
negotiated and worked through to such an extent they do 
not impede the carrying forward of the unifying vision and 
the effectiveness or legitimacy of the agency. 
However, the mission of, and authorities and outreach 
structures associated with, such an agency need to be 
responsive to local imperatives and capable of tailoring 
flexibility to local circumstances. These are prioritised 
although, of course, in no way trump wider interests and 
concerns. So the challenge is one of appropriate design, and 
there is naturally no “one-size-fits-all” solution. Functionally, 
such an authority should oversee three basic public sector 
responsibilities: maintaining peace and security across the 
region; ensuring the service needs and entitlements of the 
region’s population are met in a socially just and locally 
acceptable way; and to foster economic livelihoods.
In remote Australia, regional innovation approaches 
have the capacity to shift the focus of economic strategy 
from markets to capabilities and from compensatory and 
redistributive approaches to arrangements that can identify 
and capitalise on opportunities across a range of place-
centred processes.
4. ‘Resourcing must follow 
function’
Less contentious but typically acknowledged in the breach 
in Australian public policy—is the fourth principle, that 
‘resourcing must follow function’. Consistent with the 
agreements reached about the powers and functions of 
place-centred authority, long-term agreements are required 
to ensure that chronic gaps in local fiscal and human 
resource capacity are addressed over time.
Budget pooling and fiscal transparency of all sources 
alongside procurement reform at federal, state/territory/
shire, and special-purpose levels, plus corporate financing, 
should be pursued.
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The Groote Eylandt RPA is a working 
example of the application of some 
of the principles espoused in this 
report and is therefore a useful 
demonstration of the gains which can 
be made by going beyond attempts to 
coordinate or intervene. The Groote 
RPA is a positive example where 
COAG lessons learned and local place 
based approaches have been applied 
through the application of compacts 
and local resourcing. The process 
managed to get the critical players  
on the same page.
It accepts and endorses the legitimacy 
of the role of the three levels of 
government and of the Land Council 
and clarifies the mandate and 
financial obligations of each of them.
It has involved the resourcing of a 
dedicated secretariat to help drive 
implementation and the resourcing of 
the Land Council to engage external 
expertise when required to assist 
in settling and adjusting mandates 
through the different iterations of  
the agreement and dealing with 
problems among the participants 
(peace making).
It has provided a means of having 
accountability for outcomes.
It demonstrates that clarity of 
objectives and having shared 
objectives is a tool for improved 
performance at all levels.
The Groote Eylandt and Bickerton Island 
Regional Partnership Agreement96
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5.1. A Framework for Governance Reform  
in Remote Australia
We have identified a consistent set of claims and concerns 
expressed by people living in remote Australia, and a 
consistent uniformity of analysis by government and other 
analysts on whole-of-government responses to the impacts 
of rapid change in marginal, peripheral or remote contexts.
Reviews of OECD and non-OECD experience in regional 
governance have directed attention at place-based and 
regional innovation responses while showing that “one 
size does not fit all”. However the adoption of placed-
based or regional innovation approaches in the absence of 
place-centred governance reform is likely to become just 
another form of community development intervention-style 
response that is unlikely to deliver success in the long term. 
On the basis of these analyses, we have concluded that 
without systemic change in the way that governments 
conceive of and govern in remote Australia, there will only 
be ephemeral and insignificant improvements that will  
not sustain a pattern of good governance across the nation, 
and the consistency and magnitude of issues encountered 
and concerns expressed, across remote Australia will  
not diminish.
The general framework within which particular designs can 
be developed requires wide-ranging regional engagement 
to resolve the specific application of these principles in 
particular locations.
Critical to the success of this approach will be the need 
to be less concerned at the outset with the particular 
form (shape, type, scale) of institution, and to focus 
more on the issues to be dealt with, the functions 
that public authorities need to be able to fulfil and the 
The key issues, social, economic, demographic, 
governance or other, which underwrite the need for 
focused regional action and which need to inform the 
governance design.
Context
Framework for Governance Reform
Design 
Parameters
The key conditions which need to be met if a regional 
governace design is to be effective.
Principle, Scope 
& Mandate
The broad outcomes for the region that need to be 
realised through the governance design - benchmarks  
for success.
Function The specific role(s) that needs to be assigned to realise 
these outcomes.
Form The specific governance design.
Authority & 
Accountability
The specific authority that is assigned to the  
governance organisation.
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distinction between form and function. And application 
of the approach will differ from place to place, and from 
time to time. Achieving agreement around the regional 
context is the starting point.
The next chapters of this report outline approaches to 
governance reform in two regions of remote Australia—the 
Pilbara and Central Australia. These approaches illustrate 
both the general framework within which particular designs 
can be developed, and the specific application of these 
principles in particular locations.
Through intense regional engagement a governance reform 
process with six primary steps is proposed, summarised by 
the following terms: context; design parameters; principles, 
scope and mandate; functions; form; and accountabilities.
Context: What are the issues in the region? This  
covers the specific key social, economic, demographic, 
governance or other features which underwrite the need for 
focused regional action and which need to inform the  
governance design.
Design parameters: Which agencies currently are/
or are not responsible? Based on the present governance 
arrangements and other specific features set out in the 
context, these parameters outline the key conditions which 
need to be met if a regional governance design is to be 
effective and sustainable.
Principles, scope and mandate: What are the 
agreed benchmarks for success? These describe the broad 
outcomes for the region that need to be realised through the 
governance design.
Function: Function refers to the specific role(s) and tasks 
that need to be assigned to realise these outcomes.
Form: This covers the specific governance design—the 
shape, jurisdiction, powers, responsibilities and resources 
available to an institution.
Authority and accountabilities: This covers the 
specific authority that is assigned to the coordinating 
organisation. For example, does it have political standing 
or is it rather a composite of other authorities, albeit 
one with independent standing, mission and roles. Both 
‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’, accountability arrangements 
need to be defined. Upwards accountabilities will be to 
federal and state political and administrative authorities and 
agencies. Downwards accountabilities will be between the 
existing or putative regional structures and relevant local 
government, community and other representative bodies 
and organisations and local people. 
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In response to our engagement process and findings, this 
report outlines a set of principles and a staged reform 
process for effective long-term governance across remote 
Australia. It also outlines a process for strategic governance 
review to deal with the complexity of issues associated with 
remote Australia.
We have established that there seems to be, currently, 
no way to bring about such fundamental reform. The 
underlying strategy questions remain unresolved and largely 
unaired outside specialist circles, and are largely isolated 
from each other.
We observed outbreaks of concern around Stronger 
Futures in the NT for Aboriginal people, and the FIFO/
DIDO workplace practices across the resource-rich sectors 
of remote Australia, but no comprehensive appreciation 
of how these issues are linked. Discussion focuses on 
behavioural change, subsidies and workforce initiatives as 
necessary adaptive responses: but they are ad hoc responses.
An appropriate discussion of possible new governance 
arrangements which are sufficiently open to new evidence 
and new concepts, are serial and sufficiently sustained, and 
are not immediately politicised is, to say the least, very 
difficult in the present Australian policy system.
The integration of legitimate national, state and local 
interests through structural reform is unlikely to emerge 
from the public sector or conventional legislative processes. 
In fact, we argue, such efforts are negated by present 
governance arrangements.
Therefore, the most significant pre-conditions for the 
proposed reforms is a move towards cross-party political 
commitment and a mandate from the senior elected 
leader in each jurisdiction that seeks to address the  
long-term governance solutions for the benefit of  
remote Australia.
Only political leadership, such as that which produced 
an initiative and policy shift like Royalties for Regions 
in WA or mandated the NTER, but—importantly—aimed 
at systemic change to the way governments make 
decisions, operate and are accountable, will take us 
beyond a ‘we-must-try-harder’ mantra without regard to 
the efficacy of the system itself. This cannot be driven 
from within the bureaucracy, which is constituted 
within the status quo and bound by its rules. Political 
leadership needs to come to the conclusion that there 
is a system problem not a policy problem.
Reform of this nature and scope will not be easy, nor will 
it be uniform. In some situations people will have to use 
existing legislation and organisational resources to initiate  
a start to reform. 
Reform will be problematic unless the incorporation  
of Aboriginal perspectives is a non-negotiable  
condition precedent.
One approach would be high level political support to 
establish a small number of trials, or ‘innovation’ regions 
or zones, where the principles and approach outlined in 
the report are applied, with the specific aim of developing 
an on-going process of learning, consensus and regional 
capacity building—a starting point with a defined scale and 
scope. This will build momentum for change as required and 
potentially provide “proof by good example” of the efficacy 
of such change. 
Irrespective of the starting point, this report establishes 
a number of clear criteria, including vision, authority, 
legitimacy and effectiveness against which reforms at any 
level can be evaluated.
Is there a capacity to have a guiding vision or narrative  ●
that gives direction and explains the actions of all 
levels of government, that is, a shared vision?
Is there a capacity to settle mandates? ●
Is there a capacity to match mandates with funding   ●
and resources?
Is there local accountability within the various  ●
administrative structures?
Is there a capacity to review and adapt mandates as  ●
experience accumulates and learnings develop?
Is there a body that is above the contest, authorised   ●
by the players to be responsible to oversee all of  
the above?
Another significant opportunity would be for the 
Productivity Commission to investigate the capacity for such 
a governance reform to act as a micro-economic stimulant 
for remote Australia. 
At the level of community the concerns expressed in this 
report need to be articulated in localised contexts across 
remote Australia. The voices of community legitimise 
5.2 Conditions Precedent to Successful 
Governance Reform
5.
2 
C
O
N
D
IT
IO
N
S 
PR
E
C
E
D
E
N
T
 
T
O
 S
U
C
C
E
SS
FU
L 
R
E
FO
R
M
68 
Reports of this type invariably list a series of 
recommendations for governments and other authorities  
to action.
This report however sets out to collect and reflect the voiced 
concerns of the people of remote Australia and it concludes 
with a call to action for people of remote Australia and the 
institutions and organisations who are concerned to act in 
the best interests of remote Australia.
We do this because it is ultimately the residents of remote 
Australia who will accept the authority and endorse 
the legitimacy of the governance reforms that are being 
promoted in this remoteFOCUS project.
This report has detailed a number of dimensions of 
governance dysfunction across remote Australia.
Whilst concluding that reform requires high level political 
commitment and a national narrative about remote  
Australia it also emphasises that the necessary reforms will 
only arise as a result of intense regional engagement in place 
based activities operating within a place centred  
governance framework.
We established that the reforms were systemic and not 
specific to Aboriginal interests alone, however, without 
their mandate and endorsement of the legitimacy of this 
approach for them, the possibilities for systemic reform 
are limited. We recognise however that having established 
principles and a framework now means there is an intense 
dialogue that needs to occur between Aboriginal people and 
their institutions with the concepts and proposals raised in 
this report.
There are a number of peak institutions and regional 
community organisations who can play an active role 
alongside concerned individuals. This project has attracted 
ongoing support from the Sidney Myer Fund, the Australian 
Government and the Western Australian Government 
through the Pilbara Development Commission.
This interest allows remoteFOCUS, through Desert 
Knowledge Australia, to visit and scope regional 
understanding and responses to the proposals advanced in 
the report.
concerns for politicians to respond to. In their own  
way community concerns provide the mandate for  
political leadership.
Continuing community articulation of why their concerns 
persist and how the current system of governance appears 
unable to resolve these concerns is a fundamental  
condition precedent to establishing a mood and appetite for 
positive reform.
5.3 Growing the Voice of remote Australia: 
Next Steps for Community. 
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Add Your Voice
We urge all Australians to add their voice and experience to the call for systemic change 
through the remoteFOCUS initiative. 
Individuals and organisations living or working in, or affected by remote Australia are 
invited to visit our website and join the remoteFOCUS network.
Supporting documents are available on the Desert Knowledge Australia website: 
www.desertknowledge.com.au/Our-Programs/remote-FOCUS
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5.4 What are the next steps for a politician 
wanting to govern remote Australia well?
Political leadership at all levels will have to mandate change 
based on:
1. Acceptance that the standard concerns set out in 
the report are based on reality and that more of the 
same will produce more of the same and therefore 
a changed approach to how government operates  
is needed.
2. Acceptance that: 
● if the three levels of government and the 
community (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) are 
working at cross purposes success is impossible 
because goals are different;
● if members of the communities disagree with 
or do not support what governments are trying 
to do wicked problems (health education 
employment) will not be solved;
● in remote Australia government is the main 
provider of an economy (as against having some 
industries and particularly mining which do not 
of themselves ensure an economy as against 
having an industry); and 
● different rules may need to be established for 
application in remote Australia, recognising the 
lack of market and other unique operational 
realities – for example purchaser-provider 
models of service delivery effective in 
metropolitan Australia may not be appropriate 
in remote areas.
3. Acceptance that there is a need to have:
● shared goals (vision) based on a shared; 
● clarity of mandates, ie an acknowledgement 
of roles and responsibilities of each level of 
government and key community elements  
including Aboriginal communities;
● funding and capability which matches 
mandates;
● ability to adjust mandates and settle disputes 
over time as no arrangements will be perfect 
and circumstances will change;
● an ability to look after all the above across 
the political cycle and according to agreed 
principles;
● a body or agency authorised by the different 
levels of government and the community to 
keep the ring on all of the above otherwise 
left to themselves the different levels of 
government will revert to the norm and act in 
their separate interests and in the interest of 
metropolitan Australia; 
● appointments to lead such a body or agency that 
are authoritative by nature of those appointed 
rather than representative. Such appointments 
should extend beyond the political cycle and 
be accountable to the stakeholders against the 
criteria laid down by them.
4. Acceptance that to work through these issues  
in various places requires a resourced, skilled and 
independent process to be put in train, and an 
action/learning/innovation framework to  
be established. 
In the Pilbara a valuable start has been made by the WA 
Government. Royalties for Regions is a unilateral (that 
is, State) policy which addresses the traditional failure to 
provide financial resources to regions sufficient to meet 
their legitimate needs and aspirations. Pilbara Cities is 
again a decision by the State to establish unilaterally a 
unifying vision going beyond ad hoc responses to particular 
issues. The next step is to ensure all governments and 
the different Pilbara communities are on the same page. 
And this cannot be done unilaterally. It needs the political 
leadership of all levels of government and the various 
elements of community in the Pilbara to agree to the need 
for the sort of approach set out above. A particular necessity 
is the incorporation of Aboriginal interests into this process 
through their established representative structures.
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In Central Australia the need for a unifying vision going 
beyond service provision and law and order and reliance 
on the boom and bust cycles of commodities, focused on 
development of capacity and economic livelihoods, regional 
connectivity and innovation is clear. Again with three levels 
of government, representative community organisations and 
a web of representative Aboriginal organisations the task is 
similar to that in the Pilbara but in different circumstances, 
as detailed in the report.
What is required is an intense regional engagement around
the issues in the region ●
what needs to happen at each level of government and  ●
of communities themselves
what are agreed objectives, what are we wanting   ●
to achieve
who is responsible for what tasks including keeping  ●
everyone on track over time
are the resources and capabilities matched to task ●
what structure will have the authority and legitimacy to  ●
maintain this approach over time
Such engagement is best mandated by political  
leadership but RAPAD is a reminder that a similar process 
can be used in a partnership between local governments  
and communities to achieve changes involving  
those participants.
The Groote Eylandt RPA is a working example of the 
application of some of the principles espoused in this report 
and is therefore a useful demonstration of the gains which 
can be made by going beyond attempts to coordinate or 
intervene. The Groote RPA is a positive example where 
COAG lessons learned and local place based approaches 
have been applied through the application of compacts and 
local resourcing. The process technique managed to get the 
critical players on the same page.
It accepts and endorses the legitimacy of the role of the  ●
three levels of government and of the Land Council and 
clarifies the mandate and financial obligations of each 
of them.
It has involved the resourcing of a dedicated secretariat  ●
to help drive implementation and the resourcing of 
the Land Council to engage external expertise when 
required to assist in settling and adjusting mandates 
through the different iterations of the agreement and 
dealing with problems among the participants  
(peace making).
It has provided a means of having accountability   ●
for outcomes.
It demonstrates that clarity of objectives and having  ●
shared objectives is a tool for improved performance at 
all levels.
This approach is demonstrated in more detail through 
provisional worked examples of the application of the 
principles and framework to develop possible options for 
governance reform in the Pilbara, and a context for regional 
engagement in Central Australia. 
These examples will be enhanced through further and wider 
public engagement to refine and alter the analysis. However, 
as written they demonstrate in a preliminary way how 
the principles and process outlined in the report might be 
applied if concerned stakeholders chose to mandate  
serious reform.
Policy development and administration for remote Australia 
is largely determined within State and Territory borders. 
As a result there is a fragmented approach. Major decisions 
affecting remote Australia are almost entirely made in 
capital and regional centres on the coast or in Canberra, with 
little understanding of its key drivers and its unique setting. 
Instead, strategic and context-specific action is required to 
achieve positive outcomes. There is a critical need for an 
on-going institution that has the mandate and authority 
to focus on remote Australia, change the dynamic of 
under-development that afflicts the region, and sustain 
a momentum for change and regional coordination that 
is specific to remote Australia—an Outback Commission 
by any other name.
The establishment of an overarching body such as this will 
take some time, and will no doubt be hotly contested. In 
the mean-time iterative reform and learning (innovation) 
can and should be pursued.  The principles and analysis 
outlined in this report can be applied at different places and 
levels, lessons learned and the approach refined, scaled and 
connected up. What is needed is a willingness to explore 
new approaches and perhaps make mistakes. Of course 
mistakes are presently being made as part of what is the 
‘normal way of doing things’, but the system is self-levelling 
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“If we cannot rise to the level of a justificatory narrative – if we 
lack the will to theorise our better instincts – then let us at least 
recall the well-documented cost of abandoning them.”100
and self-protecting. Learning from mistakes is innovation 
and true leadership and that is what is desperately needed 
in remote Australia. The compelling evidence of governance 
dysfunction in remote Australia demands this of the nation.  
National self-interest demands this of our governments.  
Local self-interest demands this of local leadership. The 
integrity of all individuals who could and should be part of 
the solution demands it.
It is easy politics to hide behind concepts of representational 
democracy and market economics and waive the needs of 
remote Australia in favour of the weight of public opinion 
and numbers in the serviced suburbs. For it is here where 
the majority of political leaders derive their authority and 
maintain their relevance. This type of neglectful inequality is 
corrosive for the nation and rots Australia from within.
Furthermore, the economic cost (a common “mainstream” 
criterion) of deferring action, or refusing to reform is 
nationally significant. Investment now with a view to 
avoiding vastly higher costs both in terms of addressing 
disadvantage and relocation is prudent and in the national 
interest. There are aspects of our national interest and 
identity that we lose by making the wrong decisions over 
and over again or by neglecting to make a decision at all.
For some the ‘failed state’ declaration for remote Australia in 
the 2008 remoteFOCUS Prospectus may have seemed “over 
the top”. But denial of the damage being done through the 
continuing failure of governance (despite good intentions) 
helps perpetuate an institutional and national indifference 
which creates despair and loss of hope for those impacted 
by that failure of governance.
And to choose indifference over reform is to become a 
bystander; to succumb to the fears and prejudices of a 
largely ignorant (of the problems in remote Australia) 
expatriate majority and relieve oneself of the burden of 
leadership and initiative. To not respond to evidence of 
persistent systemic failure is to effectively dispute that 
evidence, or to imply that a response would be of little or 
no consequence. Even worse, it is to suggest that the people 
of remote Australia are an electoral abstraction and not as 
important as people living in the populated cities along the 
coastal fringe.
It is not a case of whether or not we know what to do, 
but rather a case of having the collective will to do it. The 
market will not define the national interest in remote 
Australia and its peoples. Only political and civic leadership 
will drive the necessary reforms.
We know what this might cost but we don’t appear to yet 
know what this is worth as a nation.
Is the current governance of remote Australia good, or even 
adequate? We think not. Is it fair and just? We think not. Is 
it right, can Australia properly be a nation while there is this 
hole in our heartland? We think not.
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The next section of this report describes in a preliminary way how the 
principles and framework discussed in the remoteFOCUS report might be 
applied in developing governance options for the Pilbara. The following 
provisional example works through the six primary steps to establish the 
context; design parameters; principles, scope and mandate; functions; 
form; and accountabilities required to establish a governance design for 
the Pilbara.
We stress that the following proposal represents a tentative response. 
While we are totally committed to the finding that there needs to be a 
regional governance authority, many details about its precise role and 
functioning require more work than has been possible within the scope of 
this study. These details will be critical to the effectiveness of any agency 
—and the design needs to be consonant with the views of a complex 
array of stakeholders. That said, the following indicates the factors that 
we believe are essential and some suggestions about how these factors 
might be met. 
We have drawn on understandings gained from the many reports written 
about the Pilbara and the numerous Pilbara Dialogues and community 
consultations to demonstrate the logic that flows from the remoteFOCUS 
analysis. Clearly this option is subject to the caveat that further refinement 
would require a clear mandate and significantly more consultation with a 
wide range of stakeholders. 
It is important to note that the framework and the principles that 
underpin it should be the focus of further discussion rather than the 
specific items used in this example.
A more comprehensive version of this case study is found in the remoteFOCUS report 
Loyalty for Regions: Governance Reform in the Pilbara.
Case A. 
The Pilbara: An Option 
for Governance Reform
74 
The Pilbara has been historically and now almost entirely 
driven by economic imperatives rather than government 
imperatives and currently it is fair to say that government  
is in catch-up mode.
There is overwhelming community concern that rapid 
resource development, and in particular FIFO/DIDO 
workplace practices, has changed the nature of these 
communities and changed local community outcomes  
some of which are unsatisfactory.
In recognition of the pace of change, the longevity of 
the resources boom and the impact of that growth the 
WA Government, with some Commonwealth support 
has made significant commitments to community 
development including a revitalised vision for the Pilbara 
and intervention in the market. It has proclaimed two 
twin cities in the Pilbara together with other towns further 
inland. This vision is the first clear statement of a desired 
settlement pattern in the north by government since 
Premier Charles Court many years ago.
The WA government has completed a planning framework 
and has locked in budget and a limited amount of legal 
commitment through the Land Administration Act and 
Land Development Act.
The good intentions of the government are further 
evidenced by the investment in the Royalties for Regions 
funding in the Pilbara and is now evident in a range of 
infrastructure and social programs in the Pilbara. Most 
parties, however, would agree that the pace of change and 
the depth of demand for services and housing, particularly, 
mean there is a significant degree of catch-up required. 
This process is expected to finish in 2035. We infer that in 
order to achieve this outcome, institutional structures of a 
similar commitment and longevity will need to be in place 
to accompany this vision.
Local authority has been developed, albeit on a limited 
scale, through the appointment of a general manager 
to Pilbara Cities, the development of the WA Planning 
Framework and the work of the Pilbara  
Development Commission.
The Commonwealth government relies on RDA Pilbara to 
plan and engage on a regional basis, while Infrastructure 
Australia examines opportunities to contribute to major 
strategic infrastructure projects.
Consistent advice from people living in the region and 
working in regional institutions is that outside of the 
negotiations between resource companies, native-title 
holding groups and the WA Government on land issues 
there has been a failure to bring Aboriginal people into 
meaningful partnerships that will ensure they receive the 
full benefit of the Pilbara vision and opportunity. This is 
potentially a serious and chronic problem for all the parties. 
Changes cannot just be dictated by government. How the 
people of the Pilbara resolve the coexisting realities of 
Aboriginal people with entrenched legal and communal 
rights (and income streams and land holdings) and specific 
identities determined by culture and contract, and the 
desire of these same groups of people wishing to derive 
normal citizenship benefits as individuals from services 
provided by government will be an ongoing challenge. 
Whether the people of the Pilbara have a governance 
structure that enables them to meet this challenge is also an 
open question.101
Aboriginal people have a significant role to play if the vision 
is to be achieved. They hold substantial native title rights 
to land across the Pilbara, and they will lock in substantial 
income in the form of communal royalty equivalents from 
these rights.
A.1 Context
What are the issues in the region? This covers the key social, 
economic, demographic, governance or other features which 
underwrite the need for focused regional action and which 
need to inform the governance design.
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Our earlier analysis has shown that in areas where there 
is a contest for resources, the agreement and negotiating 
process actually reinforces individual and communal 
identities and rivalries. In a context of continuing economic 
change, there will be conflicts between and within 
Aboriginal groups and between Aboriginal groups, resource 
companies and government which will need to be resolved 
in a permanent and relatively workable way. 
There are examples of workable structures in which 
Aboriginal people have worked their way through 
analogous issues. This is exemplified in the formation of 
the Pilbara Indigenous Marine Reference Group in the 
Pilbara.102 The RPA development on Groote Eylandt103 is 
a more systematic and long term example of a workable 
outcome. In both cases, people and governments have been 
united through finding common objectives and purpose, 
defined responsibilities, defined resource commitments for 
all parties and defined timelines for action.
Agreements that involve directed compensation or royalty 
equivalent payments to restricted outcomes can ultimately 
be detrimental to the quality of governance arrangements 
which will be necessary to sustain a Pilbara Cities vision.  
Agreements that restrict or reduce capacity to decide what 
to do potentially limit the growth of good governance 
among Aboriginal people.
Local government is under-resourced for the challenges that 
it faces. Its capacity to generate revenue through property 
taxes is limited. This is because the resource companies 
engage through a state agreement process currently leaving 
local shires unable to rate the land resource companies 
develop for their operations. In this context, local shires 
must seek support from individual resource companies by 
‘grace and favour’, not by right. 
Current institutional structures are not effective or 
legitimate in either containing or resolving a productive 
contest on the geographic scale of the Pilbara because no 
single existing authority is mandated to act in the best 
interests of the Pilbara as a whole.
Given the various stakeholders who need to be engaged and the likely form that key 
pressures will take, any governance response in the Pilbara will need the capacity to:
Establish a shared vision between governments and communities, ●
Negotiate compacts that provide clear mandate of   ●
responsibilities and a common platform for accountability at all 
levels of governance,
Foster place-centred solutions and regional innovations, and ●
Ensure resourcing for functional capacity. ●
A.2 Design Parameters
Which agencies currently are/or are not responsible? Based 
on the present governance arrangements and other specific 
features set forth in the context, these express the key 
conditions which need to be met if a regional governance 
design is to be effective.
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The governance body should endure over time and beyond political cycles. It should 
have a specific charter which empowers it to pursue:
Social and economic benefits for the people of the Pilbara in  ●
balance with both the national and wider state-based interest,
Social inclusion and equity across the Pilbara where Aboriginal  ●
people are integral not an add-on,
Coordinated multi sector responses to economic and social change, ●
Mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability both  ●
‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’,
Coordinated multi-level responses to the contest of interests  ●
within and between government, business and Aboriginal interests,
Environmentally and socially sustainable strategies for the Pilbara,  ●
and
Practice subsidiarity to the optimum obtainable degree. ●
A.3 Principles, Scope and Mandate 
What is agreed as the benchmarks for success? These describe 
the broad outcomes for the region that need to be realised 
through the governance design.
There are six main functions that should be undertaken 
by such a body.
Maintaining and promoting the Pilbara  ●
narrative,
Brokering and settling agreements (peace- ●
making where agreement is not possible),
Clarifying the mandates of all levels of  ●
government and communities,
Clarifying outcomes and service standards  ●
appropriate to place and scale,
Matters on notice—anticipating,  ●
researching, monitoring, planning and 
developing strategy, and
Conducting reviews and reporting, ongoing  ●
governance review and action learning.
An important unresolved issue concerns the role of this 
putative organisation in managing funding (or pooled 
funding) in relation to ongoing operations. Our view would 
be that operational delivery and funding disputes will 
undermine the legitimacy of the body to achieve its five 
main functions. The functions undertaken by this body 
should not be in competition with other institutions with 
specific service delivery requirements.
Through its strategic, synthesising and coordinating role, 
it would however have an authority that would enable it 
to shape the nature of the funding recommendations and 
the delivery of those services by external agencies in the 
interests of the Pilbara.
A.4 Functions
Function refers to the specific role(s) that need to be assigned 
to realise these outcomes.
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The two key aspects of the form of this body relate to how 
it is constituted legally and who owns it. The overriding 
condition that must be met is that the people (board 
members/trustees/directors) who govern the body are ‘above 
the contest’.
It would be up to the various stakeholders to determine 
whether this could best be achieved through a legislated 
commission or authority or through a company 
established under the Corporations Act as a company 
wholly owned by the members along the lines of the RAPAD 
example, or through some other legal mechanism.
The term of people appointed to the ‘board’ of the new 
body should be for a longer period than the normal political 
cycle and the characteristics of the board members should 
align closely with the functions and mandate of the body.
The number of people appointed to the body should be 
smaller rather than being fully representative of a range of 
Pilbara interest, possibly 5-7 people.
In addition to the people who reside in the Pilbara, the 
natural interest groups who might comprise the membership 
are the federal, state, and local government structures that 
already exist. We have also argued that the Aboriginal 
interest in the region is deserving of its own recognition and 
will require appropriate negotiated processes to achieve  
full participation.
If these groups formed the natural constituency of 
interest in a new governance body to achieve an above-the-
contest outcome, it is essential that the people appointed 
to run the body who are not representative of their direct 
interests but charged to serve the interests of the Pilbara 
plus other wider interests.
The governance of the body would be driven by a charter 
or set of rules that constrained the board or trustees to act 
only in the best interests of the Pilbara and its peoples. 
We acknowledge that at times this would leave this body 
in conflict with one or a number of its members and their 
accountabilities, however, resolving contests would be a 
principal role of the new body.
The body would be serviced by a secretariat and access to 
a network that would facilitate tasking and engagement of 
other actors in the region.
Budget and resources to fund the governance body 
could well be found within existing arrangements, noting, 
again, that resourcing must follow function and a level of 
funding certainty will be essential for success.
In order to be legitimate the body needs to be located in 
the Pilbara although in the early years it will no doubt 
be necessary to have a node in Perth (this has significant 
human and financial resource implications).
A.5 Form
This covers the specific governance design, the shape, 
jurisdiction, powers, responsibilities and resources available to 
an institution. A.
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Both ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’ accountability 
arrangements need to be defined. ‘Upwards’ accountabilities 
will be to various federal and state political and 
administrative authorities and agencies; ‘downwards’ 
accountabilities will be between the existing and/or 
putative regional structures and relevant local government, 
community and other representative bodies and 
organisations and to local people.
With the overriding charter to act in the best interests 
of the Pilbara, the body will be required to influence 
Commonwealth agencies having interests and programs 
in the region, state agencies operating in the region and 
local and regional shires and regional authorities including 
Aboriginal organisations responsible for local outcomes.
In addition to the four shire institutions, the Pilbara 
Regional Council, Pilbara Development Commission, Office 
of Pilbara Cities, RDA Pilbara, share an interest and would 
require a relationship with the new body.
A critical issue is that a new governance body would require 
mandated authority to act and an ability to achieve the 
outcomes in the best interests of the Pilbara.
Accountability, ideally, might be through a reporting 
mechanism such as a joint (federal-state) parliamentary 
committee or through an auditor-general model. This 
would ensure that the body was accountable to the  
public in general but only when judged against its Charter 
or mandate.
To be effective this body must be capable of influencing the 
direction of expenditure and performance outcomes across 
each level of government and at local government level. It 
must also be capable of negotiating with the private sector 
to obtain an optimal alignment of interests. Unless the body 
can hold those responsible for expenditure of such funds 
accountable through some mechanism then it will not be 
able to achieve the mandate it has been set.
A.6 Authorities and 
Accountabilities
This covers the specific authority that is assigned to the 
coordinating organisation. For example, does it have political 
standing or is it a composite of other authorities, albeit one 
with independent standing, mission and roles. 
A
.6 A
U
T
H
O
R
IT
IE
S  
&
 A
C
C
O
U
N
TA
BILIT
IE
S
79 remoteFOCUS | Fixing the Hole in Australia’s Heartland 79 
Political leadership at all levels will have to mandate 
change based on:
1. Acceptance that the standard concerns 
set out in the report are based on reality 
and that more of the same will produce 
more of the same and therefore a changed 
approach to how government operates  
is needed.
2. Acceptance that 
if the three levels of government and   ●
the communities (Aboriginal and  
non-Aboriginal alike) are working at  
cross purposes success is impossible 
because goals are different, 
if members of the communities disagree  ●
with or do not support what governments 
are trying to do wicked problems (health 
education employment) will not be solved
in remote Australia government is the  ●
main provider of an economy (as against 
having some industries and particularly 
mining which do not of themselves ensure 
an economy as against having an industry), 
and 
different rules may need to be established  ●
for application in the Pilbara, recognising 
the market distortion and other unique 
operational realities 
3. Acceptance that there is a need to have;
shared goals (vision) based on a shared  ●
understanding of context and shared or 
agreed outcomes 
clarity of mandates, ie an  ●
acknowledgement of roles and 
responsibilities of  each level of 
government and key community elements 
including Aboriginal communities.
funding and capability which   ●
matches mandates.
ability to adjust mandates and settle  ●
disputes over time as no arrangements  
will be perfect and circumstances  
will change.
an ability to look after all the above   ●
across the political cycle and according to 
agreed principles.
a body or agency authorised by the  ●
different levels of government and the 
community to keep the ring on all of the 
above otherwise left to themselves the 
different levels of government will revert 
to the norm and act in their separate 
interests and in the interest of regions 
beyond the Pilbara. 
appointments to lead such a body  ●
or agency that are authoritative by 
nature of those appointed rather than 
representative. Such appointments should 
extend beyond the political cycle and be 
accountable to the stakeholders against 
the criteria laid down by them.
4. Acceptance that to work through these 
issues in the Pilbara requires a resourced, 
skilled and independent process to be put 
in train, and an action/learning/innovation 
framework to be established. 
A.7 The Pilbara Challenge
The test of whether new arrangements will improve 
governance in the Pilbara is that any newly created body 
has the authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy that allow it to 
respond to the nature and pace of change in the Pilbara and the 
contest of positions in response to change.
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In the Pilbara a valuable start has been made by the WA 
Government. Royalties for Regions is a unilateral (that 
is, State) policy which addresses the traditional failure to 
provide financial resources to regions sufficient to meet 
their legitimate needs and aspirations. Pilbara Cities is again 
a decision by the State to establish unilaterally a unifying 
vision going beyond ad hoc responses to particular issues.  
The next step is to build loyalty to the region 
—to ensure state and local governments and the different 
Pilbara communities are on the same page—but this cannot 
be done unilaterally. It needs the political leadership of 
each level of government and the various elements of 
community in the Pilbara to agree to the need for the 
sort of approach set out above. Of particular concern is 
the incorporation of Aboriginal interests into this process 
through their established representative structures.
Such a body would need, by its composition and legal 
structure, to be above the contest and endure over time.
It may be possible to achieve this outcome through an 
adjustment of some existing structures, however, we would 
argue that the mandate and function proposed for such a 
governance body suggest a fresh start should be made.
An appropriate discussion of possible new governance 
arrangements which are sufficiently open to new evidence 
and new concepts, are serial and sufficiently sustained, and 
are not immediately politicised is, to say the least, very 
difficult in the present government policy system.
The integration of legitimate national, state and local 
interests through structural reform is unlikely to emerge 
from the public sector or conventional legislative processes. 
In fact, we argue, such efforts are negated by present 
governance arrangements.
The reality is that without a mandate for change from 
senior office holders in the Western Australia and 
potentially the Commonwealth, such reform will be difficult 
to achieve. Also, a reasonable level of cross party support in 
the early stages of development will be necessary to ensure 
the durability of the body.
Only political leadership, such as that which 
produced an initiative and policy shift like 
Royalties for Regions in WA aimed at systemic 
change to the way government makes 
decisions, operates and is accountable, will 
take us beyond a ‘we-must-try-harder’ mantra 
without regard to the efficacy of the system 
itself. This cannot be driven from within  
the bureaucracy, which is constituted within 
the status quo and bound by its rules. Political 
leadership needs to come to the conclusion 
that there is a system problem not a  
policy problem.
Reform of this nature and scope will not be easy, nor will 
it be uniform. In some situations people will have to use 
existing legislation and organisational resources to initiate a 
start to reform. 
Reform will be problematic unless the incorporation of 
Aboriginal perspectives is a non-negotiable condition 
precedent. Inadequate and inconsistent resourcing of 
Aboriginal organisations and government agencies tasked 
with engaging in partnership with Aboriginal people 
will hinder attempts to improve governance design in 
the Pilbara. A prerequisite would be resourcing both 
government and Aboriginal organisations and communities 
of Aboriginal people were resourced to enable them to 
pursue partnership and greater understanding of the 
benefits and requirements of governance reform.
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One approach would be high-level political support to 
establish a Pilbara trial where the principles and approach 
outlined in the report are applied, with the specific aim of 
developing an on-going process of learning, consensus and 
regional capacity building—a starting point with a defined 
scale and scope. This will build momentum for change as 
required and potentially provide “proof by good example” 
of the efficacy of such change. 
Irrespective of the starting point, the remoteFOCUS report 
establishes a number of clear criteria, including vision, 
authority, legitimacy and effectiveness against which 
reforms at any level can be evaluated.
Is there a capacity to have a guiding  ●
vision or narrative that gives direction 
and explains the actions of all levels of 
government, that is, a shared vision?
Is there a capacity to settle mandates? ●
Is there a capacity to match mandates with  ●
funding and resources?
Is there local accountability within the  ●
various administrative structures?
Is there a capacity to review and adapt  ●
mandates as experience accumulates and 
learnings develop?
Is there a body that is above the contest,  ●
authorised by the players to be responsible 
to oversee all of the above?
At the level of community the concerns expressed in this 
report need to be articulated in localised contexts across 
the Pilbara. The voices of community legitimise concerns 
for politicians to respond to. In their own way community 
concerns provide the mandate for political leadership.
Continuing community articulation of why their concerns 
persist and how the current system of governance  
appears unable to resolve these concerns is a fundamental 
condition precedent to establishing a mood and appetite for 
positive reform.
It is now not a case of not knowing what to do, rather a 
case of having the collective will to do it. Only political and 
civic leadership will drive the necessary reforms.
A
.7
 T
H
E
 P
IL
BA
R
A
  
C
H
A
LL
E
N
G
E
82 
83 remoteFOCUS | Fixing the Hole in Australia’s Heartland 83
In Central Australia there is a clear need 
for a unifying vision that goes beyond 
service provision and law and order and 
reliance on the boom and bust cycles of 
commodities. A vision focused at least 
in part on development of capacity and 
economic livelihoods, regional connectivity 
and innovation. Again with three levels of 
government, representative community 
organisations, a business community 
and a web of representative Aboriginal 
organisations the task is formidable.
What is required is an intense regional engagement 
around the key social, economic, demographic, 
governance or other features which underwrite the need 
for focused regional action and which need to inform the 
governance design. The process needs to confirm:
the issues in the region ●
what needs to happen at each level of  ●
government and of communities themselves
what are agreed objectives, what are we wanting  ●
to achieve
who is responsible for what tasks including  ●
keeping everyone on track over time
are the resources and capabilities matched   ●
to task
what structure will have the authority and  ●
legitimacy to maintain this approach over time
An appropriate discussion of possible new governance 
arrangements needs to be open to new evidence and  
new concepts. It needs to be sustained and not 
immediately politicised. 
The following is one possible context statement for 
Central Australia that might begin that conversation. 
Whilst it has a high degree of relevance, it is provided 
here not because it is the only context statement that 
could be generated but to highlight the need for a 
productive engagement across the whole community 
over a longer period of time to generate a more common 
understanding of both the context and the key conditions 
which need to be met if a regional governance design is 
to be effective. The very fact that the reader may disagree 
with this preliminary context statement highlights the 
importance of people developing together a reasonably 
shared understanding of the context before they proceed 
to the next steps required to build up the most suitable 
governance structures for their region.
The remoteFOCUS project was not resourced to conduct 
the full engagement necessary to provide a more 
definitive context statement or to progress to laying 
out design parameters required of better governance 
arrangements, or the principles, scope and mandate 
of any new structures, or its functions, form, or its 
authorities and accountabilities. However the following 
is provided as a preliminary overview, after which some 
next steps are suggested.
Case B. 
Central Australia: Context for 
Governance Reform
84 
It covers 64% of the NT and contains 24% of the population. ●
As a region, Central Australia has an estimated regional population of  ●
48,000 people including 28,000 in Alice Springs, 3,500 in Tennant Creek 
and 8,137 in the Barkly Shire, 4,887 in the Central Desert Shire and 
7,322 in the MacDonnell Shire.
Its broad-based and relatively fragile economy has always been subject  ●
to fluctuations of the seasons and decision-making taken in places well 
removed from Central Australia. 
A social profile of the region reflects a political landscape that has  ●
effectively driven Aboriginal people away from major urban centres 
through: 
	 	 •	The	post-war	assimilation	investments	in	government	communities,	and	
	 	 •	The	Aboriginal	desire	to	be	close	to	Country,	and	
	 	 •	The	response	to	the	granting	of	land	rights	and	native	title.
This settlement pattern reflects a response to the longstanding and still  ●
current intercultural tension of:
	 	 •	Pastoralists	needing	land	and	waterholes,	
	 	 •	Tourists	needing	services	and	first-class	accommodation,	
	 	 •	A	government	class	seeking	to	create	public	order	and	moderate	the		 	
      contest of values and land uses, and 
	 	 •	Aboriginal	people	asserting	their	desire	to	sustain	strong	linkages	to	land		
      and culture, and enjoying citizen’s rights.
B.1 Context
Central Australia is a product of its history, its geography and 
its peoples. 
These core elements of settlement in Central Australia are 
now undergoing significant adjustment. Unlike the Pilbara, 
where the drive is from the expansion in the resources 
sector, the drive is from largely Commonwealth and 
Territory-led reforms of Aboriginal policy and significant 
financial investment in those reforms accompanied by a 
hope that the resources sector will also land in the Centre 
or that tourism will return if the dollar drops. Given the 
political profile of Central Australia, the normal processes 
of democratic government are unlikely to resolve the 
underlying structural divisions exacerbated by these 
reforms. The region is in a state of economic transition.
Alice Springs is the major centre for the regional economy. 
The town has the range of infrastructure and services 
expected in a regional centre and its local economic base—
government services (Aboriginal administration, health and 
defence related services), tourism, retail, transport and some 
manufacturing and pastoral and an expanding  
mining sector. 
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It is the service hub for the communities of Central Australia   ●
plus the eastern part of Western Australia and the top of  
South Australia. 
It supplies services not available in any other town within a 1500km  ●
radius and is headquarters for two of the three shires in the region.
Tennant Creek’s population has decreased by 9% from 1996 to 2008  ●
with an Aboriginal population in the Barkly Shire of 50% and 24% of 
the Aboriginal population below the age of 20 years with only 6% of the 
non-Aboriginal population under 20 years. 
Projections have 5,000 Aboriginal people in the Barkly 
Shire and about 2,000 non-Aboriginal people. These 
demographic projections sit uncomfortably with the fact 
there are currently 171 businesses in Tennant Creek, 71% 
of businesses are locally owned but only 14% are owned by 
Aboriginal people or organisations. It would appear there 
needs to be a significant uptake of business by Aboriginal 
people if the local economy and local services are to  
be sustained.
Mining produces the biggest share of Gross Regional Product 
(GRP) in Central Australia including in the Barkly Shire but 
doesn’t employ many people. The other larger government, 
health and community services sectors employ more people 
locally but they only represent about 9% of businesses. By 
far the largest number of businesses are in the property and 
retail area though these contribute little to GRP.
Twenty-four per cent of the Barkly regional population 
receive either Centrelink or Job Services network benefits.
Despite having an unemployment rate of just 2.5%, Alice 
Springs has a two-track economy where the unemployment 
rate for Aboriginal people sits at 14.2%. 
Recent investment of the NT and Commonwealth 
governments in Aboriginal communities and town camps 
in Alice Springs and Tennant Creek Transition Plans have 
delivered a significant economic stimulus into the region.
The economic base of the region is currently precariously 
positioned and dependent on future government 
investment. The significant mining opportunities 
traditionally contribute to the boom and bust nature of the 
centre whereas tourism and the provision of services to 
Aboriginal people have made a more consistent contribution 
to the region’s growth. Failure to understand this would 
be a significant impediment to current policy reform. The 
recent rise in the Australian dollar has impacted on tourism 
and this fact in concert with changed policy settings in 
Aboriginal affairs have created increased uncertainty in 
Central Australia.
Rolf Gerritsen, a Central Australian economist,  ●
estimates that if Aboriginal people were 
suddenly extracted from Central Australia the 
Alice Springs economy would shrink by 40% 
and there would be widespread out-migration 
of non-Aboriginal people.
This is an indication of interdependency  ●
of the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
populations, and the degree of dependence 
of Aboriginal people, the Central Australian 
communities and NT Government on  
national funding.
The dilemma for all governments is that the  ●
pressure for Aboriginal people to move to find 
employment and services either has them 
converging on the hub or migrating further 
south to large coastal cities. 
If a consequence of these initiatives is to  ●
depopulate the remote regions of Australia 
matters of national strategic interest need to 
be weighed carefully and governments need 
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to have large programs to house, educate, 
and employ people in the immigration towns 
with little immediate capacity to fit easily into 
urban living.
Whilst the population estimates for Alice Springs have 
shown a recent increase they mask a decline in the non 
Aboriginal population (by 6% 2001-06) and an increase of 
in migration of Aboriginal people responding to restrictions 
in outlying communities and seeking opportunities and 
services available in Alice Springs.
One of the challenges for Alice Springs is to  ●
build and sustain a workforce in a community 
which has a high turnover and recent decline 
in population.
A significant adjustment would occur if  ●
government or defence retreated from the 
region. The Commonwealth has already 
shown it is disengaging with direct contact in 
Aboriginal communities.
Surviving off these longer-term investments  ●
are something like 1,800 businesses. 
79% are micro or small businesses. ●
83% of these businesses are reliant on other  ●
external government investment and the 
transient population (transaction costs of 
mobility) for their survival.
These are largely property and business  ●
services, construction, retail and transport 
and storage. The value of the most numerous 
businesses is not reflective of the business 
contribution to GRP.
The region is heavily dependent on  ●
government investment and public funds 
transfers with 35% of the region’s population 
drawing Centrelink or Job Services  
network benefits.
The failure or inability of current governance arrangements 
to resolve the differences in values, ideas and land uses that 
have been at the heart of the intercultural space in Central 
Australia still challenge the region today. 
The dominance of Aboriginal issues has left  ●
the region without the capacity to tackle some 
of the future challenges. Nor has it allowed 
the region to develop the types of institutions 
that will enable contested views to be 
resolved over time.
Another contest that remains unresolved is  ●
the relationship between the different levels 
of government and the shuffling of mandates 
and the lack of clarity around longer term 
directions for the region. 
The difficulties and underfunding of new  ●
shire arrangements and the separation of the 
largely Aboriginal interests into the shires as 
differentiated from the Municipality of Alice 
Springs is a further example of the failure to 
fully engage and respect the region as a total 
system rather than two systems requiring two 
systems of governance.
At all levels of government there appears to  ●
be no one person or department responsible 
for taking an overview or a holistic view 
of the impact of change on the region: a 
view that examines the impact on business, 
environment and Aboriginal and non 
Aboriginal people who have invested in  
the region.
Local political realities in Central Australia are such that it 
is the large number of small business people (who often do 
not necessarily share either the values of Aboriginal people 
or of the pastoralists and land managers who are involved in 
the contest over land use), who are the group who influence 
political response and who generally support the policing or 
strategic intervention approach to stabilise the community 
in the short run rather than the more time and relationship 
intensive activities that engage Aboriginal people and build 
community institutions that can deal with and govern the 
contest of views.
In this contest, government has increasingly  ●
assumed an executive role and adopted a 
managerial response but invariably that is 
a controlling role and it has distanced the 
community from the setting of policy. 
Executive government has used its power to  ●
take charge of delivery of service in order to 
improve human development indicators. It is 
now able to influence consumption, spending 
and security of individuals.
A trade-off in this whole-of-government and  ●
strategic intervention approach is that the 
community has been largely disempowered 
and the way government has gone about 
procuring services in support of this approach 
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leaves little room for local suppliers to be 
innovative. Without that local innovation the 
adequacy of the measures in a sustainable 
sense are questionable.
There are also significant spill over effects in the region.
Local institutions have become overloaded  ●
or where they have contested the executive 
approach been underfunded and disappeared. 
There has been an expectation created that  ●
the Shires will assume greater responsibility 
for the small communities abandoned by the 
Commonwealth and the NT Government as 
they consolidate their growth towns and hub 
and spoke models of service delivery. 
The interventions have seen an increase in  ●
seeing development of the region in  
security terms both in terms of active law 
and order cries within Alice Springs and 
the policing of pornography and alcohol in 
outlying communities.
In summary, it could be argued that the executive policy 
reforms increased rather than decreased marginalisation  
and typecast Aboriginal peoples’ responses to the changed 
policy environment.
The managerial responses have mixed legitimacy among 
the people they are directed at and this has provided for 
contested and turbulent responses among some Aboriginal 
people and among the non Aboriginal population of central 
Australia with a consequent loss of hard won social capital. 
For more remote people it has created a feeling of despair 
and torpor.104
The current Federal Government has renewed interest in 
regional Australia and has developed a large mix of specific 
programs. The challenge for governance reform is how to 
ensure these investments work in the best interests of  
the region.
Government has demonstrated its good intentions through 
a long-term commitment to targets to ‘Close the Gaps’ in 
a specific number of areas. This commitment has financial 
commitment, a commitment to be strategic and coordinated 
not only within the Commonwealth agencies but also 
between the Commonwealth and the Territory.
Executive control of housing, welfare and security 
services and social security payments complemented 
by the placement of government business managers 
in communities and adjusting the role of the Regional 
Indigenous Coordination Centres all point to a strong 
commitment by government.
However, returns from this endeavour appear patchy and, 
whilst improvements are noted, they are often ephemeral or 
are outpaced by even more significant improvement in the 
same indicator among non-Aboriginal populations. In that 
sense, gap closing may be a problematic measure.
There is a growing agreement within government that 
training of staff in community development techniques 
would be desirable and greater community engagement and 
meaningful consultation and negotiation would also assist in 
achieving government and community objectives however, 
there is currently no program to support this. This position 
is further developed in the remoteFOCUS submission 
to the Senate Committee Stronger Futures Inquiry– 
submission 373.105
What is clear from the remoteFOCUS work is that despite 
a uniformity of analysis of what needs to be done and 
recognition at the highest levels that current outcomes are 
problematic, the system of government appears unable to 
make the necessary systemic adjustments. On our analysis 
many areas of current systems and practices need to be 
addressed systemically.
It is clear that innovative economic policy  ●
rather than a singular focus on improved 
subsidies, welfare and services must be at the 
heart of policy on Central Australia.
Economic policy requires more from  ●
government than setting macro-economic 
conditions—it needs to become an active 
partner in business/livelihood with 
community and private sector and it needs to 
be prepared to be innovative—more of the 
same regional development will not work.
Agglomeration, regional integration,  ●
and regional connectivity are keys to an 
innovative response in Central Australia.
Government could stimulate capacity in  ●
Central Australia though micro-economic 
reform including adoption of more innovative 
regional and procurement policies.
The current arrangements comprising three  ●
tiers of government and a series of ad hoc 
regional arrangements overshadowed by 
localised law and order concerns, appear to be 
incapable of resolving both the priorities and 
the contests that need to take place around 
these arrangements.
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The structure and configuration of institutions  ●
across central Australia are, therefore, largely 
not fit for purpose.
Failure to innovate is most marked in the  ●
public sector.
For Central Australia, the national debate  ●
over rights and responsibilities of Aboriginal 
people and the general question of citizen 
rights and equity for all Australians has 
created service expectations that cannot be 
fiscally sustained in this region.
There are a number of inherent contradictions within the 
current policy mix impacting on Central Australia. 
1. There is a lack of clarity of national 
purpose as to whether Aboriginal people 
can pursue cultural difference and whether 
as a result the nation is prepared to 
respect Aboriginal difference and allow 
a future for remote settlements that that 
difference reflects. At a more nuanced 
level what cultural difference is Australia 
prepared to accept, support and fund.
2. As a consequence we currently have an 
unworkable settlement strategy in Central 
Australia where the hub and spoke service 
model of the growth towns strategy and 
the abandonment of homelands by the 
Commonwealth set a default policy of 
population movement to large regional 
centres without regard to economic issues 
and being indifferent to the consequences 
for a range of other employment and 
human service outcomes that result from 
such mass mobility.
3. Central Australia has an inadequate 
economic base to support the 
infrastructure requirements and the 
recurrent effects of such a de facto de-
population strategy. Fiscal federalism 
allows the Territory government to 
apply revenue assessed by the Grants 
Commission against needs of remote 
communities to be allocated independently 
of those community needs.
4. The governance arrangements in Central 
Australia with elements of Commonwealth 
disengagement and a distant and largely  
over-stretched Territory government and 
grossly underfunded local governments 
means there is no effective or legitimate 
means to address concerns unless the 
Commonwealth invests significantly 
in regional renewal and alternative 
governance outcomes. This disengagement 
means that many of the elements of civic 
life normally present in a community are 
not evident in remote communities.
5. Targets for change have been elusive and, 
in hindsight, judged chronically inadequate 
and opportunistic, chasing new projects or 
hoping for mining to arrive or commodity 
prices to increase. The employment targets 
required will require more than reliance 
on markets if government is to sustain 
any improvement in human development 
indicators.
The response to these five concerns has been a managerial 
response that in ways unintended simply reproduces  
the problems.
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One approach would be the establishment of a regional innovation trial where the principles 
and approach outlined in the report are applied, with the specific aim of developing an on-
going process of learning, consensus and regional capacity building—a starting point with a 
defined scale and scope. This will build momentum for change as required and potentially 
provide “proof by good example” of the efficacy of such change. 
The mix of economic and social issues evident in this context for Central Australia suggest 
a more systemic and holistic response is required to establish a platform for shared 
accountability and future development of the region. Regional connectedness and learning 
are part of the innovation process as proximity is a trigger for innovation.
The remoteFOCUS report suggests that place centred approaches and regional innovation 
strategies provide an effective mechanism for engaging the community and confirming the 
views of the multiple stakeholders required to create a shared vision. We are of the view that 
in order to be systemic this vision has to encompass the whole of Central Australia rather 
than a mere focus on Alice Springs.
Innovation in its broadest sense involves creating new ideas, and diffusing them into 
economies, driving changes which improve welfare and create economic growth. It is also 
increasingly dependent on interpersonal relationships as ideas develop within networks 
seeking solutions to particular problems. Where innovation takes place these relationships 
shape informal cultures and formal institutions to create more conducive environments for 
particular kinds of innovation. There is also a territorial dimension to innovation because 
innovation relationships depend on proximity for interaction and geographical proximity 
can allow actors to interact more easily.106
Irrespective of the starting point, the remoteFOCUS report establishes a number of clear 
criteria, including vision, authority, legitimacy and effectiveness against which reforms at 
any level can be evaluated.
Is there a capacity to have a guiding vision or narrative that gives  ●
direction and explains the actions of all levels of government, that is, a 
shared vision?
Is there a capacity to settle mandates? ●
Is there a capacity to match mandates with funding and resources? ●
B.2 Next Steps: Towards 
Governance Reform in  
Central Australia
What might then be the basis for a discussion around a new 
governance reform in Central Australia and what mechanisms 
might be used to facilitate that discussion?
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Is there local accountability within the various administrative structures? ●
Is there a capacity to review and adapt mandates as experience  ●
accumulates and learnings develop?
Is there a body that is above the contest, authorised by the players to be  ●
responsible to oversee all of the above?
The current three-tiered system of government fails to do this adequately in Central 
Australia. Land Councils and Native Title Bodies provide effectively a fourth tier of 
governance adding to the complexity of arrangements.
The test of whether new arrangements are possible in Central Australia is that the process 
of developing an innovation strategy is able to determine what type of regional  
governance arrangement will have the authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy to  
respond to the nature and pace of change in Central Australia and deliver on a regional 
innovation strategy.
Working through these issues requires a resourced, skilled and independent process to be 
put in train, and an action/learning/innovation framework to be established. It will also 
require a commitment from each level of government and leading Aboriginal organisations 
and the Land Council and Native Title Bodies.
We know that more of the same will produce more of the same and therefore a changed 
approach to how government operates is needed. We accept that: 
if the three levels of government and the community(ies) are working at  ●
cross purposes success is impossible because goals are different, 
if members of the communities disagree with or do not support what  ●
governments are trying to do wicked problems (health education 
employment) will not be solved
in Central Australia government is the main provider of an economy   ●
(as against having some industries and particularly mining which do not 
of themselves ensure an economy as against having an industry), and 
in the short term the pressure of change may require unique   ●
operational realities. 
As we noted in the Pilbara option, it is now not a case of not knowing what to do, rather a 
case of having the collective will to do it. Only political and civic leadership will drive the 
necessary reforms.
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Dr Diane Smith, Dr Mark Stafford Smith, The Hon Tom 
Stephens MLA, Dr Bruce Walker, Neil Westbury PSM,  
Ben Wyatt MLA.  
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Geoscience Australia, Australian Operating Mines Map, 12. 
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Stutsel, Melanie. (2008) “Resource Development in Desert 13. 
Australia”, Director Environmental and Social Policy, 
Minerals Council of Australia, Speech to 2008 Desert 
Knowledge Symposium, Alice Springs 5th November 2008.
Dillon, Michael and Neil Westbury, 2007, Beyond Humbug, 14. 
transforming government engagement with Indigenous 
Australia, South Australia: Seaview Press p.35).
Brett, Judith. ‘Fair Share: Country and City in Australia’ 15. 
Quarterly Essay, Issue 42, 2011, p52. 
This thinking is demonstrated in the remoteFOCUS 16. 
responses to the Stronger Futures Inquiry – submission 
373 (www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/
Senate_Committees?url=clac_ctte/strong_future_nt_11/
submissions.htm) as well as the recent FIFO/DIDO 
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For a sensitive discussion of the complexity of choice in 18. 
an Aboriginal context, particularly the tensions between 
individualist and collectivist patterns, see for example Tim 
Rowse (2002); also Pearson. 
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